Mrs. Dorris Jenkins, who taught history, said that she had two ambitions in life. One was to be in a footnote. That had already happened, since a former student had put her in a footnote to his dissertation. The other was to have a student become a philosopher. Although at the time I was still thinking that I wanted to go into archaeology, I had started studying philosophy, so I asked her exactly what it would take for her to consider that a student had become a philosopher. She was uncompromising: The criterion was a Ph.D. in Philosophy.
My last semester in high school, Mrs. Jenkins organized a debate team, which I joined. But she died suddenly that very term. I didn't go into philosophy because of that, but it did seem like a very serious portent. There would be no other students after me who might become philosophers. And that, as it happened, is what I did. The following dissertation is finally how I got the Ph.D., and there did not seem to be a more appropriate dedication than to the teacher whose final ambition was thus fulfilled.
C.G. Jung (1875-1961), "The Transcendent Function," in The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Vol. 8 Collected Works, Bollingen Series XX, Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 69-91.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), "Of the right of pure reason to an extension in its practical use which is not possible to it in its speculative use," Critique of Practical Reason, The Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobs-Merrill, New York, 1956, pp. 52-59.
Ibid. p. 166.
Kant, "The autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality," Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobs-Merrill, New York, 1959, p. 59.
Kant, "Of the division of philosophy" etc., Critique of Judgment, Hafner Library of Classics, New York, 1951, pp. 7-15.
Jakob Fries (1773-1843). While Shlomo Avineri's (Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 119-122) exposure of Fries's anti-semitism is disturbing, the conclusions he draws from it are unwarranted. An accusation of "subjectivism" both against Kant and Fries is baseless -- a distortion in the defense of Hegel that is especially unfair because of the likely unfamiliarity of readers with Fries's thought. The equation of either Fries or the Burschenschaften with the Nazis is a gross anachronism. The fact of the age of Prussian and Austrian reactionary oppression and authoritarianism, beside which anyone expressing nationalistic and republican sentiments automatically qualifies as a liberal of the time. The verdict of history is evident in the fact that the black, red, and gold flag of the students and their movement became an abiding symbol, at first of nationalism, but later entirely of liberalism and republicanism -- a symbol that surfaced both in 1848 and in the Weimar Republic. The conservatism championed by Hegel is what in fact led to the co-option of nationalism by the authoritarian state that in truth made the Nazi terror possible. There is no thought here of excusing Fries; but in the perspective of history we should see that the students need not have been pure and enlightened to have been more progressive than the German governments. If there had been a revolution in 1817, it is likely there would [have been] a Terror as in similar revolutions. Germany, spared such horrors, benefited from gradual change only by moving steadily to autocracy, dictatorship, and catastrophe. Whatever Fries's prejudices or role may have been earlier, by the time the Nazis came, the representatives of his tradition were as firmly opposed to Hitler as they could possibly have been. So we should not simply dismiss Fries for this reprehensible failing: few dismiss Marx for his anti-semitic remarks and Heidegger, although a publicly proclaimed Nazi sympathizer, is none the less a philosopher to be taken seriously. If historians of science now can blind themselves to the participation in the Third Reich of Werner Heisenberg -- even to the point of attempting to develop quantum Uncertainty into a moral principle -- then we can at least grant to Fries an examination of the principles of his philosophy. Harald Höffding's judgment of Fries was this:
So sympathetic a tribute must have come from an estimation of Fries's strengths, not from a polemical exposure of his weaknesses.
Leonard Nelson (1882-1927). The Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen der Ethik in three volumes, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, System der philosophischen Ethik und Pädagogik, and System der philosophischen Rechtslehre und Politik. These are volumes IV, V, and VI of the Gesammelte Schriften, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1972. Only the System of Ethics (Yale, 1956) has been published in English, although a photocopied manuscript translation of the Critique (1957) was made available by the Leonard Nelson Foundation in 1970.
Nelson, "The Critical Method and the Relation of Psychology to Philosophy," Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy, Dover, New York, 1965, pp. 105-157.
Robert Paul Wolff, "The Subjective Deduction," Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, Harvard, 1963, pp. 100-164, Immanuel Kant, "The A Priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience," Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1965, pp. 129-140.
Nelson, op. cit., "The Impossibility of the 'Theory of Knowledge'," pp. 185-205, and p. 118.
Ibid. pp. 121-123.
Wolff, op. cit., p. 109.
C.G. Jung, Psychological Types, Bollingen Paperbacks, Princeton, 1976, pp. 2-4.
Nelson, op. cit., p. 75
Nelson, Socratic Method etc., p. 153. cf. note 10.
Kant, Pure Reason, p. 65.
Nelson, op. cit., p. 120.
Ibid., p. 117.
Alan R. White, "The Correspondence Theory" & "The Coherence Theory," Truth, Anchor, New York, 1970, pp. 102-122.
Nelson, op. cit., "Prejudice of Logical Dogmatism," p. 141 and diagram p. 146.
Ibid. pp. 141-153.
Ibid. p. 123.
Ibid., "The Regressive Method: Induction and Abstraction," pp. 105-110.
Ibid., "The Verification of Judgments: Proof, Demonstration, and Deduction," pp. 111-121.
Kant, op. cit., p. 120.
Nelson, op. cit., "Theory of Deduction," pp. 122-125.
Ibid. p. 126.
Aristotle, Topica, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1966, pp. 272-273 -- ho dialektiòs syllogismós.
Nelson, "Philosophy and Axiomatics," op. cit., pp. 164-167. The term "metalanguage" is not used here; but the meaning is clear, and Hilbert's use of the term "metamathematics is cited.
Ibid., "The Prejudice of the Transcendental," pp. 134-135.
Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Humanities Press, New York, 1973, p. 88.
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970, p. 41.
Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time", Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1970, p. 18. J.L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1971. Page 39:
This is one point of origin for the concept of negative transcendence.
Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, The Norton Library, New York, 1962, p. 5.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1, Dover, New York, 1966, p. 112.
G.S. Kirk & J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1964, p. 405 -- the manner in which the void answered Eleaticism.
Kant, op. cit., "Transcendental Illusion," pp. 298-299.
Mehta, op. cit., "Truth of Being," pp. 205-223.
Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1957, pp. 89-92.
C.L. Baker, Introduction to Generative-Transformational Syntax, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1978, pp. 14-25.
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1971, p. 146.
Kant, Practical Reason, pp. 85-86.
R.C. Zaehner, The Teachings of the Magi, Oxford, 1976, p. 18.
Otto, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
Wolff, op. cit., pp. 31 & 25, respectively.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 433.
Kant, Pure Reason, pp. 105-106.
William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1, Dover, New York, 1950, pp. 249-258.
Raymond J. McCall, Basic Logic, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1967, pp.1-7.
Baker, op. cit., p. 59. The terminology may obscure the meaning here. Phrase structure rules provide the elements of the sentence and then transformational rules essentially shuffle them around.
Kant, op. cit., p. 105.
compare D.M. Armstrong, "What is Consciousness?" The Nature of Mind, Cornell, 1981, p. 55: "Consciousness is the cream on the cake of mentality, a special and sophisticated development of mentality."
Kant, op. cit., pp. 182-183; and Wolff, op. cit., pp. 211-213. And Kant p. 135.
Panayot Butchvarov, Being Qua Being, Indian University Press, Bloomington, 1979, p. 21.
Jon Barwise and John Perry, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, 1983, p. 4.
McCall, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
Jacques Maritain, Formal Logic, Sheed & Ward, New York (no date), p. 225. A Thomist, Maritain rises to the defense of Aristotelian quantification.
Kant, op. cit., p. 92.
Sanskrit vid, from which véda, "knowledge," e.g. the sacred Vedas. Arthur MacDonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary, Oxford, 1971, pp. 282 & 298. In Greek (w)id is a strong root, with Aplaut grades in 0, e, and o. The present form *eídô is not used; but both eîdon and oîda are principle parts of the verb hóraô, "see," with a secondary meaning for oîda, "have seen," as a present tense "to know." Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1964, p. 226-227. See page 375 for idéa. The Latin cognate root video is also mentioned. The Old English is witan, from which "wit," "wise," "wisdom," etc., as in any ordinary dictionary providing etymologies.
Baker, op. cit., p. 92.
Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, 1975, p. 136. In linguistic usage "deep structure" is a more relative term, and deep structures can presuppose the phase structure rules of particular languages. The feeling about phase structure rules is almost as though the formal schemas exist first and then "lexical items" are filled in. But that can hardly be the route by which meaning, which from the beginning must involve the content of lexical items, is transformed into a linguistic expression. A semantic representation is at least the conception of pure meaning.
Baker, op. cit., 220-226.
Bruce Biggs, "Parts of Speech: The Base Classes," Let's Learn Maori, A.H. & A.W. Reed, Auckland, New Zealand, 1969, pp. 50-53. Adjectives come out as "statives," i.e. stative verbs.
Sir Alan Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, Oxford, 1964, pp. 234 & 326. The former speaks of the "sole surviving relic ... of the Semitic finite verb."
Ibid. p. 431. The phonology of the Coptic verb classes -- for tenses, etc., any Coptic grammar.
Barwise and Perry, op. cit., pp. xi-xii.
Because they are only "forms of sensibility." Kant, op. cit., p. 90 -- a backhanded statement that "this mode of intuiting in space and time need not be limited to human sensibility," although it may be.
Grete Henry, "The Significance of Behaviour Study for the Critique of Reason," Ratio, Volume XV No. 2, Basil Blackwell, December 1973, pp. 208-209. Here one of Nelson's students abandons the notion of "immediate knowledge."
Schopenhauer. op. cit. p. 352. One of the finest images in all of philosophy.
Kant, op. cit., pp. 143-144.
Ibid. pp. 152-153. Kant's Second Edition statement of the thought noted in 68.
Ibid. p. 111.
Wolff, op. cit., pp. 121-125
Kant, op. cit., p. 112
Ibid., pp. 143-144. Here Kant continues, first saying that "apprehension" is when the action of synthesis is "immediately directed upon perceptions," and then turning right around and saying that imagination must have "previously" taken up impressions in order to have formed an image. This reflects Kant's change of mind; for on page 124 he has just said: "But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition."
Ibid., pp. 89-90.
Ibid., p. 134.
Ibid., p. 25 note.
D.M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge, 1974. Although I will be critical of Armstrong, his chapter "The Infinite Regress of Reasons," pp. 150161, is a very excellent treatment -- qualified only by the rejection here of the thesis that knowledge entails belief.
Kant, op. cit., pp. 345-350.
Ibid., p. 27.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 444, & for sub/obj. p. 13.
Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, pp. 5-6. That belief should be considered part of all mediate knowledge is unobjectionable; the difficulties come precisely with "non-inferential" beliefs, which both demand the certainty of immediate knowledge yet suffer from all the uncertainties and possible arbitrariness of propositional formulations.
Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 157-158.
Ibid., pp. 191-192.
Ibid., p. 156.
Ibid., p. 157.
The original conception of the "regress of reasons" is due to Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1966, pp. 33 & 261 -- where the regress ends in first principles known by noûs.
Cornford, op. cit., pp. 140-163, where knowledge as true belief and knowledge as true belief with an account are both rejected in the Theaetetus.
Wolff, op. cit., 229-230.
Kant, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
Ibid., p. 126.
Wolff, op. cit., p. 15.
Ibid., pp. 278-279 -- Wolff's final formulation for Kant's proof of causality.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 8: "Succession is the form of the principle of sufficient reason in time, and succession is the whole essence and nature of time." Since Kant's argument in the Analogies of Experience is based on time consciousness, succession exhausts the matter for Schopenhauer. Cf. p. 473.
Wolff, op. cit., p. 3.
Nothing that is said about synthesis in the Analytic would require that it be Euclidean or otherwise. For his sense of the structure of space, Kant certainly relies on the structure of space as a form of sensibility, which is peculiar to the Aesthetic. The argument then is just whether we do or do not see space as Euclidean, and that is nothing to belabor Kant with.
Wolff, op. cit., p. 208 -- on the Schematism's introduction of the "modes of time-consciousness."
Ibid., p. 219.
Frederic M. Wheelock, Latin, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1966, p. 123 for declension of comparatives, p. 86 for case taken by â, "from."
Aristotle, On Interpretation, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1962, pp. 131-141.
Alston H. Chase and Henry Phillips, A New Introduction to Greek, Harvard, 1965, p. 113.
A. Meillett, Introduction à L'Étude Comparative des Langues Indo-Européennes, Alabama, 1967, p. 204.
In the Greek Indicative, both the imperfect and aorist have past significance. Just as English does not avail itself much of the form of the present aorist to express a present aorist, the only sense of the Greek present seems to be imperfect, just as in the Subjunctive the present is truly an imperfect.
Wolff, op. cit., p. 244.
see note 87.
Nelson, Progress and Regress in Philosophy, Vol. 1, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970, p. 105. The little known work of Kant mentioned here, Enquiry -- into the Clarity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality, is suitably symbolic of what the Friesians grasped in Kant while others did not. Kant's considerations suit the distinction between intuitive and non-intuitive knowledge as well as they do his own later theories.
Plato, Timaeus, Penguin, Baltimore, 1965, p. 70.
Nelson, Socratic Method etc., pp. 190-191 -- Nelson's attack on the "mediacy of all knowledge."
Ibid. 191.
Kirk and Raven, op. cit., p. 405.
William Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, Oxford, 1972, p. 161. "The Absolute is the Nought."
Cassell's New Latin Dictionary, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1960, p. 360 (maneo), p. 610 (transcendo).
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press, New York, 1971. p. 42. "Translucence."
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 5.
Kant, op. cit., p. 146.
H. and H.A. Frankfort, Before Philosophy, Penguin, Baltimore, 1963, p. 30.
Kirk and Raven, op. cit., pp. 299-300.
T.J. De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, Dover, New York, 1967, pp. 57-62 -- "Atomistic Kalam" -- the most interesting aspect of philosophy in Islam is that the most interesting doctrines, like this, like Occasionalism, like al-Ghazzâlî's critique of causality, were originated by theologians who not only did not call themselves "philosophers" (falâsifah) but were hostile to those who did.
Wolff, op. cit., p. 10.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 10.
Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, Allen & Unwin, London, 1958, pp. 56-82 -- "The Repudiation of Causality by al-Ghazâlî."
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 29-31.
Plato, op. cit., p. 41.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 100.
Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, pp. 27-31 -- "The Problem of the Secondary Qualities."
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Free Press, New York, 1967, p. 91.
Nelson, "Pleasure," Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 324-332.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 130.
Ibid., p. 40.
Ibid., p.5. cf. Br[.]hadâran[.]yaka Upanis[.]ad, IV Adhyâya, 5 Brâhman[.]a, 15.; The Upanis[.]ads, volume II, translated by F. Max Müller, Dover Publications, New York, 1962, p. 185
Ibid., pp. 11-13.
Ibid., pp. 19-21.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., pp. 194-197.
Ibid., p. 376 -- "in direct contradiction to Kant," although Hume is not mentioned as an alternative.
Ibid., p. 373.
Nelson, Ethics, pp. 112-116.
Jung, Symbols of Transformation, Bollingen XX, Princeton, 1976, p. 158; and The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Princeton, 1975, p. 26.
Jung, Symbols of Transformation, p. 137.
Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, pp. 43-44 -- "they are patterns of instinctual behaviour."
For the influence of Schopenhauer: Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Vintage, 1973, p. 69.
Jung, Four Archetypes, Mother/Rebirth/Spirit/Trickster, Bollingen, Princeton, 1973.
Jung, Archetypes etc., pp. 29-30.
Schopenhauer, "On Women," Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2, Clarendon, Oxford, 1974, p. 619.
Nelson, Progress and Regress in Philosophy, Vol. w, pp. 233-234.
Ibid., pp. 229, 230. Nearby (p. 226) is a passage very revealing of my differences with Fries and Nelson:
Here the "unavoidable notion" may be assigned to the sense of numinous pseudo-necessity; but Nelson has not tempered that with the corresponding sense of ur-contingency, which would prevent his Kant-like conclusion that we do not know things as they are in themselves. Here contingency is just as fundamental as necessity; and the various modes of each are complexly interrelated.
Ibid., pp. 227-230.
Nelson, Socratic Method etc., p. xix note -- this is in the introduction of Julius Kraft.
Otto, op. cit., "Mysterium Tremendum," pp. 12-24.
Jung, Archetypes etc., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 7. At the same time Jung acknowledges the most powerful religious sense, as here, "Tribal lore is always sacred and dangerous," and as in note 151, "unconditional, dangerous, taboo, magical."
Nelson, op. cit., "The Socratic Method," pp. 1-40.
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1975, pp. 33-35.
Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
Moore, op. cit. pp. 52-53.
Nelson, Ethics, p. 14.
Schopenhauer, The World as Will etc., p. 100.
Kant, Pure Reason, p. 474.
Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 233.
Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 69.
Nelson, op. cit., pp. 32-35.
Ibid., pp. 185-187, and Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 343-404 -- "Examination of Aesthetic Interest."
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 9.
Zaehner, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
Kant, Practical Reason, p. 86.
Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary, Harvard, 1972, p. 464. "Jên" in Wade-Giles.
Nelson, Ethics, p. 88.
Kant, Foundations etc., p. 47.
Kant, Practical Reason, pp. 135-136. Earlier, in beginning to deal with the "highest good" (pp. 112-114): "The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will." Only perfect goodness, morally, merits perfect happiness and so, by the agency of God, ensures it. Whatever merits happiness, here the moral law is certainly not the "sole determining ground of the pure will."
Nelson, op. cit., p. 187.
Kant, Judgment, p. 56.
Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 6-19.
Kant Practical Reason, p. 126.
Zaehner, op. cit., pp. 18 & 55.
Jung, Memories etc., p. 326.
Jung, Answer to Job, Bollingen, Princeton, 1973.
Genesis 3:11. Revised Standard Version, Cokesbury, 1952.
Jung, op. cit., p. 13.
Genesis 3:22.
Alan W. Watts, "The Rise and Development of Zen," The Way of Zen, pp. 77-112.
Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Doubleday, 1961,p. 139. Adding to the difficulty of Heidegger's meaning is a printing error that transposed "techne" and "dike" on line eleven.
Ibid., p. 166 -- "the inner truth and greatness of this movement..."
Matthew 5:39. E Kaine Diathike, United Bible Societies, 1967, Biblike Etairia, Athens.
Matthew 5:43-48.
Geoffrey Ashe, Gandhi, pp. 99-105.
De Boer, op. cit., 43-55.
Jung, "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 421-458.
P.T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, pp. 421-458.
Zaehner, op. cit. p. 140.
Matthew 6:31-33.
Kant, Pure Reason, p. 636.
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 1
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 2
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 3
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 4
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 5
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 6
Scorned by Hegel, and still scoffed at by those who entertain a romantic admiration for Romantic philosophy, this sober inquirer has nevertheless in his theory of knowledge, as well as in his psychology and ethics, developed thoughts which have always maintained their validity and their value, while the speculative systems have long ceased to possess any but historical interest. [A History of Modern Philosophy, Vo. 2, Dover, New York, 1955, page 248.]
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 7
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 8
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 9
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 10
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 11
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 12
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 13
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 14
Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), The Idea of the Holy, Oxford, 1972, pp. 145-147.
Nelson, System of Ethics, Yale, 1956, p. 15.
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 15
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 16
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 17
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 18
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 19
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 20
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 21
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 22
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 23
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 24
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 25
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 26
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 27
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 28
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 29
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 30
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 31
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 32
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 33
...and aims at showing how the Nothing, as the other to all that is, constitutes Dasein's transcendence as experienced in the first instance when we seek to ascend from beings (essents) to Being.
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 34
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 35
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 36
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 37
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 38
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 39
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 40
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 41
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 42
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 43
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 44
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 45
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 46
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 47
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 48
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 49
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 50
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 51
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 52
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 53
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 54
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 55
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 56
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 57
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 58
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 59
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 60
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 61
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 62
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 63
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 64
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 65
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 66
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 67
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 68
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 69
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 70
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 71
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 72
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 73
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 74
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 75
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 76
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 77
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 78
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 79
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 80
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 81
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 82
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 83
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 84
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 85
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 86
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 87
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 88
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 89
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 90
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 91
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 92
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 93
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 94
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 95
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 96
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 97
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 98
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 99
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 100
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 101
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 102
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 103
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 104
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 105
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 106
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 107
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 108
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 109
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 110
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 111
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 112
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 113
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 114
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 115
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 116
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 117
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 118
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 119
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 120
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 121
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 122
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 123
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 124
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 125
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 126
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 127
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 128
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 129
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 130
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 131
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 132
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 133
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 134
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 135
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 136
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 137
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 138
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 139
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 140
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 141
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 142
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 143
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 144
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 145
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 146
"Intimation" however, consists in subordinating the objects of knowledge to those of faith and thus represents a third form of conviction, as it can neither claim the self-evidence of knowledge nor even (as faith can) become clear in the logical form of concepts. Yet it is not inferior in its degrees of certainty and in the reliability of its conviction.
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 147
This insuperable contingency in the givenness of the objects of our knowledge shows very clearly that the existence of the objects of our knowledge is dependent on their being known. For we are compelled by an unavoidable notion of our own pure reason to assume that nothing can be really real unless it is also determined as necessary. On this assumption contingency cannot be a quality of reality, but can only express some defect in our knowledge of reality, namely lack of knowledge of its necessity. So the insuperable contingency of the objects of our knowledge is the clearest proof of the fact that our knowledge is necessarily limited in quality, the fact that we do not know things as-they-really-are.
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 148
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 149
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 150
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 151
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 152
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 153
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 154
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 155
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 156
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 157
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 158
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 159
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 160
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 161
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 162
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 163
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 164
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 165
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 166
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 167
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 168
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 169
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 170
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 171
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 172
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 173
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 174
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 175
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 176
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 177
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 178
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 179
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 180
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 181
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 182
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 183
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 184
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 185
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 186
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 187
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 188
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 189
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 190
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 191
The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 192
Copyright (c) 1985, 1997 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved