The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 0 [1997]


Mrs. Dorris Jenkins, who taught history, said that she had two ambitions in life. One was to be in a footnote. That had already happened, since a former student had put her in a footnote to his dissertation. The other was to have a student become a philosopher. Although at the time I was still thinking that I wanted to go into archaeology, I had started studying philosophy, so I asked her exactly what it would take for her to consider that a student had become a philosopher. She was uncompromising: The criterion was a Ph.D. in Philosophy.

My last semester in high school, Mrs. Jenkins organized a debate team, which I joined. But she died suddenly that very term. I didn't go into philosophy because of that, but it did seem like a very serious portent. There would be no other students after me who might become philosophers. And that, as it happened, is what I did. The following dissertation is finally how I got the Ph.D., and there did not seem to be a more appropriate dedication than to the teacher whose final ambition was thus fulfilled.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 1


C.G. Jung (1875-1961), "The Transcendent Function," in The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Vol. 8 Collected Works, Bollingen Series XX, Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 69-91.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 2


Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), "Of the right of pure reason to an extension in its practical use which is not possible to it in its speculative use," Critique of Practical Reason, The Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobs-Merrill, New York, 1956, pp. 52-59.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 3


Ibid. p. 166.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 4


Kant, "The autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality," Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobs-Merrill, New York, 1959, p. 59.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 5


Kant, "Of the division of philosophy" etc., Critique of Judgment, Hafner Library of Classics, New York, 1951, pp. 7-15.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 6


Jakob Fries (1773-1843). While Shlomo Avineri's (Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 119-122) exposure of Fries's anti-semitism is disturbing, the conclusions he draws from it are unwarranted. An accusation of "subjectivism" both against Kant and Fries is baseless--a distortion in the defense of Hegel that is especially unfair because of the likely unfamiliarity of readers with Fries's thought. the equation of either Fries or the Burschenschaften with the Nazis is a gross anachronism. The fact of the age of Prussian and Austrian reactionary oppression and authoritarianism, beside which anyone expressing nationalistic and republican sentiments automatically qualifies as a liberal of the time. The verdict of history is evident in the fact that the black, red, and gold flag of the students and their movement became an abiding symbol, at first of nationalism, but later entirely of liberalism and republicanism--a symbol that surfaced both in 1848 and in the Weimar Republic. The conservatism championed by Hegel is what in fact led to the co-option of nationalism by the authoritarian state that in truth made the Nazi terror possible. There is no thought here of excusing Fries; but in the perspective of history we should see that the students need not have been pure and enlightened to have been more progressive than the German governments. If there had been a revolution in 1817, it is likely there would [have been] a Terror as in similar revolutions. Germany, spared such horrors, benefited from gradual change only by moving steadily to autocracy, dictatorship, and catastrophe. Whatever Fries's prejudices or role may have been earlier, by the time the Nazis came, the representatives of his tradition were as firmly opposed to Hitler as they could possibly have been. So we should not simply dismiss Fries for this reprehensible failing: few dismiss Marx for his anti-semitic remarks and Heidegger, although a publicly proclaimed Nazi sympathizer, is none the less a philosopher to be taken seriously. If historians of science now can blind themselves to the participation in the Third Reich of Werner Heisenberg--even to the point of attempting to develop quantum Uncertainty into a moral principle--then we can at least grant to Fries an examination of the principles of his philosophy. Harald Höffding's judgment of Fries was this:

Scorned by Hegel, and still scoffed at by those who entertain a romantic admiration for Romantic philosophy, this sober inquirer has nevertheless in his theory of knowledge, as well as in his psychology and ethics, developed thoughts which have always maintained their validity and their value, while the speculative systems have long ceased to possess any but historical interest. [A History of Modern Philosophy, Vo. 2, Dover, New York, 1955, page 248.]

So sympathetic a tribute must have come from an estimation of Fries's strengths, not from a polemical exposure of his weaknesses.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 7


Leonard Nelson (1882-1927). The Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen der Ethik in three volumes, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, System der philosophischen Ethik und Pädagogik, and System der philosophischen Rechtslehre und Politik. These are volumes IV, V, and VI of the Gesammelte Schriften, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1972. Only the System of Ethics (Yale, 1956) has been published in English, although a photocopied manuscript translation of the Critique (1957) was made available by the Leonard Nelson Foundation in 1970.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 8


Nelson, "The Critical Method and the Relation of Psychology to Philosophy," Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy, Dover, New York, 1965, pp. 105-157.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 9


Robert Paul Wolff, "The Subjective Deduction," Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, Harvard, 1963, pp. 100-164, Immanuel Kant, "The A Priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience," Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1965, pp. 129-140.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 10


Nelson, op. cit., "The Impossibility of the 'Theory of Knowledge'," pp. 185-205, and p. 118.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 11


Ibid. pp. 121-123.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 12


Wolff, op. cit., p. 109.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 13


C.G. Jung, Psychological Types, Bollingen Paperbacks, Princeton, 1976, pp. 2-4.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 14


Nelson, op. cit., p. 75
Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), The Idea of the Holy, Oxford, 1972, pp. 145-147.
Nelson, System of Ethics, Yale, 1956, p. 15.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 15


Nelson, Socratic Method etc., p. 153. cf. note 10.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 16


Kant, Pure Reason, p. 65.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 17


Nelson, op. cit., p. 120.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 18


Ibid., p. 117.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 19


Alan R. White, "The Correspondence Theory" & "The Coherence Theory," Truth, Anchor, New York, 1970, pp. 102-122.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 20


Nelson, op. cit., "Prejudice of Logical Dogmatism," p. 141 and diagram p. 146.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 21


Ibid. pp. 141-153.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 22


Ibid. p. 123.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 23


Ibid., "The Regressive Method: Induction and Abstraction," pp. 105-110.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 24


Ibid., "The Verification of Judgments: Proof, Demonstration, and Deduction," pp. 111-121.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 25


Kant, op. cit., p. 120.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 26


Nelson, op. cit., "Theory of Deduction," pp. 122-125.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 27


Ibid. p. 126.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 28


Aristotle, Topica, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1966, pp. 272-273--ho dialektiòs syllogismós.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 29


Nelson, "Philosophy and Axiomatics," op. cit., pp. 164-167. The term "metalanguage" is not used here; but the meaning is clear, and Hilbert's use of the term "metamathematics is cited.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 30


Ibid., "The Prejudice of the Transcendental," pp. 134-135.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 31


Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Humanities Press, New York, 1973, p. 88.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 32


Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970, p. 41.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 33


Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time", Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1970, p. 18. J.L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1971. Page 39:

...and aims at showing how the Nothing, as the other to all that is, constitutes Dasein's transcendence as experienced in the first instance when we seek to ascend from beings (essents) to Being.

This is one point of origin for the concept of negative transcendence.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 34


Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, The Norton Library, New York, 1962, p. 5.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 35


Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1, Dover, New York, 1966, p. 112.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 36


G.S. Kirk & J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1964, p. 405--the manner in which the void answered Eleaticism.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 37


Kant, op. cit., "Transcendental Illusion," pp. 298-299.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 38


Mehta, op. cit., "Truth of Being," pp. 205-223.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 39


Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1957, pp. 89-92.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 40


C.L. Baker, Introduction to Generative-Transformational Syntax, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1978, pp. 14-25.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 41


G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1971, p. 146.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 42


Kant, Practical Reason, pp. 85-86.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 43


R.C. Zaehner, The Teachings of the Magi, Oxford, 1976, p. 18.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 44


Otto, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 45


Wolff, op. cit., pp. 31 & 25, respectively.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 46


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 433.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 47


Kant, Pure Reason, pp. 105-106.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 48


William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1, Dover, New York, 1950, pp. 249-258.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 49


Raymond J. McCall, Basic Logic, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1967, pp.1-7.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 50


Baker, op. cit., p. 59. The terminology may obscure the meaning here. Phrase structure rules provide the elements of the sentence and then transformational rules essentially shuffle them around.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 51


Kant, op. cit., p. 105.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 52


compare D.M. Armstrong, "What is Consciousness?" The Nature of Mind, Cornell, 1981, p. 55: "Consciousness is the cream on the cake of mentality, a special and sophisticated development of mentality."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 53


Kant, op. cit., pp. 182-183; and Wolff, op. cit., pp. 211-213. And Kant p. 135.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 54


Panayot Butchvarov, Being Qua Being, Indian University Press, Bloomington, 1979, p. 21.

Jon Barwise and John Perry, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, 1983, p. 4.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 55


McCall, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 56


Jacques Maritain, Formal Logic, Sheed & Ward, New York (no date), p. 225. A Thomist, Maritain rises to the defense of Aristotelian quantification.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 57


Kant, op. cit., p. 92.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 58


Sanskrit vid, from which véda, "knowledge," e.g. the sacred Vedas. Arthur MacDonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary, Oxford, 1971, pp. 282 & 298. In Greek (w)id is a strong root, with Aplaut grades in 0, e, and o. The present form *eídô is not used; but both eîdon and oîda are principle parts of the verb hóraô, "see," with a secondary meaning for oîda, "have seen," as a present tense "to know." Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1964, p. 226-227. See page 375 for idéa. The Latin cognate root video is also mentioned. The Old English is witan, from which "wit," "wise," "wisdom," etc., as in any ordinary dictionary providing etymologies.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 59


Baker, op. cit., p. 92.

Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, 1975, p. 136. In linguistic usage "deep structure" is a more relative term, and deep structures can presuppose the phase structure rules of particular languages. The feeling about phase structure rules is almost as though the formal schemas exist first and then "lexical items" are filled in. But that can hardly be the route by which meaning, which from the beginning must involve the content of lexical items, is transformed into a linguistic expression. A semantic representation is at least the conception of pure meaning.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 60


Baker, op. cit., 220-226.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 61


Bruce Biggs, "Parts of Speech: The Base Classes," Let's Learn Maori, A.H. & A.W. Reed, Auckland, New Zealand, 1969, pp. 50-53. Adjectives come out as "statives," i.e. stative verbs.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 62


Sir Alan Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, Oxford, 1964, pp. 234 & 326. The former speaks of the "sole surviving relic ... of the Semitic finite verb."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 63


Ibid. p. 431. The phonology of the Coptic verb classes--for tenses, etc., any Coptic grammar.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 64


Barwise and Perry, op. cit., pp. xi-xii.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 65


Because they are only "forms of sensibility." Kant, op. cit., p. 90--a backhanded statement that "this mode of intuiting in space and time need not be limited to human sensibility," although it may be.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 66


Grete Henry, "The Significance of Behaviour Study for the Critique of Reason," Ratio, Volume XV No. 2, Basil Blackwell, December 1973, pp. 208-209. Here one of Nelson's students abandons the notion of "immediate knowledge."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 67


Schopenhauer. op. cit. p. 352. One of the finest images in all of philosophy.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 68


Kant, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 69


Ibid. pp. 152-153. Kant's Second Edition statement of the thought noted in 68.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 70


Ibid. p. 111.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 71


Wolff, op. cit., pp. 121-125

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 72


Kant, op. cit., p. 112

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 73


Ibid., pp. 143-144. Here Kant continues, first saying that "apprehension" is when the action of synthesis is "immediately directed upon perceptions," and then turning right around and saying that imagination must have "previously" taken up impressions in order to have formed an image. This reflects Kant's change of mind; for on page 124 he has just said: "But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 74


Ibid., pp. 89-90.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 75


Ibid., p. 134.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 76


Ibid., p. 25 note.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 77


D.M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge, 1974. Although I will be critical of Armstrong, his chapter "The Infinite Regress of Reasons," pp. 150161, is a very excellent treatment--qualified only by the rejection here of the thesis that knowledge entails belief.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 78


Kant, op. cit., pp. 345-350.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 79


Ibid., p. 27.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 80


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 444, & for sub/obj. p. 13.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 81


Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 82


Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, pp. 5-6. That belief should be considered part of all mediate knowledge is unobjectionable; the difficulties come precisely with "non-inferential" beliefs, which both demand the certainty of immediate knowledge yet suffer from all the uncertainties and possible arbitrariness of propositional formulations.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 83


Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 84


Ibid., pp. 191-192.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 85


Ibid., p. 156.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 86


Ibid., p. 157.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 87


The original conception of the "regress of reasons" is due to Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1966, pp. 33 & 261--where the regress ends in first principles known by noûs.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 88


Cornford, op. cit., pp. 140-163, where knowledge as true belief and knowledge as true belief with an account are both rejected in the Theaetetus.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 89


Wolff, op. cit., 229-230.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 90


Kant, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 91


Ibid., p. 126.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 92


Wolff, op. cit., p. 15.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 93


Ibid., pp. 278-279--Wolff's final formulation for Kant's proof of causality.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 94


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 8: "Succession is the form of the principle of sufficient reason in time, and succession is the whole essence and nature of time." Since Kant's argument in the Analogies of Experience is based on time consciousness, succession exhausts the matter for Schopenhauer. Cf. p. 473.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 95


Wolff, op. cit., p. 3.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 96


Nothing that is said about synthesis in the Analytic would require that it be Euclidean or otherwise. For his sense of the structure of space, Kant certainly relies on the structure of space as a form of sensibility, which is peculiar to the Aesthetic. The argument then is just whether we do or do not see space as Euclidean, and that is nothing to belabor Kant with.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 97


Wolff, op. cit., p. 208--on the Schematism's introduction of the "modes of time-consciousness."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 98


Ibid., p. 219.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 99


Frederic M. Wheelock, Latin, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1966, p. 123 for declension of comparatives, p. 86 for case taken by â, "from."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 100


Aristotle, On Interpretation, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1962, pp. 131-141.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 101


Alston H. Chase and Henry Phillips, A New Introduction to Greek, Harvard, 1965, p. 113.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 102


A. Meillett, Introduction à L'Étude Comparative des Langues Indo-Européennes, Alabama, 1967, p. 204.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 103


In the Greek Indicative, both the imperfect and aorist have past significance. Just as English does not avail itself much of the form of the present aorist to express a present aorist, the only sense of the Greek present seems to be imperfect, just as in the Subjunctive the present is truly an imperfect.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 104


Wolff, op. cit., p. 244.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 105


see note 87.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 106


Nelson, Progress and Regress in Philosophy, Vol. 1, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970, p. 105. The little known work of Kant mentioned here, Enquiry--into the Clarity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality, is suitably symbolic of what the Friesians grasped in Kant while others did not. Kant's considerations suit the distinction between intuitive and non-intuitive knowledge as well as they do his own later theories.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 107


Plato, Timaeus, Penguin, Baltimore, 1965, p. 70.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 108


Nelson, Socratic Method etc., pp. 190-191--Nelson's attack on the "mediacy of all knowledge."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 109


Ibid. 191.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 110


Kirk and Raven, op. cit., p. 405.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 111


William Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, Oxford, 1972, p. 161. "The Absolute is the Nought."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 112


Cassell's New Latin Dictionary, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1960, p. 360 (maneo), p. 610 (transcendo).

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 113


Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press, New York, 1971. p. 42. "Translucence."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 114


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 5.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 115


Kant, op. cit., p. 146.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 116


H. and H.A. Frankfort, Before Philosophy, Penguin, Baltimore, 1963, p. 30.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 117


Kirk and Raven, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 118


T.J. De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, Dover, New York, 1967, pp. 57-62--"Atomistic Kalam"--the most interesting aspect of philosophy in Islam is that the most interesting doctrines, like this, like Occasionalism, like al-Ghazzâlî's critique of causality, were originated by theologians who not only did not call themselves "philosophers" (falâsifah) but were hostile to those who did.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 119


Wolff, op. cit., p. 10.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 120


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 10.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 121


Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, Allen & Unwin, London, 1958, pp. 56-82--"The Repudiation of Causality by al-Ghazâlî."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 122


Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 29-31.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 123


Plato, op. cit., p. 41.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 124


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 100.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 125


Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, pp. 27-31--"The Problem of the Secondary Qualities."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 126


Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Free Press, New York, 1967, p. 91.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 127


Nelson, "Pleasure," Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 324-332.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 128


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 130.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 129


Ibid., p. 40.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 130


Ibid., p.5. cf. Br[.]hadâran[.]yaka Upanis[.]ad, IV Adhyâya, 5 Brâhman[.]a, 15.; The Upanis[.]ads, volume II, translated by F. Max Müller, Dover Publications, New York, 1962, p. 185

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 131


Ibid., pp. 11-13.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 132


Ibid., pp. 19-21.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 133


Ibid., p. 100.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 134


Ibid., p. 170.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 135


Ibid., pp. 194-197.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 136


Ibid., p. 376--"in direct contradiction to Kant," although Hume is not mentioned as an alternative.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 137


Ibid., p. 373.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 138


Nelson, Ethics, pp. 112-116.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 139


Jung, Symbols of Transformation, Bollingen XX, Princeton, 1976, p. 158; and The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Princeton, 1975, p. 26.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 140


Jung, Symbols of Transformation, p. 137.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 141


Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, pp. 43-44--"they are patterns of instinctual behaviour."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 142


For the influence of Schopenhauer: Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Vintage, 1973, p. 69.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 143


Jung, Four Archetypes, Mother/Rebirth/Spirit/Trickster, Bollingen, Princeton, 1973.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 144


Jung, Archetypes etc., pp. 29-30.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 145


Schopenhauer, "On Women," Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2, Clarendon, Oxford, 1974, p. 619.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 146


Nelson, Progress and Regress in Philosophy, Vol. w, pp. 233-234.

"Intimation" however, consists in subordinating the objects of knowledge to those of faith and thus represents a third form of conviction, as it can neither claim the self-evidence of knowledge nor even (as faith can) become clear in the logical form of concepts. Yet it is not inferior in its degrees of certainty and in the reliability of its conviction.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 147


Ibid., pp. 229, 230. Nearby (p. 226) is a passage very revealing of my differences with Fries and Nelson:

This insuperable contingency in the givenness of the objects of our knowledge shows very clearly that the existence of the objects of our knowledge is dependent on their being known. For we are compelled by an unavoidable notion of our own pure reason to assume that nothing can be really real unless it is also determined as necessary. On this assumption contingency cannot be a quality of reality, but can only express some defect in our knowledge of reality, namely lack of knowledge of its necessity. So the insuperable contingency of the objects of our knowledge is the clearest proof of the fact that our knowledge is necessarily limited in quality, the fact that we do not know things as-they-really-are.

Here the "unavoidable notion" may be assigned to the sense of numinous pseudo-necessity; but Nelson has not tempered that with the corresponding sense of ur-contingency, which would prevent his Kant-like conclusion that we do not know things as they are in themselves. Here contingency is just as fundamental as necessity; and the various modes of each are complexly interrelated.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 148


Ibid., pp. 227-230.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 149


Nelson, Socratic Method etc., p. xix note--this is in the introduction of Julius Kraft.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 150


Otto, op. cit., "Mysterium Tremendum," pp. 12-24.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 151


Jung, Archetypes etc., p. 28.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 152


Ibid., p. 7. At the same time Jung acknowledges the most powerful religious sense, as here, "Tribal lore is always sacred and dangerous," and as in note 151, "unconditional, dangerous, taboo, magical."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 153


Nelson, op. cit., "The Socratic Method," pp. 1-40.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 154


Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Library of the Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1975, pp. 33-35.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 155


Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 156


Moore, op. cit. pp. 52-53.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 157


Nelson, Ethics, p. 14.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 158


Schopenhauer, The World as Will etc., p. 100.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 159


Kant, Pure Reason, p. 474.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 160


Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 233.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 161


Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 69.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 162


Nelson, op. cit., pp. 32-35.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 163


Ibid., pp. 185-187, and Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 343-404--"Examination of Aesthetic Interest."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 164


Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 9.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 165


Zaehner, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 166


Kant, Practical Reason, p. 86.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 167


Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary, Harvard, 1972, p. 464. "Jên" in Wade-Giles.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 168


Nelson, Ethics, p. 88.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 169


Kant, Foundations etc., p. 47.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 170


Kant, Practical Reason, pp. 135-136. Earlier, in beginning to deal with the "highest good" (pp. 112-114): "The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will." Only perfect goodness, morally, merits perfect happiness and so, by the agency of God, ensures it. Whatever merits happiness, here the moral law is certainly not the "sole determining ground of the pure will."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 171


Nelson, op. cit., p. 187.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 172


Kant, Judgment, p. 56.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 173


Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 6-19.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 174


Kant Practical Reason, p. 126.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 175


Zaehner, op. cit., pp. 18 & 55.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 176


Jung, Memories etc., p. 326.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 177


Jung, Answer to Job, Bollingen, Princeton, 1973.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 178


Genesis 3:11. Revised Standard Version, Cokesbury, 1952.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 179


Jung, op. cit., p. 13.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 180


Genesis 3:22.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 181


Alan W. Watts, "The Rise and Development of Zen," The Way of Zen, pp. 77-112.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 182


Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Doubleday, 1961,p. 139. Adding to the difficulty of Heidegger's meaning is a printing error that transposed "techne" and "dike" on line eleven.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 183


Ibid., p. 166--"the inner truth and greatness of this movement..."

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 184


Matthew 5:39. E Kaine Diathike, United Bible Societies, 1967, Biblike Etairia, Athens.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 185


Matthew 5:43-48.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 186


Geoffrey Ashe, Gandhi, pp. 99-105.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 187


De Boer, op. cit., 43-55.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 188


Jung, "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 421-458.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 189


P.T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, pp. 421-458.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 190


Zaehner, op. cit. p. 140.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 191


Matthew 6:31-33.

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The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, Note 192


Kant, Pure Reason, p. 636.

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Copyright (c) 1985, 1997 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved