  Islâm,
|
Islâm,
|
Iqra' bismi Rabbika.
Recite! In the name of your Lord!'al-Qur'ân, Sûrah 96, Verse 1
Wanaḥnu 'aqrabu 'ilayhi min ḥabli-l-warîdi.
We are nearer to him than the jugular vein.'al-Qur'ân, Sûrah 50, Verse 16
Waman yuḍlili llâhu famâ lahu min hâdin.
And whom God leads astray, there is for him no right guide.'al-Qur'ân, Sûrah 39, Verse 23
Islâm, 
, is the religion founded by the Prophet Muḥammad. The word is sometimes said to mean "peace," but it is salâm, 
, that is the word for peace. Islâm means "submission, resignation," i.e. to the will of God. Both are from the same root, slm, 
, "to be safe and sound, unharmed," and many other meanings. This is related to Hebrew 
, shalôm, "peace," and the Ancient Egyptian
root snb, "health." The 
, Dâru-l'Islâm, the "House of Islâm," means the predominantly Islâmic part of the world, especially or particularly the part covered by Islâmic states. Outside the Dâru-l'Islâm is the 
, Dâru-lḥarb, the "House of War"; and it was the traditional duty of Islâmic rulers to extend the House of Islâm into the House of War.
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This expansion of the Dâru-l'Islâm was the Jihâd, 
, the Holy War. Someone who does the Jihâd is a Mujâhid, 
(pl. Mujâhidûn, 
). Jihâd is now often said not to mean, or not primarily to mean, Holy War but merely a moral and spiritual "struggle" for perfection. The root (jhd, 
), indeed, does mean "to endeavor, struggle," etc., but also "to fight." Different derivatives of the root, as with slm, are used for different purposes. Ijtihâd, 
, is from the same root and can also mean "struggle," but it is mainly used to mean "independent interpretation" on a point of Islâmic Law, i.e. independent of legal precedent (following precedent is taqlîd, 
). It is no distortion of Jihad to say that it means "Holy War." Indeed, in the Middle Ages it was an important question whether Islâm could be properly practiced in a non-Muslim state. Even though Islâm was supposed to tolerate "People of the Book," which originally meant Jews and Christians but in practice came to include Zoroastrians and even, unevenly, Hindus, this was only in a subordinate position (dhimma, 
, the status of the dhimmî, 
, the tolerated non-believer) -- Muslims being "tolerated" in a non-Muslim state was against the divine order.
The treatment of Jihâd in public discourse does not always seem honest. Thus, the former History International cable channel (now "H2") recently (12/10/08) aired a show called "Secrets of the Koran." This was copyrighted 2006 and so perhaps was a repeat showing. The show explained the ideology of Jihâd as the result of the Crusades, and otherwise positively affirmed that Muslims are only supposed to use force in self-defense. But to suppose such a thing with any kind of superficial consistency, major events in Islamic history were then ignored or glossed over.
The Omayyads were never even mentioned during the show, and the original Islamic conquest of Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt, although visible on maps, was discussed in no detail and often only characterized as "spreading the Word of Islâm." This was a grave distortion when the original Islamic Conquest, which consisted not only of violent invasions, but was not even intended to "spread the Word" or obtain converts at all. Islâm was initially viewed as a religion just for Arabs. The earliest non-Arab coverts had to become affiliated with an Arab tribe, and their status was subordinate. Equality for all Muslims was, in general, the achievement of the Abbasid Revolution. The Islamic Conquest was therefore in the name of Islâm, but its purpose was simply domination.
 Most terrible evils has Romania suffered from the Arabs even until now. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (d.959) quoting The Chronicle of Theophanes (c.815) [De Administrando Imperio, Greek text edited by Gy. Moravcsik, Dumbarton Oaks Texts, 1967, 2008, p.94] |
Later, the show mentioned that the Crusades were elicited by an appeal from the Roman/Byzantine Emperor Alexius Comnenus, and that this had something to do with the Turks. Exactly what the Turks had been doing, however, was glossed over nearly as completely as the history of the Omayyads, and one might have derived the impression that Turkey had always been in Anatolia (they are not shown coming from anywhere else). That the advent of the Turks represented a major surge in Islamic Conquest was not made obvious; and the viewer of the show might notice a hiatus between fending off the Crusaders and the Ottoman Turks arriving at the gates of Vienna. In between, of course, there were rather serious events like the Fall of Constantinople, which get ignored.
Obviously, if the ideology of Jihâd only exists because of the aggression of the Crusaders, and war in Islâm is only supposed to be used for defense, 
things like the Arab Conquest of the Middle East or the Turkish Conquest of the Romania and Hungary are going to be somewhat awkward to explain. Hence the dishonesty. It is as though Egyptians, Syrians, etc., on hearing the Word, spontaneously converted to Islâm, with Christian counter-attacks constituting, in modern leftist terminology, "Imperialist Aggression." No, the only thing about any Imperium that is really resented is that the wrong people possessed it. "Secrets of the Koran," thus, unfortunately, constituted a dishonest apologetic, not truly informative history.
Islâmic rulers engaged in Jihâd were not secular rulers in the modern sense, but neither were Mediaeval Christian rulers. In some ways Islâmic rulers seem more secular than Christian ones, since their military origin was usually recent and conspicuous (the Mamlûks are the most obvious), while Christian rulers (like the Kings of France) might claim authority directly from God. More important were other differences. European states had a legal tradition from Roman Law that was originally independent of Christianity, while Islâm had developed its own system of law. European judges were thus secular officials, while Islâmic judges were religious jurists. Europe even had parallel secular and eccelesiastical judicial systems, which is why King Henry II of England could be angry with Thomas à Becket, not for protecting the poor Saxons from oppression by the Norman King, but for protecting priests guilty of rape and murder from the full force of secular justice.
Islâmic jurists were the principal institutional existence of Islâm, which otherwise had no priests or religious hierarchy. The Imâm in Orthdox Islâm might be learned (an 'Âlim, 
, "Knower," pl. 'Ulamâ', 
), might even be a judge (a Qâḍî, 
), but essentially is just the leader of the Prayer, with no particular religious authority. ('Ulamâ' or "Ulema" is frequently used for jurists and learned religious opinion in general; and, strickly speaking, the indefinite citation form for Qâḍî is Qâḍin, 
.) The institutional distinction in the West between Church and State made it relatively easy to separate these institutions. This separation was not only less easy in Islâm but the trend in recent years has actually reversed, with a reinstitution of Islâmic Law in states that had previously adopted secular law codes. This reversal has, not surprisingly, accompanied a renewed militancy and a sense of Jihâd that owes nothing to mollifying apologetics.
Other comparisons have been made between the characters of Muḥammad, Jesus, and Moses, since Muḥammad commanded armies, had multiple marriages, etc. Muḥammad, indeed, had the responsibilities of rule, with a hostile enemy, Mecca, nearby. This involved battles. Jesus wasn't in any such position. His Kingdom, as he said, was not of this world. Moses did have the responsibilities of rule, though actual fighting didn't begin until the Israelites crossed the Jordan. Moses didn't go with them, and Joshua then handled the military business. Since Joshua was instructed by God to annihilate the people he found in the Promised Land, Muḥammad comes off rather well in comparison, since the war with Mecca ended in a negotiated settlement where the only losers were the idols in the Ka'aba, 
(though there had been a fair amount of killing in the conflict, and Muḥammad had in the meantime expelled the Jews from Medina).
As for his marriages, Muḥammad seemed to have been genuinely devoted to his wife Khadîja, an older widow whom he married after helping her run her business. Khadîja was one of the first who believed that Muḥammad was actually receiving a divine revelation. He married no other until after she died. I do not know how to judge the subsequent marriages. At least some of them seem to have been honorary, with the widows of fallen companions. His favorite wife, 'Â'isha, was betrothed to him at six. It was she who laid him to rest in the floor of their house in Medina, and the last person to set foot there for many centuries, as the Prophet's Mosque was built around it. One might think the Prophet was simply heir to some of the understandable temptations of power, but this explanation is generally not allowed in Islâmic tradition, since the Prophet is viewed as necessarily morally perfect. That is hardly necessary. The Bible does not present Moses as morally perfect -- indeed, 
God prohibits his entry into the Promised Land as a punishment.
At right we have been seeing an image of the Angel Gabriel leading the Prophet Muḥammad on the miraculous horse Buraq, from a 15th century Persian miniature. I include this because of the recent controversy over cartoons of the Prophet published in October 2005 in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. By early 2006, Islamic radicals managed to stir up riots in many Islâmic countries over the cartoons, featuring attacks on Denmark, the EU, and Christians.
It was positively affirmed by the radicals that images of the Prophet are absolutely forbidden in Islâm and that the cartoons were an intolerable slander against Islâm -- except that the Danish cartoons were really very mild and the radicals had included some other cartoons, nastier ones, that had nothing to do with the Danish newspaper. They were obviously looking for a pretext, not honestly expressing any reasonable protest. Not only that, but what they positively affirmed was not true. Although images have definitely been frowned upon in Islâmic history, and often absent altogether, there is nevertheless no lack of them. A favorite theme was the Prophet's "Night Journey," when he was taken up in a dream to heaven and hell, as we see in the image here. The whole episode thus exposes the extremism of modern Islâmic fundamentalism. This is not the Islâm of The Thousand and One Nights or 'Umar Khayyâm. It is a fascism that derives from the least humane and most intolerant varieties of Islâmic law, often that of the Ḥanbalî school favored by the Wahhâbîs of Sa'udi Arabia, not to mention the dangerous, militant, and reactionary insanity of revolutionary Irân.
Apologists then accuse Westerners of hostile misunderstandings Islâm, when the disagreement of the apologists is with the radicals, whose own interpretations often have substantial support in Islâmic jurisprudence -- if indeed the apologists really do disagree with the radicals: They often seem disingenuous to a suspicious degree. It is also unsettling when opinion polls in Muslim countries show what are often majorities of Muslims endorsing radical views (for instance that apostates from Islâm should be killed), such as the death penalty for apostates. This sort of thing is not easily explained away.
The Ambassador answered us that it was founded on the laws of their Prophet; that it was written in their Koran; that all nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners; that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners; and that every Mussulman [ Letter by John Adams & Thomas Jefferson, March 28, 1786, to John Jay, U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs (under the Articles of Confederation), concerning an interview in London with the ambassador from Tripoli, Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja.
It is a hard fight. It's extremely difficult, day after day, when you face people and say, "If Sharia law is taken to its logic this is what things are going to look like" and you come across people who say, "You got it all wrong."
I had a Q&A in a setting like this one with the vice president of our country [Joe Biden, Ayann Hirsi Ali, "Notable & Quotable," The Wall Street Journal, November 22-23, 2014, at the Independent Woman's Forum's Women of Valor Dinner, November 19, 2014 -- note the arrogance and isolence of ignorant Joe Biden trying to lecture a Somali women, raised as a Muslim, about Islam.
People who are viewed as "insulting" Islam are regularly threatened with violence, including death. This happens inside and outside Islamic countries, occurring in the form of legal sanctions in the former, with efforts to institutionalize such prohibitions everywhere, so that Islam could not be criticized even, for instance, in the United States.
Yet most of the genuine insults to Islam these days come from Muslims themselves. If anyone's purpose was to discredit Islam by vicious actions done in its name, there is now abundant evidence that this is the program of many Muslims, including several internationally recognized Islamic states.
In April 2014, the radical Islamic group in Nigeria, Boko Haram ("Education is forbidden") kidnapped 276 girls out of a government school in the north of the country. The leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, subsequently asserted, in a videotaped message, that the girls were now slaves and would be sold as slaves. "Slavery is allowed in my religion, and I shall capture people and make them slaves," he said. This must be cold comfort for the anti-American ideologues who want to convey the impression that slavery was invented in America and was a unique evil imposed by white people on Africans, and that one of the worst and most unforgivable things about slavery was sexual expoitation. Now Abubakar Shekau openly proclaims slavery and sexual slavery part of the program of Islamic revival, and he is correct in terms of traditional Islamic law, where slaves are indeed the sexual property of their owners.
Although Michelle Obama joined a Twitter campaign to "free our girls," the girls mostly have not been freed, but have vanished into forced conversion, forced marriages, and slavery. The Nigerian Army is so corrupt and ineffective (at least until the recent elections) that the influence and massacres of Boko Haram have continued to spread across northeastern Nigeria and now are spilling into the Cameroon and Chad, whose own armies now seem a bit more active than that of Nigeria. Abubaker Shekau boasts of all these developments as triumphs, even as the Obamas, the American Left, and the "Mainsteam" media subsequently seem to have entirely forgotten about "our girls."
Meanwhile, the Sudan condemned to death Meriam Yehya Ibrahim for apostasy from Islam, on the principle that her father was a Muslim, even though he had abandoned her at birth and she was raised as a Christian by her Ethiopian mother. People claiming to be her father's family suddenly showed up and charged her with apostasy, perhaps in the hope of seizing her business. A Sudanese court condemned Ibrahim to death by hanging for apostasy; nullified her marriage to her American husband, Daniel Wani, on the grounds that he was not a Muslim; and then condemned her to 100 lashes for adultery before her execution. Since Ibrahim was actually pregnant, her punishments were deferred for two years, and she subsequently gave birth under degrading conditions in prison, where she is still held. International protests have had no effect on the Sudanese government, let alone on the sort of general opinion in Islam that might otherwise make a difference. According to opinion polls, most Muslims still think that apostasy should be punished with death and are thus complacent in the face of the outrage a case like this provokes among morally sensible and conscientious persons everywhere.
Eventually, Ibrahim was at first given permission to leave the Sudan, but then she was rearrested at the airport. After being released again, Ibrahim was protected at the U.S. Embassy. On 24 July 2014, she finally arrived in Rome through the additional assistance and good offices of the Italian Government. Finally safe in New Hampshire, the actions of the Sudan have come in for wide condemnation.
Equally ugly and vicious, or more so, on 27 May 2014 a pregnant Pakistani woman, Farzana Parveen, was stoned to death by members of her own family in broad daylight and in full view of the public outside the High Court in Lahore, where she was going to refute the chargers filed by her family that she had been kidnapped by her husband. The actions of the family thus tend to contradict their own complaint, and one begins to suspect that the charges were filed only to draw Parveen out in public, where she could be captured or killed. This is in the despicable category of "honor killings" of women, of which there have even been examples in the United States, as when two sixteen-year-old girls in Texas were murdered by their own father, who then escaped back to Egypt. At least in Pakistan, several of the perpetrators have now been arrested, including Parveen's father, although police present at the scene of the murder did nothing and, of course, it remains to be seen what will come of the case. Surrendering at the scene, the father was unrepentant and said, "I killed my daughter as she had insulted all of our family by marrying a man without our consent, and I have no regret over it."
The ideology of the "Islamic State" (IS, ISIS, or ISIL), that was established in Syria and Iraq in 2014, is that "People of the Book," Christians and Jews, are no longer to be tolerated by Islam. This was a provision only for the early days of Islam. Now, unbelievers of any sort must convert, leave, or die in the territory governed by the State. Of course, Jews in the area, given the attitude of previous regimes, already had almost entirely fled to Israel. Now all the rest, mostly Christians, must go -- although it looks like Shi'ites and other heterodox sects of Islam, constituting a plurality of the population of Iraq, are also not longer going to be tolerated by the Militantly Sunni State. Thus, after apologists have told Western audiences about the tolerance of Islam for everyone, the fighters on the ground have instead taken to apply ethnic (or religious) cleansing, that is, where Christians are not actually executed, or Christian women and girls sold into slavery. This seems to provoke rather more enthusiasm than outrage in Muslim communities around the world, even as we were archly informed by Obama and John Kerry how "un-Islamic" ISIS really is.
Although now (2019) ISIS has been driven from Iraq, after hard fighting, and has mostly been eliminated in Syria, it has been regrouping with allies in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, etc. It is not clear what has happened to its leadership, like the "Caliph" al-Baghdadi, who have always maintained a shadowy existence.
In the news recently has been another case in Pakistan. A poor, illiterate Christian woman, Asia Noreen Bibi, was arrested and tried for "blasphemy" in 2009 and condemned to death by hanging in 2010. Although her sentence was upheld by some higher courts (Lahore, 2014), the Supreme Court of Pakistan voided the verdict in 2018. In January, 2019 the Supreme Court has cleared the way for her to leave the country, apparently to join her family in Canada, as she has done.
Ironically, in a 2018 election Ireland just revoked its ancient blasphemy law, which of course had not been applied for centuries. The situation in Pakistan is very different, where flimsy accusations of blasphemy have been used to persecute or even kill Christians, often at the hands of mobs or prison inmates or even by prison guards. A Government minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, and the Governor of the Punjab, Salmann Taseer, were both murdered, Taseer by his own bodyguard, simply for criticizing the blasphemy laws and the handling of Bibi's case. One of the Justices on the Supreme Court asked, "Is this the face of Islam you want to show to the world?" Indeed. The fanatics are making it a very ugly face. But the bloody minded and chanting mobs don't really seem to even know their Islam. The school of Islamic law traditionally followed in Pakistan, the Hanafi, does not call for the death penalty for non-Muslims who might be considered to blaspheme against Islam. At the same time, Bibi was originally accused by two Muslim woman who objected to her using a water cup that Muslims had used to drink water. An argument ensued. Thus, the original objection had nothing to do with Islam but reflected the pollution taboos germane to the Hindu Caste sytem, from which Indians presumably would escape by converting to Islam. But these now seem to have been imported into Pakistani Islam, with Christians regarded as the equivalent of Untouchables. This is thin ice for Muslims, many of whom are suspected by Hindus of having originally been Untouchables themselves. This encourages Hindu fanatics in India, who are allied with Prime Minister Modi, who was just reelected.
With a further irony, Pakistan has long been a nominal ally of the United States. Yet opinion polls seem to show that Pakistan is the most anti-American nation in the world, followed closely, as we might expect, by Palestinians. But it is not clear what kind of grudge Pakistanis have; and the popular anti-American element is suspected to extend into parts of the Pakistani government, including the intelligence services. That Osama bin Ladin lived unmolested in Pakistan for years, and was only killed in a secret American operation, would seem to reflect protection by powerful figures, powerful enough that no one in Pakistan could be trusted with information about the surgical strike to kill him in 2011. The Pakistani Government objected to the raid, of course, but it seemed the sort of half-hearted objection that reflected understanding of its circumstances.
While outrages by the Tâlibân, Boko Haram, or ISIS allow us the comfort of seeing fanatical Jihadists as a minority of fanatics, the murderous mobs and celebrated assassins in Pakistan give a very different impression. As the Justice said, "Is this the face of Islam you want to show to the world?" For a great many Pakistanis, apparently so.
Thus is Islam truly insulted and discredited, rivaling in moral perversity the now well-established tradition of "martyrdom" by the murderous suicide bombing of civilians; and Muslims are left with no reasonable ground for complaint when others view Islam with distrust, fear, and loathing. When the "Believers" Ἐγκλινοβάραγγος (Enklinobarangus)
At Brandeis University, we are learning the hierarchy of the new multiculti caste system. In theory, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is everything the identity-group fetishists dig: female, atheist, black, immigrant. If conservative white males were to silence a secular women's rights campaigner from Somalia, it would be proof of the Republican Party's "war on women," or the encroaching Christian fundamentalist theocracy, or just plain old... racism... But when the sniveling white male who purports to be the President of Brandeis (one Frederick Lawrence) does it out of deference to Islam, Miss Hirsi Ali's blackness washes off her like a bad dye job on a telly news anchor. White feminist Germaine Greer [The Female Eunuch, 1970] can speak at Brandeis because, in one of the more whimsical ideological evolutions even by dear old Germaine's standards, Ms. Greer feels that clitoridectomies add to the rich tapestry of "cultural identity": "One man's beautification is another man's mutilation," as she puts it. But black feminist Hirsi Ali, who was on the receiving end of "one's man's mutilation" and lives under death threats because she was boorish enough to complain about it, is too "hateful" to be permitted to speak. In the internal contradictions of multiculturalism, Islam trumps all: race, gender, secularism, everything. So, in the interests of multiculti sensitivity, pampered upper-middle-class trusty-fundy children of entitlement are pronouncing a Somali refugee beyond the pale and signing up to Islamic strictures on the role of women.
Mark Steyn, The [Un]documented Mark Steyn, Don't Say You Weren't Warned [Regnery Publishing, 2014, pp.371-372, boldface added]
Islam was never a religion of peace. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Caliph of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 14 May 2015; apparently killed himself, and two children, with a suicide bomb when cornered by American forces in Syria, 26 October 2019.
We hate you, first and foremost, because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah -- whether you realize it or not -- by making partners for Him in worship, you blaspheme against Him, claiming that He has a son, you fabricate lies against His prophets and messengers, and you indulge in all manner of devilish practices.
We hate you because your secular, liberal societies permit the very things that Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He has permitted...
Your secular liberalism has led you to tolerate... and even support 'gay rights,' to allow alcohol, drugs, fornication, gambling, and usury to become widespread, and to encourage the people to mock those who denounce these filthy sins and vices. As such... we wage war against you to stop you from spreading your disbelief and debauchery...
The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if you were to pay jizyah [ "Why We Hate You," ISIS official Dabiq Magazine, July 2016
Muslim clerics are threatening the lives of Jews from the pulpits of American mosques, and they are doing it with virtual impunity, say former US law-enforcement officials who worry that the rhetoric could lead to violent attacks.
Over the past six months, at least five prominent US imams have been caught on tape preaching violence against Jews in sermons at mosques across America.
Yet these radical preachers inciting anti-Semitic violence aren't prosecuted or even permanently banished by the leadership of their mosques.
"It's outrageous they aren't immediately removed and investigated for what may be solicitation [to commit a crime of volence]," was the view of veteran FBI Special Agent John Guandolo...
Jewish people already are disproportionately targeted for hate crimes in America, but recent sermons could fan the flames of anti-Semitism. In November, the FBI released new data showing there were more Jewish victims of anti-religious hate crimes in 2016 (the last reported year) than victims of all other religious groups combined. "License to Incite," The New York Post, January 28, 2018, p.34 -- so much for the idea the Muslims are minding their own business but being widely victimized and assaulted in America. A new political crime has been added to Leftist demonology. This is "Islamophobia." The precedent for this term seems to be "homophobia," and both are about equally confused in their etymology. A "phobia" is a fear, so "Islamophobia" should mean "fear of Islam," as "homophobia," with "homo" used as a prefix for "homosexual," should mean "fear of homosexuals." This is not the way these words are used, however. "Homophobia" and "Islamophobia" are supposed to mean hatred of homosexuals, and of Islam, respectively, where this hatred is the morally (and perhaps legally) culpable expression of bigotry and hostility.
In "homophobia" this was already a tendentious reading of traditional attitudes towards homosexuality. Certainly there are people who hate homosexuals, and are even willing to commit violence against them, and it might be reasonable to imagine people fearing homosexuals, if they think that the innocent can be "converted" to homosexuality, or that homosexuality is a decadent and disruptive influence in society. But in general, "homophobia" is usually just applied to people who, largely for religious reasons, and without any particular personal hostility or tendency to violence, judge that homosexual practices are immoral. This is rarely addressed in an honest way in public debate, where "liberal" opinion is in the business of smearing traditional religion (or at least traditional Christianity). Instead, "homophobia" has become a political slogan and a slur, whose meaning and implications are left unarticulated, and which itself becomes an expression of hostility and contempt for religious traditionalists.
It is then ironic that "Islamophobia" should follow in the footsteps of this usage, taking advantage of its device as a political slogan and a slur, when in the modern world the source of some of the most intense persecution of homosexuals is from militant Islam. When the President of Iran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, was invited to speak at Columbia University (at the time of his appearance before the United Nations), many of the anti-American elite were certainly hopeful of hearing a good diatribe against Imperialism and the United States. Unfortunately, a naive, or perhaps hopeful (or both), participant then asked Ahmadinejad about the status of homosexuals in Iran. The answer was that there are no homosexuals in Iran. An informed questioner would have already known that they are hanged as quickly as they can be identified. The sentiment that homosexuals should be executed had also been previously expressed by a British Imam, without consequences, despite laws in Europe that could construe such an opinion as an incitement to a hate crime.
How absurd this can all get was revealed recently when a "gay pride" parade was cancelled in London, not because of anti-gay threats from Muslims -- which had actually been expressed -- but purportedly in "solidarity" with opposition to anti-Muslim "Islamophobia," which was said to be the moral equivalent of homophobia. Why a desire to assert solidarity between anti-homophobia and anti-Islamophobia should result in a "gay pride" parade being cancelled was left unexplained -- as, indeed, one would expect the opposite reaction, that the "gay pride" parade, with an anti-homophobia theme, would be combined with a parade asserting an anti-Islamophobia theme. Obviously, the fear of violence against the parade from Muslims led to its cancellation; but the organizers, in a sort of anticipatory Stockholm Syndrome, decided to dislay their political correctness by identifying with those from whom they feared violence. There are few more bizarre contortions evident in contemporary politics.
Ironic or not, the use of "Islamophobia" is an attempt to demonize those who actually do fear Islam,
Islamophobia
We took the liberty to make some enquiries concerning the ground of their pretentions to make war upon nations who had done them no injury, and observed that we considered all mankind as our friends who had done us no wrong, nor had given us any provocation.
, i.e. Muslim] who was slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise. He said, also, that the man who was the first to board a vessel had one slave over and above his share, and that when they sprang to the deck of an enemy's ship, every sailor held a dagger in each hand and a third in his mouth; which usually struck such terror into the foe that they cried out for quarter at once.
]. He said "ISIS had nothing to do with Islam." I said, "I beg to differ." He said, "Let me tell you one or two things about Islam." I politely left the conversation at that. I wasn't used to arguing with vice presidents.
come, it seems that others, including heterodox Muslims, have reasonably come to expect only murder, torture, and tyranny.
Islam is the religion of fighting.
, the tax on infidels] and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation, we would continue to hate you.
|
Jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim.
Anwar al-Awlaki (d.2011) |
The conflicts, confusions, and deceptions in these attitudes came to a head with the proposal for building a mosque on Park Place, a couple of blocks from the site of the 
World Trade Center in New York -- the "ground zero mosque." We see the building on the site at right, with modest New York City police protection.
There would have been a right way and a wrong way to do this project. The right way would have reflected the concern of well-meaning Muslims to dissociate their religion from the 9/11 attacks and to express their dismay and mortification that the terrorists should have invoked Islam to justify the atrocities. The mosque as an expression of contrition for the damage done by vicious co-religionists would have at least been a step in assuaging the justifiable fears of all the targets of terrorism. Indeed, there should be such a mosque at Ground Zero, in conjunction with facilities related to the religions of all the victims of 9/11. There were, after all, many innocent Muslims who were killed at the World Trade Center. The project of the mosque should be making clear that the "martyrs" of 9/11 were the victims of the terrorists, not the terrorists themselves (for whom, of course, a "martyrdom operation" means a suicide attack).
The wrong way to promote the project, however, is the way it has actually been done. The leader of the effort, the Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, himself was on record as blaming the United States for the 9/11 attacks and refused to distance himself from terrorist organizations like Hamas. He and his wife have responded to objections to the project with accusations of "Islamophobia," by which they clearly mean, not reasonable "fear of Islam," but a bigoted and intolerant hostility for Islam. Thus, they give every indication of militancy and would leave any reasonable person with the impression that the mosque is not an attempt at reconciliation -- which would be ill served by calling most Americans bigots -- but is in fact a Jihad Victory Mosque whose purpose is to promote an Islamist agenda as close as possible to the place were militant Islamists killed almost 3000 victims. This makes the project an insolent gesture that both insults America and makes use of the anti-American "useful idiots" who are eager to cooperate in their own destruction.
Imam Rauf appeared on "The O'Reilly Factor" on 8 May 2012 and announced that he was no longer involved with the Park Place mosque, citing some kind of disagreements with other backers. It would be nice to know who those other backers are and what Rauf's differences were with them. Nevertheless, in the interview Rauf keep talking as though he were still planning the project. Perhaps he was just talking about his general goals. Bill O'Reilly mentioned that he had long ago said that if Rauf would appear on "The Factor" and renounce Terrorism, O'Reilly himself would take up a hammer and help build the mosque. Rauf brought along a drawing of a hammer, that he said was from his wife, and gave it to O'Reilly. I did not notice, however, that Rauf ever did actually renounce Terrorism during the interview. Perhaps my attention wandered and I missed it.
We need to begin to suspect the motives of anyone willing to use the term "Islamophobia." The Left admires militant Islam for its expressions of hostility to America, capitalism, "imperialism," and democracy -- i.e. for something that apologists want to deny that Islam actually represents. The Left, of course, has no respect for Islam as a religion or for its traditional religious or social values. All of these, from the subordination of women to the ferocious treatment of homosexuals, are actually anathema to elite political correctness. But opportunism trumps honesty, and this is as true for the Islamists as for Western Leftists. Both are pleased with the alliance, however Unholy to either ideology, as the old Arab saying (from the days of tribal vendettas) is well remembered -- "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."
We see this alliance in various examples of what can only be called wishful thinking, if not outright delusion. Thus, Hollywood personality Rosie O'Donnell, a homosexual herself, drew considerable attention to her assertion that Christian fundmentalists are as bad as Islamic terrorists (along with claims that the 9/11 attack was an "inside job," a favorite trope of the Left). Since "just as bad" doesn't seem to square with the absence of Christian suicide bombers, mass terror attacks, or large popular organizations that preach Christian Holy War through terror and combat, O'Donnell seemed more than a little out of touch with reality. Not as extreme but just as revealing was the speculation by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg that the perpetrator of the May 2010 attempted Times Square bombing was, "Homegrown, maybe a mentally deranged person or someone with a political agenda that doesn’t like the health care bill or something." It looked like Bloomberg was hoping that the bomber was one of his political enemies (i.e. opposed to socialized medicine), rather than the kind of Muslim radical that he turned out in fact to be. Bloomberg loudly supports the ground zero mosque.
Meanwhile, the City of New York attempted to prevent the rebuilding of the St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church, which was actually crushed by the falling South Tower of the World Trade Center on 9/11. Bloomberg did not speak out on this issue. Fortunately, the church persisted in its right to rebuild, and now a glorious design has been approved, which should be finished by 2016 or 2017. Adjacent to the 9/11 Memorial, which is open, bleak, and cold -- appropriately -- the church will display a warm glow from its translucent walls. With elements borrowed from Santa Sophia, the church stands in fitting contrast to any Jihad Victor Mosque that might be built.
The courageous Ayaan Hirsi Ali grew up in Somalia, lived in Saudi Arabia and Kenya, and fled an arranged marriage, and Islam, to the Netherlands. There she worked with Theo van Gogh on the movie about women in Islam that got him assassinated on the street. She was elected to the Dutch parliament before her citizenship was revoked, probably because of the embarrassment she was causing to spineless Dutchmen like Ian Buruma (a Professor of "Democracy and Human Rights" at Bard College), who has publicly said that Ali is as much a fanatic (for freedom, human rights, and tolerance?) as the Islamists (for murder, terror, and intolerance?). If Buruma means that this is good, he has not done a good job of clarifying his intention.
Similarly, Ali has been confronted in interviews with the proposition that crimes are committed as much by Christians as by Muslims. Since the common crimes of Christians are rarely framed in terms of a Holy War against infidels, or suicide bombings, Ali naturally found the proposition more puzzling than anything else; and we are left with the impression of a kind of desperation on the part of the interviewers to deflect blame from Islam and to create the kind of "moral equivalence" that the Left promoted, in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. Most people see through this easily, although, as George Orwell said, nothing is so preposterous that an intellectual will not believe it. People like O'Donnell, Bloomberg, and Buruma know that they have the "useful idiot" intellectuals on their side.
In 2014 American "higher education" disgraced itself when Ali was at first invited as a commencement speaker at Brandeis University and then "disinvited" when it was realized that she might criticize Islam, and had done so in the past. This was an opportunity for every other college in the country to scramble and invite her themselves. Apparently none of them did. All this was was after Theo van Gogh had been assassinated, after Malala Yousafzai had been shot in the head by the Talibân, after the girls had been kidnapped and sold into slavery in Nigeria, and after many other cases of violence and oppression against women in Islam. Since Brandeis said that Ali's views were "inconsistent with Brandeis University’s core values," one could be excused some curiosity about what those values might be, since critics of Judaism and Christianity, sometimes vitriolic ones, have been invited to speak at Brandeis. The values, not just of Brandeis but of most other colleges in the country, are clearly those of cowardice, if not anti-American sympathy for the Terrorist enemies of America, civilization, and humanity. This what American education has come to.
Currently, the ugliest counter-examples to the good intentions of Muslims are the continuing attacks on Christians in Iraq, Pakistan, and especially in Egypt. Churches are looted, burned, demolished, and/or bombed. Christians in Iraq and Egypt are kidnapped and ransomed or tortured and murdered. Women and girls are kidnapped, forcibly converted to Islam, and "married" to Muslims against their will. Campaigns are conducted in Egypt that Christians families are holding their own girls "hostage" after they supposedly converted to Islam. The government of Egypt does not even allow churches to be built or repaired without its permission, which is effecively never given. Or, if it is, mobs often attack the churches, or even the whole Christian villages around them, during or after construction. On 24 November 2010, Egypt security forces actually stormed the St. Mary and St. Michael churches, which were under construction in Giza, occupying them and firing live ammunition at Coptic demonstrators, killing at least four. The official complaint was that a permit for the construction had not been obtained, although actually it had. Either way, a paramilitary attack, shooting civilians, is not the reasonable response to people building churches.
The Western Press pays little attention to these atrocities, both because the Western secular elite, in the intelligentsia, academia, and the media, is hostile to Christianity, and generally kills stories about the persecution of Christians, and because the political Left is effectively an ally of Islamic Fascism. Since Egyptian state security forces fail to protect Christians and often appear to cooperate in their persecution, including this recent case of shooting Christian demonstrators, while the government-controlled Press promotes anti-Christian hysteria, this puts the lie to claims about the general tolerance, respect, and good-will that Islam is supposed to show towards other religions. That is not the practice on the ground in most Islamic countries, whether the Western Press reports it or not.
On 15 April 2013, the Jihad struck a great blow against that hated symbol of American imperialism and oppression: the Boston Marathon. It also struck a blow against the idea that there is some sort of factual, moral, or psychological problem with fearing and suspecting American Muslims of nurturing and harboring terrorists. It now turns out that the apparently nice Muslim kid next door, who hangs out, smokes dope, plays on the soccer team, isn't named "Muhammad," doesn't even look like an Arab (as was all the case with Dzhokhar Tsarnaev) might nevertheless be building bombs and planning to blow up children who are watching a footrace. It is also a sobering lesson that the Chechens, whose main nationalistic complaint is with Russia, and with whom we fought on the same side in Kosovo, nevertheless harbor the same antipathy towards the "Great Satan" as other Jihadists. The Leftist "Islamophobia" narrative is exploded. Of course, since it was perverse, dishonest, and tendentious to begin with, there is nothing to stop it contining in the hands of the same blind anti-American ideologues who originated it.
The word "Allâh" in Arabic, with Cognates in Hebrew & Babylonian
Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine
My thanks to Professor Shaun Marmon of Princeton University for drawing my attention to Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996]. This remarkable and invaluble work is, strangely enough, already out of print. Also of great use was Classical Islam, a History 600-1258, by G.E. von Grunebaum [Aldine Publishing, 1970 -- a professor, d.1972, I had a class with at UCLA while an undergraduate], The Arabs, by Anthony Nutting [Mentor, 1964], The Arab Awakening, by George Antonius [Capricorn Books, 1965], The Cambridge History of Islam, edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis [Vols. 1A, 1B, 2A, & 2B, Cambridge, 1977], and other historical sources credited elsewhere in these pages.
The word "Allâh" in Arabic, with Cognates in Hebrew & Babylonian
Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine
The advent of Islâm, with Arab armies coming out of the practical equivalent of nowhere, was unforeseen and unforeseeable. It dramatically and permanently altered the history of both the Middle East and the Mediterranean world. Persia was eliminated for many years as an independent political or cultural force, and the revival of Romania was ended, with the Empire reduced from about 3/4 of its original extent, as restored by Justinian, to little more than 1/4, all that was left by the reign of Leo III.
Index
Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
Islâm, 622 AD;
Classical Islâm
| THE PROPHET | |
|---|---|
THE HIJRAH,  , ERA,THE ISLÂMIC HISTORICAL ERA | 16 July 622 AD |
| 28 April 1998 AD = 1419 Annô Hegirae | |
 ,  Peace Upon Him | 622-632 |
Although perhaps alienated cousins, Christendom and Islâm could have nearly equal claim as standard bearers of "Western Civilization," and the revival of European learning after the 11th Century undeniably owed a heavy debt to what Islâm had been doing with Classical philosophy and science in the previous centuries.
Although the Arabs tend to be thought of as desert nomads, the origin of Muḥammad was urban and mercantile. His home town of 
, Makkah (Mecca), became increasingly hostile to his attacks on polytheism and idolatry, until he was invited to the nearby Yathrib as a mediator -- later marked as the beginning of the Islâmic Era in 622. Soon the virtual ruler of Yathrib, which then became 
, Madînatu-nNabî', the "City of the Prophet," or just , Madina (Medina), Muḥammad seemed to pose an even greater threat, and the Meccans resorted to military force. Since the results of this were inconclusive, and warfare was very bad for business, the Meccans decided that if you can't beat 'em, join 'em. Under a treaty, Muḥammad returned to Mecca and smashed the idols. Since the House of God, the , Ka'aba, then became the goal of universal Moslem pilgrimage, the Meccans ended up doing very well out of the transaction. Muḥammad did not long survive this triumph and was buried in his house in Medina, around which the Prophet's Mosque was built.
At a time when the very existence of Jesus is often doubted, and that of Moses regularly taken as no more than mythic, the historicity of Muḥammad has generally been regarded as secure. Nevertheless, most of the information we have about Muḥammad comes from much later sources. Although Islâm would develop a rich tradition of historiography, this did not begin until the days of the Abbasids, and many of the later traditions that are reported about Muḥammad are rightly matters of scepticism. The full treatment of "higher criticism" in Islâm, however, has only come recently; and Muslims are often unsettled and "offended" (i.e. make death threats) when fundamental questions about the historical Muḥammad get asked. Not only do we get proposals that Muḥammad didn't exist but also strange assertions such as that the Qur'ân was originally in Aramaic and was patched together over many years.
A moderate and sober version of this revisionism can be found with In the Shadow of the Sword, The Birth of Islam and the Rise of the Global Arab Empire, by Tom Holland [Anchor Books, 2012, 2013]. The salient issue in this book is whether Muḥammad actually came from Mecca. The arguments, largely from the internal evidence of the Qur'ân itself, seem quite strong, but with one fatal flaw. If Muḥammad was not from Mecca, but from some locale rather further north, where was that? There is not a clue about a specific location, and never even a speculative suggestion from Holland. Yet if Muḥammad seems to have been involved in active international trade, as we are given to understand, and if he achieved enough fame to be invited to rule Yathrib, as he was, it is hard to understand how the center of his early activities would never get mentioned. If one objection against Mecca is that there is really little notice of the place in the Qur'ân, this same objection applies even more strongly to a place that, as it happens, is not mentioned at all. And if another objection to Mecca is that it is never mentioned by non-Islâmic sources, then, again, this applies equally well to the place that the Qur'an does mention as the site of the Ka'aba, namely "Bakka," which itself otherwise cannot be identified from any other source whatsoever.
So, while it is edifying that Islâm should receive the same kind of critical attention that Judaism and Christianity have endured, it is not clear that this really adds up to much. We may have questions, but clear and decisive answers are elusive, and the forms of revisionism, radical or moderate, are left with incomplete cases. A mature and confident Islâm could shrug off such things, as Christians must the constant assaults of atheists; but it is obviously a condition of our times that Muslims often react with fury and violence to skepticism, whether innocent, perceptive, or foolish. Until Muslims get a grip, "Islamophobia," as fear of Islâm, will be fully justified.
The Islâmic Era accompanies the Islâmic Calendar, which is purely lunar and cycles through the seasons every 32 or 33 years, a convenient provision when fasting is required during the daylight hours in the month of Ramaḍân -- neither Northern nor Southern hemispheres are stuck with Ramaḍân at times of either long or short days.
| THE RIGHTLY GUIDED CALIPHS | |
|---|---|
| 'Abû Bakr |  Caliph, 632-634 |
| assumes title , Khalîfah, "Successor," to the Prophet | |
| 'Umar | 634-644 |
| Romans defeated at Yarmûk, 636; fall of Gaza, Antioch, Persians defeated, al-Qadisiyyah, Mesopotamia falls, 636/8; Jerusalem surrendered, 638; Egypt invaded, 639; fall of Caesarea in Palestine, 640; Persians defeated, Nihawand, opens Iranian plateau, 642 | |
| 'Utman | 644-656 |
| attacks in India, 644; Roman army destroyed in North Africa, but army withdraws, 647; Persia overrun, by 651 | |
| 'Alî | 656-661 |
| Battle of Siffin, truce with Mu'âwiya, 657; 'Alî assassinated with poisoned sword by Kharijite | |
Curiously, the 30 year cycle of the Islâmic calendar commensurates with the 19 year cycle of the Jewish calendar after 1368 solar or 1410 lunar Islâmic years. This puts the Islâmic Era in 622 at one full cycle after the beginning of the Era of Nabonassar in 747 BC. Another full cycle comes down to our time, in 1990. Anyone disposed to numerological portents are welcome to make of this what they will.
With the death of the Prophet, some Arabs thought that the House of Islâm had ended. They were soon persuaded of the error of their ways, and the armies of united Arabia were turned on Romania and Persia, which were both exhausted from the longest and harshest war they had ever fought against each other. The Roman position in Syria and Egypt was also compromised by the Monophysite heresy of the locals, and its suppression by Imperial authorities.
The tolerance of the Arabs for any "People of the Book" seemed preferable, especially after the respect and consideration shown by the Caliph 'Umar when he entered Jersualem. The period of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs," who were all either fathers-in-law or sons-in-law of Muḥammad, however, ended in some confusion. The murder of 'Uthman was blamed by his powerful Meccan relatives on 'Alî, who was unable to exert authority against them over all Islâmic territories. The "bloody shirt of 'Uthman" was thereafter considered a largely cynical ploy by the Omayyads to further their own cause, which soon did triumph at the death of 'Alî, whose sons were either bought off (Ḥasan) or killed (Ḥusayn).
Part of the strategy of conquest was the founding of Arab garrison towns. These were called the 
, amṣâr. The word in the singular, 
, miṣr, could mean "big city, metropolis, capital"; and the root verb could mean "to colonize," which seems appropriate for the circumstances. The same word, Miṣr, also meant "Egypt," with cognates in all the ancient Semitic languages to that effect. With the Arabs, the Semitic name would settled permanently on Egypt.
The amṣâr might be called the "Fetters" of Islâm, on analogy with the "Fetters" of Greece, since they helped a relatively small number of Arabs concentrate their force to hold a large empire -- although the original "Fetters" were to secure hegemony, not conquest, and so were mainly forts, not Macedonian settler cities. The amṣâr were created to be exclusively Arab cities; but local women, freely admitted to the towns, soon altered their purely Arab character. Whether the conquerors had families back at Medina, or elsewhere, they did not resist taking local wives or concubines. Soon, the Abbasid Caliphs themselves mostly would have Persian or Turkish mothers. Indeed, of the 37 Caliphs down to 1258, only three of their mothers would be free-born Arabs. Other mothers were Afghan, Khawarizmian, Greek, Slavic, Berber, Persian, Turkish, Armenian, and Ethiopian [Arabs, A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires, by Tim Mackintosh-Smith, Yale University Press, 2019, p.283].
These cities were al-Baṣrah, 
(founded 636), al-Kûfah, 
(639), al-Fusṭâṭ, 
(641), and al-Qayrawân, 
(670). Baṣrah was founded below the point where the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers conjoin. This was a strategic location where attacks could be launched north, east, and back west, if need be. Kûfah was on the Euphrates near the Lakhmid capital of al-Ḥîrah and thus was positioned to dominate the Arab tribes adjacent to Mesopotamia. This is where the first battle was with the Sassanids, in 633. Fusṭâṭ was in Egypt and is discussed at that link. Al-Qayrawân was founded a bit later, by the Omayyads, as part of the invasion of North Africa. It noteworthy that all these cities were founded inland. The Caliph Umar had told his generals to go nowhere they could not get by camel, and so for a long time the Arabs avoided contact with the sea, either to use it, or be vulnerable from it. This would change, but the locations of the cities didn't. This is especially striking in Egypt and North Africa, where the Roman metropoles, at Alexandria and Carthage, were taken but not used in the same way.
Although the Omayyads were cousins of Muḥammad, they definitely had the greater status at Mecca and were originally quite hostile (except for 'Uthman) to Islâm. The symbolic crowns in the diagram are for the Prophet and the Caliphs (, Khalîfah, "successor"). Only that for the Prophet is given with a nimbus, since for the Orthodox only he was divinely inspired and authoritative. 
The light blue nimbus for 'Alî indicates the Shi'ite belief that he and his descendants were divinely inspired and authoritative also (the Imâms). Modern families that trace descent to the Prophet or his family, like Kings of Hijaz, Iraq, and Jordan, call themselves Hâshemites.
A curious feature of the genealogical diagram is the presence of an adopted son of Muḥammad. This is Zayd, the only living person besides Muḥammad himself named in the Qur'ân (33:37) and the first male to convert to Islam. If Zayd had lived, and his status affirmed, not only would he have been the obvious heir and successor to Muḥammad, but it is conceivable that he might have inherited the full mantle of prophecy from him. Instread, Zayd was killed in battle and predeceased Muḥammad, leaving only a minor son, 'Usâmah. And the doctrine became accepted that prophecy ceased with Muḥammad, the "Seal" of the prophets. Islâmic tradition is that Zayd had actually been "unadopted," with verses in the Qur'ân explicitly abolishing adoption altogether and denying that Muḥammad was the father of anyone (Sura 33:4,40). However, when Muḥammad triumphantly entered Mecca, 'Usâmah rode behind him, in a position reserved for his heir. And when the Prophet lay dying, and 'Usâmah arrived, Muḥammad, no longer able to speak, placed his hand on the 17 year-old boy's head, in a gesture that could well have been a conferral of authority. Instead, the boy was pushed aside by the older Companions. When an edition of the Qur'ân was redacted by the Omayad Caliph 'Abd'al-Malid, there is some suspicion that the verses were introduced to discredit the line of Zayd and eliminate the family of 'Usâmah as a threat to the Throne. The Shi'ites had no reason to complain about this. And thus, if there had been a Party of Zayd and 'Usâma, it entirely lost its place in history. 'Usâma himself lived out his life, with heirs, but had been retired to a quiet life in Medina, like 'Alî's son Ḥasan.
| THE SHÎ'ITE IMÂMS | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 'Alî | Caliph, 632-661 |
| First Cousin & Son-In-Law of the Prophet & Fourth Rightly Guided Caliph | ||
| 2 | Ḥasan |  Imâm, 661-669 |
| 3 | Ḥusayn | 669-680 |
| Martyred at Karbalâ', 680 | ||
| 4 | 'Alî Zayn al-'Âbidîn | 680-712 |
| 5 | Muḥammad al-Bâqir | 712-731 |
| 6 | Ja'far al-Ṣâdiq | 731-765 |
| 7 | Ismâ'îl | 765-760 |
| Schism -- followers of Isma'il become the "Seveners" or "Ismailis," basis of Shî'ism of the Fatimids, the Assassins, and in India | ||
| 7 | Mûsâ al-Kâẓim | 765-799 |
| 8 | 'Alî al-Riḍâ | 799-818 |
| 9 | Muḥammad al-Jawâd | 818-835 |
| 10 | 'Alî al-Hâdî | 835-868 |
| 11 | al-Ḥasan al-'Askarî | 868-874 |
| 12 | Muḥammad al-Muntazar al-Mahdî | 874-878 |
| Disappears, 878 -- becomes the "Hidden Imâm," basis of "Twelver" & Iranian Shi'ism | ||
The Shî'ah, 
, or "Faction" of 'Alî held that he was the proper Successor to the Prophet and that only his descendants qualified for the office. Soon, he and his successors were also believed to have a unique divinely inspired understanding of the meaning of the Qur'ân. Thus, the Shî'ite office of , Imâm, became a source of doctrinal authority such as was missing from Orthodox Islâm, which relied on tradition and consensus to establish Islâmic law and doctrine. The line of Imâms splits, however, when the Seventh, Ismâ'îl, is rejected by much of the community. The Seveners, nevertheless, had the most spectacular successes of Shî'ism in the Middle Ages. Today, the Agha Khan heads a Sevener community in India. The collateral line ended with the Twelfth Imâm, who disappeared in 878. Although probably kidnapped and murdered by the Abbasid Caliph, he was believed by his followers to have gone into deathless "Occultation," preparing to return as the "Rightly Guided One," the 
, Mahdî, to usher in the Apocalypse. In time, this Twelver Shî'ism was used by the Safavids to establish a durable national monarchy in Irân. In 1848, it had been 1000 Islâmic lunar years since the Occultation, and the return of the Hidden Imâm was widely expected. Various figures appeared as the Imâm, including the 
, Bâb ("Gate"), from whom the Bâbî and Bahâ'î faiths derive. The source of doctrinal authority in Irânian Shi'ism became an 
, Ayatollâh (in Persian pronunciation), the "Token/Mark of God," who was not individually believed to be the Hidden Imâm but was thought to communicate with him. The Ayatollâh Khomeini was able to use his position to overthrow the last Shâh in 1979 and establish a theocratic "Islâmic Republic."
| OMAYYAD CALIPHS | |
|---|---|
| Mu'âwiya I | 661-680 |
| assumes caliphate at death of 'Alî, moves capital to Damascus; Arab aristocratic government; Siege of Constantinople, 674-677; attacks in India, 677 | |
| Yazîd I | 680-683 |
| Mu'âwiya II | 683-684 |
| Marwân I | 684-685 |
| Uqba ibn Nâfi' founds Qayrawân, 663/4; reaches the Atlantic, killed & Army annihilated by Berber Kusayla, 683 | |
| 'Abd 'al-Malik | 685-705 |
Builds the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, finished 691/692; Conquest of Armenia, 693; silver  , dirham (from  ) & gold  , dînâr (from denarius), first minted, 695; Fall of Carthage, 698, 705; Ḥassân ibn al-Nu'mân defeated by Berber (possibly Jewish) prophetess al-Kâhina (Dahiyah, Dahia, or Dhabba), driven out of North Africa, after 698; Kâhina defeated, Berbers convert, 702 | |
| al-Walîd I | 705-715 |
| Builds the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus, 706-715; Spain falls to Islâm, end of Visigoths, invasion of India, 711 | |
| Sulaymân | 715-717 |
| Siege of Constantinople, 717-718 | |
| 'Umar II | 717-720 |
| Yazîd II | 720-724 |
| Hishâm | 724-743 |
| defeat, 725, & explusion, 737, from India; defeated by Khazars, Ardebil, 730; but defeated and subjected Khazars, 737-c.740 | |
| al-Walîd II | 743-744 |
| Yazîd III | 744 |
| 'Ibrâhîm | 744 |
| Marwân II | 744-750 |
| Abbasid revolution, Omayyads overthrown and massacred (except in Spain); end of Arab empire, 750; Battle of Talas, 751, T'ang Dynasty Chinese defeated, but no further advance into Central Asia | |
 |
|---|
| The Omayyad Mosque, Damascus, 1970 |
The high water mark of the Omayyad realm was certainly under 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walîd, as North Africa, Spain, Transoxania, and part of the Indus Valley fell to Islâm. Permanent monuments to the period were 'Abd al-Malik's Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and al-Walîd's Omayyad Mosque in Damascus. Since both these buildings are now some 1300 years old, it is an oversight of many treatments of history that they are not more celebrated as monuments from a period that is otherwise considered an obscure part of the "Dark Ages." Never before had Damascus been, and never again would it be, the center of such power and civilization.
 |
|---|
| The Omayyad Mosque, Damascus, 1970 |
When the storm broke, it was with astonishing ferocity. The entire Omayyad clan was exterminated. Only one prince escaped, to Spain, where an Omayyad regime endured. Elsewhere, the rebellion succeeded completely, bringing to power distant cousins of the Omayyads, the descendants of Muḥammad's uncle 'Abbâs.
All Moslems now became (more or less) equal, and when the capital shifted to Baghbad, the influence of Persian civilization began to predominate over Roman. The Arabs lost their preeminence, and soon it was the rare Caliph who was not the child of a Persian or Turkish mother. As the Abbasids later declined, Arabia itself slipped from their hold, to become once again a political, if not a religious, backwater. The Arabs had bestowed their religion and their language on the civilization of the Middle East, but true Arabian Arabs would be politically insignificant until the discovery of oil in the 20th century gave them a geopolitical status beyond what any other asset would warrant.
The defeat of the Chinese at Talas was probably still a function of the momentum of Omayyad conquest. However, the overthrow of the Omayyads immediately deflated this momentum, and no further advantage was taken of the Chinese embarrassment -- at a time when the T'ang Dynasty had seen its best days and was on the verge of decline. Curiously, there seems to have been one long-term consequence of the battle of a very different sort. Reportedly, among the Chinese prisoners taken at Talas were artisans who knew how to make paper. What they were doing with a Chinese army in Central Asia, I don't know; but the significance of their craft was quickly recognized. Soon, the Abbasids founded paper mills in Baghdad and the industry quickly spread to Romania. Since parchment is more durable than paper, surviving books tend to be in that material; and the role of paper books in the Mediaeval book market is thus a matter of some uncertainty. That they existed, however, at least in Islam and Romania, is beyond doubt. Paper mills in Francia are first attested in Aragón in 1282.
The Arabic title 
, amîr, is important. Originally this just means "commander" and would be used for a general military officer, or even for the Caliph himself, the 
, Amîru 'lMu'minîn, "Commander of the Faithful." The military commanders then become governors, and so amîr comes to mean "governor." The governors then drift into independence, and amîr then can reasonably be translated "prince." The first truly independent Amirs were the Omayyads in Spain, who were content with the title for a century and a half. Later many Abbasid governors drifted into independence, and the "Emirate" becomes the basic domain of independent Islâmic statehood.
A title that is mostly not seen for many centuries is 
, malik, "king." This is not really an Islâmic title of rule, though it can be a proper name and is very close to one of the Names of God, 
, Mâlik, "Owner, Master, Possessor." 
Every day, Muslims invoke God as the 
, Mâliku Yaumi dDîni, "Possessor the of the Day of Judgment" (Sûrah 1:4). Malik has largely been a post-colonial title, often an ephemeral one.
The old Persian word for King, however, 
, Shâh, occurred with some frequently in Iran and India. What becomes the classic Islâmic title of rule, 
, Sulṭân, "Power, Dominion, Authority," the equivalent in significance and ideology, of universal secular rule, begins with the Seljuks. Its effective universality, however, is shortlived.
Meanwhile, we see a title used for the Roman Emperor in Constantinople. The Arab historian aṭ-Ṭabarî (in his Annales, edition in Leiden, 1883-1884) relates details of embassies in 845 between the Abbasid Caliph al-Wâthiq (842-847) and the Amorian Emperor Michael III (842-867) -- or his Regent mother, Theodora (842-856) -- about a prisoner exchange.
The Caliph had been executing prisoners, taken in the sack of Amoricum in 838, when they refused to convert to Islâm. Since the Romans had their own Arab prisoners, an exchange was suggested, and accepted.
The Roman ambassadors are called 
, rusulu Ṣâḥibi-r-Rûm, the "messengers of the Emperor of the Romans," one of whom seems to have been the future Patriarch Photius. See the discussion of the expression for "Romans."
So here the word for "Emperor" is 
(irregular or "broken" plural 
, ṣaḥâbah), which is familiar, as "Sahib," in countless movies about India and Africa. It is an important word in Arabic. Ṣâḥib can mean "owner, possessor, master, lord," etc., as it does here, or it can mean "companion, comrade, friend, follower" (comes in Latin). Thus, 
, aṣ-Ṣaḥâbah, are the "Companions" of the Prophet Muḥammad. These are the most important personages in the history of Islâm apart from the Prophet himself. Also noteworthy is the term 
, "messengers," where the singular, 
, rasûl, is found in the expression 
, rasûlu-llâh, i.e. Muḥammad as the "Messenger of God," which is used in the Confession of Faith.
| ABBASID CALIPHS | |
|---|---|
'Abdullâh asSaffâḥ | 750-754 |
'Abdullâh al-Manṣûr | 754-775 |
Muḥammad al-Mahdî | 775-785 |
Mûsâ al-Hâdî | 785-786 |
Hârûn arRashîd | 786-809 |
| mythic and cultural height of Abbasid Caliphate; Idrîsids break away in Morocco, 789; first paper mill established in Baghbad, 794-795; great earthquake in Egypt, Alexandria & Pharos Lighthouse damaged, 797 | |
Muḥammad al-'Amîn | 809-813 |
'Abdullâh al-Ma'mûn | 813-833 |
Muḥammad al-Mu'taṣim | 833-842 |
| moved to Samarra with Turkish guard | |
Hârûn al-Wâtiq | 842-847 |
Ja'far al-Mutawakkil | 847-861 |
| assassinated by Turkish guard | |
Muḥammad al-Muntaṣir | 861-862 |
| assassinated by Turkish guard? | |
Aḥmad al-Musta'în | 862-866 |
| deposed, executed by Turkish guard | |
Muḥammad al-Mu'tazz | 866-869 |
| used North African troops to kill Turkish leader, but then deposed and executed by Turkish guard | |
Muḥammad al-Muhtadî | 869-870 |
| Zanj Rebellion, 869-883; tried to ban alcohol; assassinated by Turkish guard | |
Aḥmad al-Mu'tamid | 870-892 |
| returned to Baghdad; suppressed Zanj Rebellion, 883; recognizes King of Armenia, 885 | |
Aḥmad al-Mu'taḍid | 892-902 |
| recovers territory from rebellions | |
'Alî Muktafî | 902-908 |
Ja'far al-Muqtadir | 908, 908-929, 929-932 |
Muḥammad al-Qâhir | 929, 932-934 |
| deposed, blinded by Turkish guard | |
Aḥmad arRâdî | 934-940 |
Ibrâhîm al-Muttaqî | 940-944 |
| deposed, blinded by Turkish guard | |
'Adbullâh al-Mustakfî | 944-946 d. 949 |
| under Shi'ite Buwayids, 945; deposed, blinded by Iranian hillmen | |
al-Faḍl al-Muṭî' | 946-974 |
'AdulKarîm aṭṬâ'î' | 974-991 |
Aḥmad al-Qâdir | 991-1031 |
'Abdullâh al-Qâ'im | 1031-1075 |
| under Seljuks; 1055, grants title of Sulṭân | |
'Abdullâh al-Muqtadî | 1075-1094 |
Aḥmad al-Mustaẓhir | 1094-1118 |
al-Faḍl al-Mustarshid | 1118-1135, d.1138 |
al-Manṣûr arRâshid | 1135-1136 |
Muḥammad al-Muqtafî | 1136-1160 |
Yûsuf al-Mustanjid | 1160-1170 |
al-Ḥasan al-Mustaḍî' | 1170-1180 |
| Aḥmad anNâṣir | 1180-1225 |
| Independent from Seljuks, 1194 | |
Muḥammad aẓẒâhir | 1225-1226 |
al-Manṣûr al-Mustanṣir | 1226-1242 |
'Abdullâh al-Musta'ṣim | 1242-1258 |
| 1258, killed by Mongol Khân Hülägü; end of Abbasid Caliphate; Mamlûks set up Abbasid puppet caliphate in Egypt; continues until Ottoman conquest | |
. On the other hand, we also get the independent, or antagonistic, development of Islamic theology, or Kalâm, 
("Talk") -- which often displays more original ideas than the strictly philosophical tradition.
The height of the Abbasid period in legendary hindsight is the reign of Hârûn arRashîd. There are several stories about him in the (Book of) One Thousand and One Nights (Kitâb Alf Layla waLayla, 
), often with him visiting the public incognito. It is hard to know how much of a historical basis there is for most of those stories. It does lend, however, a magical air to the early culture of Baghdâd. The collection of stories itself seems to date in a definitely form from Mamlûk Egypt.
As noted above, Chinese artisans with knowledge of paper making are supposed to have been captured in 751. They were first put to work making paper in nearby Samarkand. By 794-795, the Wazîr of Hârûn arRashîd, Jafar al-Barmak, founded a paper mill in Baghbad. The relative cheapness and convenience of paper over the alternatives (parchment, papyrus, stone, clay, bone, shells, ostraca) transformed literate culture, with the drawback, however, that the medium, like papyrus, is less durable than parchment, let alone stone or ostraca. The technology was soon exported to Romania, where we get notable developments in the literate culture of the 9th century, such as the introduction of "miniscule" script and punctuation -- things that are often noted as features of the Carolingian "Renaissance" but certainly derive from the innovations apparent in Islam and Romania.
Politically, the Abbasid era then becomes a story of fragmentation, as governors become autonomous and then rival powers arise. At first, only Spain escaped the Abbasid revolution.
| OMAYYAD AMIRS OF SPAIN | |
|---|---|
| 'AbdurRaḥmân I | 756-788 |
| grandson of the Caliph Hishâm; escapes to Spain from the massacre of the Omayyads | |
| Hishâm I | 788-799 |
| al-Ḥakam I | 799-822 |
| 'AbdurRaḥmân II | 822-852 |
| Muḥammad I | 852-886 |
| al-Mundhir | 886-888 |
| 'Abdullâh | 888-912 |
| Line continues with the Omayyad Caliphs, 912-1031 | |
)
| THE AGHLABID AMIRS OF TUNISIA, ALGERIA, & SICILY | |
|---|---|
| Ibrâhîm I | 800-812 |
| 'Adbullâh I | 812-817 |
| Ziyâdat Allâh I | 817-838 |
| Invasion of Sicily, 827 | |
| al-Aghlab | 838-841 |
| Muḥammad I | 841-856 |
| Sack of Ostia & Rome, 846 | |
| Aḥmad | 856-863 |
| Ziyâdat Allâh II | 863 |
| Muḥammad II | 863-875 |
| Capture of Malta, 870 | |
| Ibrâhîm II | 875-902 |
| Capture of Syracuse, 878 | |
| 'Abdullâh II | 902-903 |
| Ziyâdat Allâh III | 903-909 |
| Conquest by the Fatimids, 909 | |
| THE ṬÂHIRID AMIRS OF KHURÂSÂN | |
|---|---|
| Ṭâhir I | 821-822 |
| Ṭalḥa | 822-845 |
| Ṭâhir II | 845-862 |
| Muḥammad | 862-873 |
| Occupied by Ṣaffârids | |
The Ṭâhirids were the faithful Abbasid governors of Khurâsân, only beginning the process of drifting out of central control when the area was seized by the Ṣaffârids. Ṭâhirids were also governors of Baghdad and Iraq under the Abbasids. For many years, Muḥammad continued as the nominal governor of Khurâsân while living in Iraq. His brother al-Ḥusayn briefly returned in 876.
| THE ṬÛLÛNID AMIRS OF EGYPT | |
|---|---|
| Aḥmad ibn Ṭûlûn | 868-884 |
| Khumârawayh | 884-896 |
| Jaysh | 896 |
| Hârûn | 896-904 |
| Shaybân | 904-905 |
| Recovered by Abbasids | |
The Zanj Rebellion (869-883) was a lengthy and terrifying business, which at one point threatened the existence of the Caliphate. "Zanj," 
, is a name for East Africa and for the black slaves taken from there, by capture or purchase. Thus, the slaves, or the people, could be either 
, az-Zanj, or 
, Zunûj (an irregular or "broken" plural). An individual of the kind is a 
, Zanjî. "Zanj" seems to be preserved in the Arabic name of Zanzibar, 
, Zanjabâr, which contained a great slave market and was the source of slaving expeditions into the interior -- right down to the 19th century, when the British, of course, stopped the slave trade and made Zanzibar a Protectorate in 1890.
The Zanj Rebellion against the Abbasids began with escaped African slaves, who had sought refuge in the marshlands of southern Iraq (as slaves in America could find refuge in the everglades of Florida among the Seminole Indians, who also fought their own wars, 1816–1819, 1835–1842, & 1855–1858). They were joined by other (white) slaves and, apparently, people who were just brigands. Some scholarly opinion questions whether African slaves were predominant, or even present at all. The testimony of Arab historians apparently isn't enough to overcome the squeamishness of modern historians to admit that Islâm enslaved and ferociously treated black Africans (something that, to ignorant or dishonest politically correct opinion, has only ever been done by racist Europeans), who in this case rose up with a force that made the rebellion of Nat Turner (1831) look like a strongly worded letter to the editor. At one point the Zanj actually captured and looted the major city of Basra and advanced to within 50 miles of Baghdad. Vast slaughter attended suppressing the Zanj -- Mas'ûdî (c.896–956) says 500,000 dead in the whole rebellion. Larger numbers were suggested by other sources.
| THE SÂMÂNID AMIRS OF TRANSOXANIA AND KHURASAN | |
|---|---|
| Aḥmad I | governor of Farghâna & Soghdia, 819-864 |
| Naṣr I | 864-892 |
| Ismâ'îl | 892-907 |
| Aḥmad II | 907-914 |
| Naṣr II | 914-943 |
| Nûḥ I | 943-954 |
| 'Abd al-Malik I | 954-961 |
| Manṣûr I | 961-976 |
| Nûḥ II | 976-997 |
| patron of Ibn Sîna (d.1037) | |
| Manṣûr II | 997-999 |
| 'Abd al-Malik II | 999-1000 |
| Ismâ'îl II | 1000-1005 |
| Conquest by Qarakhanids & Ghaznawids, 1005 | |
| THE ṢAFFÂRID AMIRS OF SÎSTÂN | |
|---|---|
| Ya'qûb | 861-879 |
| Overthrow Ṭâhirids, 873 | |
| 'Amr ibn al-Layth | 879-900 |
| Ṭâhir | 900-909 |
| al-Layth | 909-910 |
| Muḥammad | 910 |
| al-Mu'addal | 910-911 |
| Sâmânid Occupation, 911-912 | |
| 'Amr ibn Ya'qûb | 912 |
| Sâmânid Occupation, 912-914 | |
| [local commanders] | 914-923 |
| Aḥmad | 923-963 |
| Khalaf | 963-1003, d.1009 |
| Tâhir | regent, 963-969 |
| Ghaznawid Occupation, 1003 | |
Although Orthodox, the Ṣaffârids rejected the need for recognition by the Caliphal authority -- but the second amir was eventually recognized as governor of several Irânian provinces. Ṣaffârid power, however, was soon checked by the Sâmanîds, who themselves claimed descent from the Sassanid Shâhs and patronized the revival of Persian as a literary language in the epic of Firdawsî (940-1020), the Shâh-nâma (Book of Kings -- nâma is today used to mean "letter" or "paper," while Arabic kitâb is used for "book"). This is now regarded as the Irânian National Epic and is noteworthy for the dignity accorded to Zoroaster as a Prophet of God.
The book contains a striking dream image, of four men pulling at the corners of a square cloth, but not tearing it. This is interpreted to mean that the four men are the Prophets Moses, Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muḥammad, while the cloth is the Religion of God. That Zoroaster figures along with Moses, Jesus, and Muḥammad is an unmistakable clue that we are dealing with a Persian source. Otherwise, Muslims do not go out of their way to include Zoroaster, certainly not on equal footing, with the other three -- the Qur'ân mentions the "Magians," 
, al-Majûs [22:17], but not among the tolerated "People of the Book." Also, as a statement about religion it is un-Islâmic and subversive in that it implies an equality, despite the conflict, between the four attendant religions. The Islâmic view is that only Muḥammad delivers an uncorrupted revelation, with his definitive version replacing that of the earlier prophets -- who in turn are accused of "corrupting" their own scriptures. Nevertheless, the origin of Islâmic Law in Abbasid Iraq seems to have involved many Persian converts, whose influence may be evident in provisions such as for a Zoroastrian practice of five prayers a day, where the Qur'ân only specifies three, and for the execution of apostates.
Both the Ṣaffârids and Sâmanîds eventually fell to the coming wave of Turkish regimes. The Sâmânids were thus the last Irânian domain in Transoxania, which in short order will merit the name "Turkestan."
)
| THE IKHSHÎDID AMIRS OF EGYPT | |
|---|---|
| Muḥammad ibn Ṭughj al-Ikhshîd | 935-946 |
| Ûnûjûr | 946-961 |
| 'Alî | 961-966 |
| Kâfûr al-Lâbî, Regent | 966-968 |
| Aḥmad | 968-969 |
| Conquest by the Fatimids, 969 | |
| THE ḤAMDÂNIDS OF ALEPP0 | |
|---|---|
| 'Alî I SayfudDawla | 944-967 |
| patron of al-Fârâbî (d.950) | |
| Sharîf I Sa'dudDawla | 967-991 |
| Antioch lost to Romania, 969 | |
| Sa'îd Sa'îdudDawla | 991-1002 |
| 'Alî II & Sharîf II | 1002-1004 |
| Lu'lu' | Regent, 1002-1004 |
| 1004-1009 | |
| Vassal of Fatimids, 1004 | |
| Manṣûr MurtaḍâdDawla | 1009-1015 |
| Fled to Romania, 1015 | |
| THE BUWAYID (BÛYID) AMIRS OF IRAQ | |
|---|---|
| Aḥmad ibn Bûya | 945-967 |
| Bakhtiyâr | 967-978 |
| Fanâ Khusraw | 978-983 |
| Marzubân | 983-987 |
| Shîrzîl I | 987-989 |
| Fîrûz | 989-1012 |
| Abû Shujâ' | 1012-1021 |
| Ḥasan | 1021-1025 |
| Shîrzîl II | 1025-1044 |
| Marzubân | 1044-1048 |
| Khusraw Fîrûz | 1048-1055 |
| Overthrown by Seljuk Great Sulṭâns, 1055 | |
The origin of the name of Baghdâd, 
, is itself obscure. The dâd element looks like it is from the Indo-European verb "give," which we also see in Persian names like Mehrdâd, "given by Mithra." 
With the first element, it could be Middle Persian "god," bag (Sanskrit bhaga), or Middle Persian "garden," bâgh (also bâgh in Punjabi, which looks like a borrowing from Persian -- the "gh" is not a voiced aspirate stop, as in Sanskrit or Hindi, but the fricative that is indicated, but not always pronounced, in Indian, i.e. Hindi and Urdu, borrowings from Persian or Arabic). My guess is that "garden" is more likely right, so that the meaning is probably "a garden is given," rather than "given by God." But this can still leave us wondering whether the name already belonged to the site, and what it was about the site that appealed to the Abbasid builders. Ctesiphon is not far down the river, closer than Samarra is up river.
The complete genealogy of the Alids, Omayyads, and Abbasids is in The Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 1B, [edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, & Bernard Lewis, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp.731-733]. Unfortunately, the diagrams contain no dates. Much the same information, with dates, is in The Arabs by Anthony Nutting [Mentor Books, 1964, p.202-203]. I have not found a complete genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasids. According to Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [pp.7 & 9], the relationship of the two lines is uncertain anyway.
Now, however, While the Seljuks rescued the Abbasids from the Buwayids, this meant nothing like the restoration of Abbasid power. Autonomy, at least, was restored in 1194 as the Seljuks passed into their own decline, but freedom for the Caliphs would be short lived. The next invaders, the Mongols, had not (yet) converted to Islâm and had no respect or interest for the Abbasids. The wife of the Khan Hülegü was reportedly a Nestorian Christian, who advised killing the Caliph. Warned the calamities would follow if the Caliph's blood touched the ground, in 1258 Hülegü had al-Musta'ṣim beaten to death in a sack. After all the glories and romance of the Abbasid Caliphate, this was a particularly sad, ignominous, and humiliating end. It seemed like a body blow to Islâm, which had lost its institutional and genetic continuity to the Prophet himself. Baghdad would not even be a capital city again until the British carved modern Iraq out of the Ottoman Empire, even as the previous prosperity of the country fell into neglected ruin, perhaps for the first time since the Sumerians.
But the Mamlûks, after a fashion, came to the rescue of the Abbasids. They reckoned that a figurehead Caliph in Cairo could be useful, as it would be. So an Abbasid cousin was recruited; and, after a while, his position even became accepted as legitimate. Even the Ottomans sought diplomas of political authority and titles from the Caliph. But eventually the Ottomans showed up in person, and Selim "the Grim" overthrew the Mamlûks and annexed Egypt. The last, the very last, Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil III, was shipped off to Constantinople.
There is no reason why the Abbasid line should not have continued in Constantinople, as figureheads for the Ottomans, as they had been for the Mamlûks, but instead they disappear from history. I do not know whether they died out, the Ottomans exterminated them, or they just faded into obscurity.
I have one source with a little more information. Tim Mackintosh-Smith says:
For the embedded quote, Mackintosh-Smith (who does not bother to number his endnotes and does not use diacritics in his text) cites "Jabarti I, p.37," which seems to mean the entry, "al-Jabartī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, 'Ajā'ib al-āthār fi 'l-tarājim wa-'l-akhbār, Beirut, n[o].d[ate]." in the bibliography [p.605]. So we are not given an English language source for this information. Al-Jabartī (1753-1825) was a scholar and historian who was born, lived, and died in Cairo. Since his life was a couple of centuries after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, he had to have been relying on earlier sources about the fate of al-Mutawakkil III.
That the Ottoman Sulṭâns somehow were the annointed successors of the Abbasids is the claim they made much later, whose mysterious origin and baseless audacity is only matched by its remarkable acceptance among Orthodox Muslims. When the title and office were abolished by Kemal Atatürk in 1924, we then have the equally puzzling lack of interest in the attempt to claim it by Hussein of Mecca, whose descent from the Prophet was otherwise acknowledged. Meanwhile, as Muslims in India had been accusing the British of undermining the Ottoman Caliph, perhaps because of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, Atatürk suddenly took all the wind out of their sails. The British had nothing to do with it, except that they had previously supported Hussein's revolt against the Turks.
Below we see Islâm in the year 1000 AD. The days of secular authority of the Abbasid Caliphs are now gone. The Caliphs are dominated by the Buwayid princes. The center of Islamic power and culture has moved to Egypt, with the Caliphate of the Shi'ite Fatimids. The Fatimids even control the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. Representing Orthodoxy, the Omayyads in Spain have also declared a Caliphate. In the East, we see the fateful advent of the Turks, with the Ghaznawids beginning their inroads into India. This will permanently introduce Islam into India, even as these Turkish states mean the disappearance of Iranian people from Central Asia and the penetration of Turkish peoples deep into Iran and ultimately Anatolia, whose modern name becomes the eponym of the whole people.
I have received from Derek Whaley a genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasids which he has assembled, with a connection to the main Abbasid line. Much of this can be confirmed in Bosworth, and I provide it, with a couple of additions and corrections, here, formerly just in a popup, but now connected up with the rest of the Abbasids.
The Mamluks still had an Abbasid puppet caliph in residence, al-Mutawakkil III (they had long ago run out of new throne-names); the conquerors took him to Constantinople, now more usually called Istanbul, 'and the caliphate and the swearing of allegiance to it were cut off'. In the Ottoman capital al-Mutawakkil was at first treated with due respect; later, however, he was accused to embezzling religious trust-funds, and was sent back in disgrace to Cairo, where he died in 1543. [Arabs, A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires, Yale, 2019, p.399]
| OMAYYAD CALIPHS OF SPAIN | |
|---|---|
| 'AbdurRaḥmân III | 912-961 |
| al-Ḥakam II | 961-976 |
| Hishâm II | 976-1008 & 1010-1012 |
| Muḥammad II | 1008-1009 |
| Sulaymân | 1009 & 1012-1017 |
| ('Alî ibn Hamûd) | 1017-1021 |
| 'AbdurRaḥmân IV | 1021-1022 |
| (al-Qasim) | 1022 |
| 'AbdurRaḥmân V | 1022-1023 |
| Muḥammad III | 1023-1024 |
| (Yahya ibn 'Alî) | 1024-1027 |
| Hishâm III | 1027-1031 |
Leadership devolved onto the Ḥâjib or Chief Minister, like Ibn Abî 'Amir Al-Manṣûr (Almanzor), who scored one of the great successes of Islamic Spain by capturing Barcelona and sacking the shrine of St. James of Compostella (Santiago -- later in the battle cry of Spanish armies, Santiago y España) in Galicia, hitherto the most sacred site of Christian Spain. But from this pinnacle of triumph against Christendom, the situation soon, very soon, escaped even this kind of control. Islâmic Spain broke into petty states and permanently lost its ability to maintain its own unity or resist the Christian Reconquista.
Note that the genealogy of the Omayyads here is included with that of the original Caliphate.
| THE MULÛK AT-ṬAWÂ'IF, REYES DE TAIFAS | |
|---|---|
| The Jahwarids of Cordova, Qurṭubah | |
| Jahwar ibn Muḥammad ibn Jahwar | 1031-1043 |
| Muḥammad ar-Rashîd | 1043-1058 |
| 'Abd al-Malik Dhu's-Siyâdatayn al-Manṣur | 1058-1069 |
| 'Abbâdid conquest, 1069 | |
, mulûk aṭ-Ṭawâ'if, or the "kings of the bands/factions/parties [singular 
, ṭâ'ifa]." This was adapted into Spanish as the Reyes de Taifas.
The map above shows 21 Reyes de Taifas in 1030, but at different times there were up to 39 of them. Only some of the more significant and durable are listed in the tables here. Already, both León and Navarre are larger than any Islamic state. Spain would never again be unified by a native Islamic state. This disunity was, of course, a golden opportunity for the Christian kingdoms; and the fall of Toledo to León and Castille in 1085 is significantly considered the beginning of the Christian Reconquista. The Moslem position was restored by the advent of the Almoravids, who then absorbed all the Taifa states. Toledo, however, which had been the capital of the Visigoths and was still considered the heart of Spain, was never recovered.
| Murcia, Mursiyah | |
|---|---|
| Khayrân aṣ-Ṣaqlabî | 1012/13-1028 |
| Zuhayr aṣ-Ṣaqlabî | 1028-1038 |
| 'Abd al'Azîz ibn Abî'Âmir al-Manṣûr of Valencia | 1038-1045 |
| Mujâhid al-'Âmirî | 1045-c.1049 |
| The Ṭahirids | |
| Aḥmad ibn Ṭâhir | c.1049-1063 |
| Muḥammad ibn Ṭâhir | 1063-1078 |
| 'Abbâdid conquest, 1078 | |
| The 'Abbâdids of Seville, Ishbîlyah | |
| Muḥammad I ibn Ismâ'îl ibn 'Abbâd | 1023-1042 |
| 'Abbâd Fakhr ad-Dawla al-Mu'taḍid | 1042-1069 |
| Muḥammad II al-Mu'tamid | 1069-1091, d.1095 |
| Almoravid conquest, 1091 | |
| The Ḥammûdids of Málaga, Malaka | |
| 'Alî ibn Ḥammûd | 1014/15-1017 |
| al-Qâsim I al-Ma'mûn | 1017-1021, 1022-1026 |
| Yaḥyâ I al-Mu'talî | 1021-1022, 1026-1036 |
| Idrîs I al-Muta'ayyad | 1036-1039 |
| Yaḥyâ II al-Qâ'im | 1039-1040 |
| al-Ḥasan al-Mustanṣir | 1040-1043 |
| Idrîs II al-'Alî | 1043-1046, 1053-1056 |
| Muḥammad I al-Mahdî | 1046-1052 |
| Idrîs III as-Sâmî | 1052-1053 |
| Muḥammad II al-Musta'lî | 1056 |
| Zîrid conquest, 1056 | |
| The Zîrids of Granada, Gharnâṭah | |
| Zâwî ibn Zîrî aṣ-Ṣanhâjî | 1013-1019 |
| Ḥabbûs ibn Mâksan | 1019-1038 |
| Bâdîs al-Muẓaffar an-Nâṣir | 1038-1073 |
| 'Abdallâh ibn Buluggîn | Granada, 1073-1090 |
| Tamîm ibn Buluggîn | Málaga, 1073-1090, d.1095 |
| Almoravid conquest, 1090 | |
| Afṭasids of Badajoz, Baṭalyaws | |
|---|---|
| 'Abdallâh ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Afṭas | 1022-1045 |
| Muḥammad al-Muẓaffar | 1045-1068 |
| Yaḥyâ | 1068 |
| 'Umar al-Mutawakkil | 1068-1094 |
| Almoravid conquest, 1091 | |
| The 'Âmirids of Valencia, Balansiyyah | |
| 'Abd al'Azîz ibn Abî'Âmir al-Manṣûr (Sanchuelo) | 1021-1060 |
| 'Abd al-Malik Niẓâm ad-Dawla | 1060-1065 |
| Occupied by Dhu'n-Nûnids, 1065-1076 | |
| Abû Bakr al-Manṣûr | 1076-1085 |
| 'Uthmân al-Qâḍî | 1085 |
| Yaḥyâ II Dhu'n-Nûnid | 1085-1092 |
| Rodrigo Díaz, El Cid,  | 1094-1099 |
| Almoravid conquest, 1102 | |
| The Dhu'n-Nûnids of Toledo, Ṭulayṭulah | |
| Ismâ'îl Dhu'r-Riyâsatayn aẓ-Ẓâfir | 1018-1043 |
| Yaḥyâ I Sharaf ad-Dawla al-Ma'mûn | 1043-1075 |
| Yaḥyâ II al-Qâdir | 1075-1080, 1081-1085, d.1092 |
| Occupied by Afṭasids, 1080-1081; Conquest by Leon & Castille, 1085 | |
| The Banû Mujâhid of Denia and Majorca | |
| Mujâhid al-'Âmirî al-Muwaffaq | c.1012-1045 |
| 'Alî Iqbâl ad-Dawla | 1045-1076 |
| conquest by Hûdids, 1076 | |
| The Tujîbids of Saragossa, Saraquṣtah | |
| al-Mundhir I al-Tujîbî | governor, 1010-1023 |
| Yaḥyâ al-Muẓaffar | 1023-1029 |
| al-Mundhir II Mu'izz ad-Dawla | 1029-1039 |
| 'Abdallâh al-Muẓaffar | 1039-1040 |
| The Hûdids of Saragossa | |
| Sulaymân ibn Hûd al-Judhâmî | 1040-c.1047 |
| Sulaymân Tâj ad-Dawla | c.1047-1049 |
| Aḥmad I Sayf ad-Dawla | 1049-1082 |
| Yûsuf al-Mu'tamin | 1081-1083 |
| Aḥmad II al-Musta'în | 1083-1110 |
| 'Abd al-Malik 'Imâd ad-Dawla | 1110 |
| Almoravid occupation, 1110-1118; occupation by Aragón, 1118-1130 | |
| Aḥmad III Sayf ad-Dawla | 1130-1146 |
| Conquest by Aragón, 1146 | |
| MURÂBIṬ (ALMORAVID) SULṬÂNS | |
|---|---|
| Yûsuf ibn Tâshufîn | 1061-1107 |
| Crosses over into Spain, defeat of Alfonso VI at Zallâqa, 1086 | |
| 'Alî ibn Yûsuf | 1107-1142 |
| Tâshufîn ibn 'Alî | 1142-1146 |
| Ibrâhîm ibn Tâshufîn | 1146 |
| Isḥâq ibn 'Alî | 1146-1147 |
| Almohad conquest, 1147 | |
| THE RUSTAMIDS OF ALGERIA, 778-909 AD | |
|---|---|
| 'Abd ar-Raḥmân | 778-788 |
| 'Abd al-Wahhâb | 788-824 |
| Aflaḥ Abû Sa'îd | 824-872 |
| Abû Bakr | 872-874 |
| Muḥammad Abû'l-Yaqẓân | 874-894 |
| Yûsuf Abû Ḥâtim | 894-895, 899-? |
| Ya'qûb | 895-899, ?-907 |
| Yaqẓân | 907-909 |
| Fatimid Conquest, 909 | |
| The Hammâdids of Algeria, 1015-1152 AD | |
| Ḥammâd | 1015-1028 |
| al-Qâ'id Sharaf ad-Dawla | 1028-1054 |
| Muḥsin | 1054-1055 |
| Buluggîn II | 1055-1062 |
| al-Nâṣir | 1062-1088 |
| al-Manṣûr | 1088-1105 |
| Bâdîs | 1105 |
| al-'Azîz | 1105- 1121/24 |
| Yaḥyâ | 1121/24- 1152 |
| Almohad Conquest, 1152 | |
| THE IDRÎSID CALIPHS OF MOROCCO, 789-985 AD | |
|---|---|
| Idrîs I | 789-791 |
| Idrîs II | 791-828 |
| Muḥammad al-Muntaṣir | 828-836 |
| 'Alî I Ḥaydara | 836-849 |
| Yaḥyâ I | 849-863 |
| Yaḥyâ II | 863-866 |
| 'Alî II | 866-? |
| Yaḥyâ III al-Miqdâm al-Jûṭî | ?-905 |
| Yaḥyâ IV | 905-925 |
| Tributary to Fatimids, 917 | |
| al-Ḥasan al-Ḥajjâm | 925-938 |
| al-Qâsim Gannûn | 938-948 |
| Aḥmad Abu'l-'Aysh | 948-954 |
| al-Ḥasan | 954-974, 985 |
| Annexed by Fatimids, 985 | |
In Morocco, under Idrîs I ibn 'Abdallâh, a great-grandson of Ḥasan, the son of 'Alî, we get another movement. With his background, it is perhaps not surprising that Idrîs both claimed the Caliphate and established Shi'ism. He also founded the Madînat Fâs, the city of Fez. Eventually the Idrîsids fragmented and then fell to the Fatimids, who inherited the mantle of the Shi'ite Caliphate. Years later, an Idrîsid branch, the Ḥammûdids became one of the Reyes de Taifas of Spain.
The other two North African dynasties given here (perhaps a bit out of sequence) were successors to the Fatimids. These began with Zîri ibn Manâd, a Berber retainer of the Fatimids. The succession of the Zirids is given below. Zîri's son, Buluggîn, was appointed Fatimid governor of Ifrîqiya -- the Roman province of Africa, which then gave its name to the whole continent, often to the confusion of "Afro-Centric" education. As with the Abbasids, so with the Zîrids. They began to drift away into autonomy. In 1015, Bâdîs ceded the western part of the territory to his uncle Ḥammâd, after a falling out over Ḥammâd's shift in allegiance to the Abbasids. Thus we get a division between Algeria and Tunisia. The Fatimids didn't much worry about autonomy in North Africa, but they were outraged when the Amîr al-Mu'izz changed his own allegiance to the Abbasids -- even while the Hammâdids had returned to Shi'ism.
The Fatimids were too weak at this point (1049) to visit their own vengeance, so they directed instead two Arab tribes, the Banu Hilâl and the Banu Sulaym, to do the job for them (1051). The result was an unorganized pillaging, which mainly just ruined the countryside and hinterland. The Zîrids and Hammâdids moved down to the coast and built fleets. This was useful against the Norman conquest of Sicily but ultimately, by 1091, the Normans succeeded, ending the history of Islamic Sicily that had begun with the Aghlabids. Eventually the Almohads ended both regimes and unified North Africa again.
| THE FATIMID CALIPHS | |
|---|---|
| al-Maḥdî | 909-934 |
| Shi'ite (Sevener) Caliphate established in North Africa to rival Orthodox Abbasid Caliphate | |
| al-Qâ'im | 934-946 |
| al-Manṣûr | 946-952 |
| al-Mu'izz | 952-975 |
| Rometta, last city of Romania in Sicily, falls, 965; Egypt occupied, Caliphate removed to new city, al-Qâhirah -- Cairo -- 969 | |
| al-'Azîz | 975-996 |
| al-Ḥâkim | 996-1021 |
| aẓẒâhir | 1021-1035 |
| al-Mustanṣir | 1035-1094 |
| al-Musta'lî | 1094-1101 |
| al-'Âmir | 1101-1130 |
| collateral line assumes throne; no longer considered to be Shi'ite Imâms | |
| al-Ḥâfiẓ | 1130-1149 |
| aẓẒâfir | 1149-1154 |
| Apostacy of & Zirids, 1049; dispatch of Banu Sulaym and Hilali into Tunisia, 1051 | |
| al-Fâ'iz | 1154-1160 |
| al-'Âḍid | 1160-1171 |
| dies natural death as Egypt passes to Yûsuf ibn Ayyûb Ṣalâhu dDîn | |
When the Fatimids occupied Egypt in 969, it did look like they might be the heirs of all of Islâm. The new capital founded in Egypt, al-Qâhirah, 
, "the Victorious," although at the place of the Roman fortress of Babylon (of all things) and the Omayyad city of Fusṭâṭ, (Old Cairo), now becomes the classic Islâmic capital of Egypt, Cairo. While Fatimid control soon extended into the Levant and to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz, this proved to be the Fatimid high water mark.
In the Fatimid decline, North Africa broke away, the Crusaders arrived in the Levant, and the Fatimid succession itself passed to a collateral line that lost the numinous status of Shi'ite Imâm. The last Fatimid Caliph, a sickly child, was allowed to die a natural death by the occupier of Egypt, Saladin, before the regime was deposed.
| THE ZÎRIDS OF TUNISIA, 947-1163 AD | |
|---|---|
| Zîrî | Governor, 947-972 |
| Yûsuf Buluggîn I | 972-984 |
| al-Manṣûr | 984-996 |
| Bâdîs Nâṣir ad-Dawla | 996-1016 |
| Division of Tunisia & Algeria, 1015 | |
| al-Mu'izz | 1016-1062 |
| Breaks with Shi'ism & Fatimids, 1049; invasion of Banu Sulaym and Hilâli, 1051 | |
| Tamîm | 1062-1108 |
| conquest of Sicily by Normans, 1061-1091 | |
| Yaḥyâ | 1108-1116 |
| 'Alî | 1116-1121 |
| al-Ḥasan | 1121-1148; Governor, 1148-1163, d.1168 |
| conquest by Normans then Almohads, 1148 | |
The story of the Zîrids has been detailed above. However, it merits noting again their origin as governors for the Fatimids, the Fatimid wrath they brought down upon themselves for converting to Orthodoxy, but then their survival of this until Almohad conquest -- although they did not actually survive the Fatimids.
The story of the Kalbî Amîrs of Sicily begins much like that of the Zîrids, as Fatimid governors. Their experience, however, would be rather different. They were the cutting edge of Islamic Conquest in the South of Italy. As such they were in close conflict with the Dukes of Benevento, the Republics of Naples, Amalfi, and Gaeta, the Papacy, and Romania. The Aghlabids had conquered Sicily between 827 and 878 but had little time to enjoy their triumph before being overthrown by the Fatamids in 909.
| THE KALBÎ AMÎRS OF SICILY, 948-1053 AD | |
|---|---|
| Ḥasan al-Kalbî | 948-954 |
| Ahmad ibn Ḥasan | 954-969 |
| Rometta, last city of Romania in Sicily, falls, 965 | |
| Abû l-Qâsim 'Alî ibn al-Ḥasan | 969-982 |
| killed, Battle of Stilo, 982 | |
| Jabir al-Kalbî | 982-983 |
| Jafar al-Kalbî | 983-985 |
| Abd-Allah al-Kalbî | 985-990 |
| Yusuf al-Kalbî | 990-998 |
| Ja'far al-Kalbî | 998-1019 |
| al-Akhal | 1019-1037 |
| appeals for help to Romania against rebellion, 1035 | |
| Abdullâh | 1037-1040 |
| killed (?) by William Iron Arm de Hauteville, 1040 | |
| Ḥasan as-Samsam | 1040-1053 |
| Normans arrive, 1061; capture of Palermo, 1072; conquest complete, 1091 | |
A few years later the Kablîs had to contend with an ambitious attempt by Constantinople to reconquer Sicily (1038-1040), under the command of the excellent general, George Maniaces. A fateful moment came when a Norman mercenary, William de Hauteville, met the Amîr of Syracuse in single combat during a sortee from the beseiged city. De Hauteville killed him and earned the sobriquet "Iron Arm." Syracuse was taken. The question I am left with is whether this Amîr of Syracuse was none other than the Kalbî Amîr of Sicily. The table lists the Amîr as Abdullâh, who is reported to have died in the same year, 1040; but Abdullâh is also said to have been the son of the Zîrid Amîr of Tunia, al-Mu'izz, who had been sent to Sicily to help the rebellion of the brother of al-Akhal, who in 1035 then appealed to Romania for help, before being assassinated in 1037. Abdullah was defeated by Maniakes in open battle at Troina in 1040 and fled the island before the events at Syracuse. I have been unable to clear this up, or find an alternative name for the Amîr of Syracuse. Kalbî fortunes briefly revived, however. Maniaces was suspected of treason and recalled. De Hauteville and other mercenaries revolted and began the process of ejecting Romania from Italy, with De Hauteville's own dynasty of Normans soon dominating and absorbing the older Christian states. This provided a brief respite for Islamic Sicily, with Romania abandoning the island in 1042. Successful on the mainland, the Normans turned their attention to Sicily, which William's half-brother Roger conquered between 1061 and 1091. By then, the Kalbîs themselves were gone, and the local Muslims, fighting among themselves, were not able to resist as long at the Romanian regime had against the Aghlabids. Sicily was restored to Christendom even as the Reconquista began in Spain.
| THE GHAZNAWIDS | |
|---|---|
| Sebûktigin | governor in Ghazna for Sâmânids, 977-997 |
| Ismâ'îl | 997-998 |
| Maḥmûd of Ghazna | 998-1030 |
| Invasions of India, 1001-1024 | |
| Muḥammad | 1030-1031, 1040-1041 |
| Mus'ûd I | 1031-1040 |
| Mawdûd | 1041-1048 |
| Mus'ûd II | 1048 |
| 'Alî | 1048-1049 |
| 'Abd ar-Rashîd | 1049-1052 |
| Farrukhzâd | 1052-1059 |
| Ibrâhîm | 1059-1099 |
| Mas'ûd III | 1099-1115 |
| Shîrzâd | 1115-1116 |
| Malik Arslan Shâh | 1116-1117 |
| Seljuk Occupation, 1117 | |
| Bahrâm Shâh | 1117-1150, c.1152-1157 |
| Ghûrid Occupation, 1150-c.1152 | |
| Khusraw Shâh | in Lahore, 1157-1160 |
| Khusraw Malik | 1160-1186, c.1191 |
| Ghûrid Conquest, 1186 | |
| THE QARAKHÂNIDS | |
|---|---|
| 'Alî Arslan Khân | Great Qaghan |
| Aḥmad Arslan Qara Khân | 998-1017 |
| Overthrow of Sâmânids, 1005 | |
| Manṣûr Arslan Khân | 1017-1024 |
| Muḥammad Toghan Khân | 1024-1026 |
| Yûsuf Qadır Khân | 1026-32 |
| 'Alî Tigin Bughra Khân | Great Qaghan in Samarkand, c.1020-1034 |
| Muḥammad Arslan Qara Khân | c.1042-c.1052 |
| Ibrâhîm Tabghach Bughra Khân | c.1052-1068 |
| Naṣr Shams al-Mulk | 1068-1080 |
| Khiḍr | 1080-1081 |
| Aḥmad | 1081-1089 |
| Ya'qûb Qadır Khân | 1089-1095 |
| Mas'ûd | 1095-1097 |
| Sulaymân Qadır Tamghach | 1097 |
| Maḥmûd Arslan Khân | 1097-1099 |
| Jibrâ'îl Arslan Khân | 1099-1102 |
| Muḥammad Arlsan Khân | 1102-1129 |
| Naṣr | 1129 |
| Aḥmad Qadır Khân | 1129-1130 |
| Ḥasan Jalâl ad-Dunyâ | 1130-1132 |
| Ibrâhîm Rukn ad-Dunyâ | 1132 |
| Maḥmûd | 1132-1141 |
| Defeat of Seljuks, Qara-Khitaï Occupation, 1141 | |
| Ibrâhîm Tabghach Khân | 1141-1156 |
| 'Alî Chaghrı Khân | 1156-1161 |
| Mas'ûd Tabghach Khân | 1161-1171 |
| Muḥammad Tabghach Khân | 1171-1178 |
| Ibrâhîm Arslan Khân | 1178-1204 |
| 'Uthmân Ulugh Sulṭân | 1204-1212 |
| Khwârazm Conquest, 1212 | |
Note that the Arabic "w" in Ghaznawid is usually pronounced as a "v," as it would be in Persian or Turkish.
The "Black" (Turkish 
, qara) Khâns displace the Sâmânids in Transoxania and begin the process whereby the region, now Turkestan, becomes predominately Turkish. Vassals of the Seljuks and then of the Buddhist Qara-Khitaï, the khâns survive until absorbed in the brief empire of the Khwârazm Shâhṣ
| SELJUK GREAT SULṬÂNS | |
|---|---|
| Ṭughrul I Beg | Sulṭân, 1037-1063 |
| 1055 frees Caliphs from Shi'ite Buwayids; granted title of Sulṭân | |
| Alp Arslan | 1063-1073 |
| Destroys Roman army, captures Emperor Romanus IV, Battle of Manzikert, 1071 | |
| Malik Shâh I | 1073-1092 |
| Sulṭâns of Rûm independent, 1092 | |
| Maḥmûd I | 1092-1094 |
| Berk Yaruq (Barkiyâruq) | 1094-1105 |
| Malik Shâh II | 1105 |
| Muḥammad I Tapar | 1105-1118 |
| Aḥmad Sanjar | in Khurâsân 1097-1157 |
| 1118-1157 | |
| Defeat by Qara-Khitaï, driven out of Transoxania, 1141 | |
| Maḥmûd II | in Iraq 1118-1131 |
| Dâwûd | in Iraq 1131-1132 |
| Ṭughril II | in Iraq 1132-1134 |
| Mas'ûd | in Iraq 1134-1152 |
| Malik Shâh III | in Iraq 1152-1153 |
| Muḥammad II | in Iraq 1153-1160 |
| Great Sultanate breaks up, 1157 | |
| Sulaymân Shâh | in Iraq 1160-1161 |
| Arslan Shâh | in Iraq 1161-1176 |
| Ṭughril III | in Iraq 1176-1194 |
| Conquest by Khwârazm Shahs, 1194 | |
The Sejuks created a great empire in Central Asia and profoundly transformed the politics and even the ethnology (with the spread of Turkic peoples) of the Middle East. After being freed from the Buwayids by the Orthodox Seljuks, the Caliph bestows a new title on Ṭughrul Beg: , Sulṭân -- "Power, Dominion, Authority." This looked like it might divide the ultimate authority in Islâm into secular and divine halves, between the Sulṭân and the Caliph. It might have, had the Seljuk domain maintained its unity and its power, which it didn't. The title of Sulṭân, rather than signifying unique and universal authority, henceforth becomes the title of choice for successor states. The greatest long term consequence, however, of the Seljuk state was the destruction of Roman power in Anatolia. There was no way of knowing it at the time, but the battle of Manzikert in 1071 was the end of Mediaeval Romania and the beginning of modern Turkey.
Under Alp Arslan and Malik Shâh there was considerable intellectual and cultural achievement, in part encouraged by their great Vizir, Niẓâm al-Mulk. This included the greatest of Islamic philosophers, al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111), and the mathematician, astronomer, and poet 'Umar Khayyâm (d.1122). Khayyâm's fatalism, although with its Islamic overtones, may owe more to an Iranian sensibility, as would what seems to be his worldiness and even cynicism ("Of all that one should care to fathom, I was never deep in anything but Wine," as FitzGerald translated it). Harsher times and considerably less intellectual daring were ahead.
The map below shows Islâm at the death of Malik Shâh I (1092). The Seljuk Great Sultanate, so vast (at least in Asia) and formidable, will now fragment, weaken, and disappear. When the First Crusade arrives in 1098, neither Seljuks nor Fatimids are in any shape to resist it. There is some irony in this, since the Crusades were initiated in response to the Seljuk conquest of Anatolia, which was then partially recovered for Romania. The extent of Seljuk control over the Ghaznawids is unclear, but the Ghûrids are just beginning their rise against their suzerains, whom they will replace (1186). While the Ghûrids fall to the Khwârazm Shâhs (1215), their slave vassals in India found the Sultanate of Delhi. The Almoravids have crossed over to Spain, defeated the Christians (1086), and delayed the Reconquista. When the Fatimid vassals, the Zirids of Tunisia, converted to Orthodox Islâm (1049), the Fatimids rid themselves of some troublesome Arab tribes by directing them to North Africa. This was a sterile revenge which gained the Fatimids nothing, but did contribute to an Arabization of North Africa.
| THE GHÛRIDS | |
|---|---|
| Abû 'Alî | Ghaznawid vassal, 1011-c.1035 |
| 'Abbâs | |
| Muḥammad | c.1059 |
| Ḥasan | |
| Ḥusayn I | 1100-1146 |
| Sûrî | 1146-1149 |
| Sâm I | 1149 |
| Ḥusayn II | 1149-1161 |
| Muḥammad Sayf ad-Dîn | 1161-1163 |
| Muḥammad Bahâ' ad-Dîn | Sulṭân, 1163-1203 |
| Muḥammad Mu'izz ad-Dîn | Ghazna, 1173-1203 |
| Sulṭân in Ghûr & India, 1203-1206 | |
| takes Lahore, 1186 | |
| Maḥmûd Ghiyâth ad-Dîn | 1206-1212 |
| Yıldız Mu'izzî Tâj ad-Dîn | governor of Ghazna, 1206-1215 |
| Sâm II Bahâ ad-Dîn | 1212-1213 |
| Khwârazm Vassals | |
| Atsız 'Alâ ad-Dîn | 1213-1214 |
| Muḥammad Shujâ' ad-Dîn | 1214-1215 |
| Khwârazm Conquest, 1215 | |
| THE KHWÂRAZM SHÂHS | |
|---|---|
| Ekinchi ibn Qochqar | Seljuk governor, 1097 |
| Arslan Tigin Muḥammad Quṭb adDîn | 1097-1127 |
| Qızıl Arslan Atsız 'Alâ' adDîn | 1127-1156 |
| Vassal of Qara Khitaï, 1141 | |
| Il Arslan | 1156-1172 |
| Tekish Tâj adDunyâ wadDîn | 1172-1200 |
| Overthrows last Sejuks in Iraq, 1194 | |
| Muḥammad 'Alâ' adDîn | 1200-1220 |
| Conquest of Qarakhânids, 1212, of Ghûrids, 1215 | |
| Mengübirti Jalâl adDîn | 1220-1231 |
| Thrown out of Transoxanian by Mongols, 1220-1221; Mongol conquest, 1231 | |
Jalâl adDîn was deposed without a major expenditure of Mongol effort. Greater effort came in 1256, when Qubilai Khan's brother Hülägü arrived with full Mongol force and the intention to conquer the whole Middle East. The long Abbasid Caliphate ended when Hülägü killed the last Caliph, perhaps at the urging of his Christian wife. The Seljuks of Rûm were subjugated, but then the Great Khan Möngke died in 1259. Hülägü returned to Mongolia to elect Qubilai Great Khan. This permanently redirected the main force of the Mongols, now against China. When the Mamlûks defeated a Mongol party in 1260, this was the practical end of Mongol expansion in the Middle East. Nevertheless, what was left was the massive state of the Il Khâns, which survived until collapsing in confusion in 1338. This was a brief ascendancy; and the great traveler Ibn Battuta, who visited the Khân Abû Sa'îd in 1327, at the flood tide of Mongol power, found upon his return from China and India, in 1348, that the realm had already disintegrated. Mongol successors, like the Jalayirids and the Black Sheep Turks, are followed on the Mongol page.
| THE ZANGID ATABEGS OF MOSUL, ALEPPO, & DAMASCUS | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Zangî I 'Imâd adDîn | appointed by Seljuk Sulṭân Maḥmûd II, 1127; Atabeg of Mosul, 1127-1146 | ||
| Capture of the County of Edessa from Crusaders, 1144 | |||
| MOSUL | ALEPPO, & DAMASCUS | ||
| Ghâzî I Sayf adDîn | 1146-1149 | Maḥmûd Nûr adDîn | 1147-1174 |
| Mawdûd Quṭb adDîn | 1149-1170 | Second Crusade, 1147-1149; captures Damascus, 1154; sends Shîrkûh to conquer Egypt, 1169; Shîrkûh dies, command passes to Saladin, 1169 | |
| Ghâzî II Sayf adDîn | 1170-1180 | Ismâ'îl Nûr adDîn | 1174-1181 |
| Mas'ûd I 'Izz adDîn | 1180-1193 | SINJÂR | |
| Zangî II 'Imâd adDîn | Sinjâr, 1171-1197 | ||
| JAZÎRA | Damascus & Aleppo, 1181-1183 | ||
| Sanjar Shâh Mu'izz adDîn | 1180-1208 | Conquest of Damacus & Aleppo by Saladin, 1183 | |
| Arslan Shâh I Nûr adDîn | Mosul, 1193-1211 | Muḥammad Quṭb adDîn | 1197-1219 |
| Maḥmûd Mu 'izz adDîn | Jazîra, 1208-1241 | ||
| Mas'ûd II 'Izz adDîn | Mosul, 1211-1218 | ||
| Arslan Shâh II Nûr adDîn | 1218-1219 | ||
| Maḥmûd Nâṣir adDîn | 1219-1234 | Shâhanshâh 'Imad adDîn, Maḥmûd Jalâl adDîn, & 'Umar Faṭh adDîn | 1219-1220 |
| Conquest by Ayyûbids, 1220 | |||
| Lu'lu' Badr adDîn | Mosul, Lu'lu'id, 1234-1259 | Mas'ûd al-Malik al-Ẓâhir | Jazîra, 1241-1250 |
| Ismâ'îl Rukn adDîn | Lu'lu'id, 1259-1262 | Conquest by Ayyûbids, 1250, then Lu'lu'ids | |
| Mongol dominion, 1254, conquest, 1262 | |||
, atabeg (ata="father"; beg or bey a title that now can just mean "mister") was a guardian for a minor Seljuk prince. The princes tended to disappear and the atabegs to become independent rulers. In no case was this process as fateful as with Zangî 'Imâd ad-Dîn, who took Edessa from the Crusaders in 1144.
| THE AYYÛBID SULṬÂNS | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| EGYPT | DAMASCUS | ||
| 1169-1193 | anNâṣir I ṢalâḥudDîn (Saladin) Yûsuf ibn Ayyûb | 1183-1186 | |
| Battle of the Horns of Hattin, Capture of King Guy of Jerusalem; Fall of Jerusalem, 1187; Third Crusade, led by King Richard I, 1189-1192 | |||
| al-'Azîz Imad adDîn | 1193-1198 | al-'Afḍal Nûr adDîn | 1186-1196 |
| al-Mansûr Nâṣir adDîn | 1198-1200 | al-'Adil I Sayf adDîn | 1196-1201 |
| 1200-1218 | |||
| Fourth Crusade, 1202-1204 | |||
| 1218-1238 | al-Kamil I Nâṣir adDîn | al-Mu'aẓẓam Sharaf adDîn | Governor 1201-1218 |
| 1218-1227 | |||
| al-Nâṣir II Ṣalâḥ adDîn | 1227-1229 | ||
| al-Ashraf I Muẓaffar adDîn | 1229-1237 | ||
| asṢâliḥ I 'Imad adDîn | 1237-1238 1239-1245 | ||
| 1238 | |||
| Fifth Crusade, 1228-1229; Jerusalem turned over to Emperor Frederick II; remained in Crusader Hands, 1229-1244 | |||
| 1238-1240 | al-'Adil II Sayf adDîn | 1238-1239 | |
| 1240-1249 | asṢâliḥ II Najm adDîn | 1239, 1245-1249 | |
| 1249-1250 | al-Mu'aẓẓam Tûrân-Shâh Ghiyât adDîn | 1249-1250 | |
| Sixth Crusade, 1248-1254; St. Louis IX captured and held for ranson, 1250-1254 | |||
| Shajar adDurr, widow of Najm adDîn | 1250 | anNâṣir II Ṣalâḥ adDîn | 1250-1260 |
| al-Ashraf II Muẓaffar adDîn | 1250-1252, nominally until 1254 | ||
| Sulṭânate of Egypt seized by the Mamlûk Slave-soldier Aybak, 1252 | |||
| Damascus occupied by Mongols, then seized by the Mamlûk Baybars, 1260 | |||
, Ṣalâḥu dDîn, the "Righteousness of the Religion," defeated the Crusaders in battle and then drove them from Jerusalem. This should have made him universally hated in Christendom, but instead we get the extraordinary effect of almost universal admiration.
Edward the "Black Prince" of England (d.1376), no Crusader himself (his military distinctions were in the Hundred Years War against France), possessed bed-curtains that were embroidered with the exploits, not of Richard the Lionheart, but of Saladin. Dante, of course, could only put Saladin in Hell, but his place was with the "virtuous pagans," enjoying an Elesian existence with the likes of Plato and Aristotle, not punished like the Prophet Muḥammad himself.
What was it about Saladin? It was certainly what was seen as his nobility and humanity of character, on top of his remarkable military abilities. This made him an exemplar of the virtues of Chivalry, far more so that the violent and treacherous King Richard (who slaughtered the surrendering population of Acre). If you had to lose your battle, Saladin was the kind of noble enemy you would choose to be defeated by (unless you were a military monk or anyone with a history of treachery, like Reynald of Châtillon, whom Saladin is said to have killed with his own hand). See the dealings of Saladin with Balian of Ibelin (d.1193). Saladin's character was widely recognized in Islam as well in Christendom, and every year men came from his native Kurdistan just to fight with him in his annual campaigns. There have been few men like him since, and perhaps none living today in either Islam (poisoned by Terrorism) or Christendom (where the cultural elite, following Nietzsche, despise Christianity).
Saladin set up his sons and relatives in several subsidiary lines, in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs (Ḥimṣ), Hamah (Ḥamât), Diyâr Bakr, and Yemen. Most of these were ended by 1260 by the Mamlûks or fell to the Mamlûks after Mongol conquest.
 |
|---|
| Saladin the Victorius, by Gustave Doré (1832–1883) |
Although originally ruling from Egypt, Saladin spent the last years of his life fighting in Syria and Palestine and was buried in Damascus, next to the Omayyad Mosque. The Ayyubid family still survives in Lebanon and retains Saladin's sword. His tomb is intact and open to visitors of the Omayyad Mosque. It was even visited by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.
Under Saladin, Cairo replaces Baghdad as the intellectual center of the Central Islâmic lands. The great Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and the Sûfî 'Ibn 'Arabî (1165-1240) both relocated from Spain to Egypt. This climate became the subject of the play Nathan der Weise (1779) by Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781). Saladin's toleration, however, had its limits, since he executed another Sûfî, Suhrawardî (1153-1191) for heterodoxy -- less of a danger for Islâmic mystics than for Christian, but still a problem.
The genealogy of the Ayyûbids that follows is from The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, pp.70-73] and A History of the Crusades, Volume III,
The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades by Steven Runciman [Cambridge University Press, 1951, 1993, p.532].
Since Bosworth simply gives names, and the genealogy there must be reconstructed from the patronymics, about which there are minor but confusing variations, some uncertainties occur. Some of these can be confirmed or corrected with Runciman's chart, which otherwise is innocent of dates and of diacritics for Arabic.
Saladin's Tomb, The Omayyad Mosque, Damascus, 1970
The chart below includes the Ayyubid lines for Aleppo and Ḥimṣ (
, Homs) that are not included in the table above. A larger popup table also includes the lines of Ḥamâh (
), Yaman (Yemen), and Diyâr Bakr.
The continuation of the Ayyubids in Diyâr Bakr under the Mongols, until annexation by the White Sheep Turks, is covered in a separate popup. Dıyarbakir is today a city in Turkey, on the upper Tigris near where the Tigris and Euphrates approach each other before diverging courses.
 |
| The Ayyûbid Gateway of the Citadel of Aleppo, 1970 |
|---|
, Nahrain, the "Two Rivers," or the 
, Jazîra, the "Island."
Today, the northern part of the Jazîra lies in Turkey and the southern part in Syria. A corner of it lies in Iraq northwest of Mosul. Edessa, long the principal city of the area and a Crusader County, is now the city of Urfa in Turkey.
It is not clear from the sources who actually used the title , Sulṭân. I have restricted it to the rulers in Egypt and Damascus. Other rulers are simply "Lords," except in Yemen, whose ruler Rucimen calls "King." As a matter of fact, every single one of these sovereigns employs the title al-Malik, i.e. "the King" -- so I have at least used it for Yemen.
| THE MULÛK AT-TAWÂ'IF, REYES DE TAIFAS | |
|---|---|
| Cordova, Qurṭubah | |
| Ḥamdîn al-Manṣûr | 1144-1145, 1146 |
| Aḥmad III Sayf ad-Dawla Hûdid | 1145-1146 |
| Yaḥyâ ibn Ghâniya | 1146-1148 |
| Almohad conquest, 1148 | |
| Valencia, Balansiyyah | |
| Manṣûr ibn 'Abdallâh Qâḍî | 1144-1147 |
| Abû 'Abdallâh Muḥammad (Rey Lobo/Lope) | 1147-1172 |
| Hilâl | 1172 |
| Almohad conquest, 1172 | |
| Murcia, Mursiyah | |
|---|---|
| 'Abdallâh ibn 'Iyâd. | 1145-1148 |
| 'Abdallâh ibn Faraj ath-Thaghrî | 1145-1148 |
| Abû 'Abdallâh Muḥammad of Valencia | 1148-1172 |
| Almohad conquest, 1172 | |
| The Banû Ghâniya of Majorca | |
| Muḥammad al-Mussûfî ibn Ghâniya | 1126-1155 |
| 'Abdallâh | 1155 |
| Abû Ibrâhîm Isḥâq | 1155-1183 |
| Muḥammad ibn Isḥâq | 1183-1184 |
| 'Alî ibn Isḥâq | 1184-1187 |
| 'Abdallâh ibn Isḥâq | 1187-1203 |
| Almohad conquest, 1203 | |
| MUWAḤID (ALMOHAD) CALIPHS OF SPAIN & NORTH AFRICA | |
|---|---|
| 'Abdul-Mu'min | 1130-1163 |
| Yûsuf I abû Yaqûb | 1163-1184 |
| Ya'qûb ibn Yûsuf al-Manṣûr | 1184-1199 |
| Muḥammad ibn Ya'qûb | 1199-1213 |
| devastating defeat by Christian Spain at Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212 | |
| Yûsuf II Abû Yaqûb | 1213-1224 |
| 'Abdul-Wâḥid Abû Muḥammad | 1224 |
| 'Abdallâh Abû Muḥammad | 1224-1227 |
| Yaḥyâ Abû Zakariyyâ' | 1227-1235 |
| Idrîs I ibn Ya'qûb | 1227-1232 |
| abandonment of Spain, 1228-1229 | |
| 'Abdul-Wâḥid ibn Idrîs I | 1232-1242 |
| 'Alî ibn Idrîs I | 1242-1248 |
| 'Umar ibn Isḥâq | 1248-1266 |
| Idrîs II ibn Muḥammad | 1266-1269 |
| North Africa breaks up between Ḥafṣids, Marînids, & 'Abdul-Wâdids (Zayyânids) | |
Almohad Spain ironically was distinguished by intellectual brilliance and by intolerant oppression. Some of the most important Islâmic and Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages lived during the Almohad period. The principal Islâmic figures were Ibn Bâjja (Avempace, d.1138), Ibn Ṭufayl (Abubacer, d.1185), and especially, Ibn Rushd (Averroës, 1126-1198). The great Jewish philosophers were Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and Moses Nahmanides (1194-1270). Ibn Rushd was probably one of the two or three greatest Islâmic philosophers ever, and was certainly the most influential on subsequent thought in 13th Century Europe. Maimonides was definitely the most important Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages. Both men suffered from the religious fanaticism of the Almohad regime. Ibn Rushd was the last Islâmic philosopher to rigorously defend Neoplatonic and Aristotelian principles that had come to be regarded as un-Islâmic. However, it was his skill as a physician that helped in his ultimate rehabilitation with the Caliph. Maimonides, on the other hand, fled the Almohad persecution of Christians and Jews all the way to Egypt, where he found refuge at the court of Saladin. Nahmanides, on the other hand, was already a denizen of Christian Spain as, in his lifetime, the Almohads lost most of the Spain, abandoned the peninsula, and then were even overthrown in North Africa.
The Almohads styled themselves Caliphs, something not always noted in historical summaries of the area. Since they were Orthodox and the Abbasid line in Baghbad had not ended yet (though it would by the end of the dynasty), the precedent must have been the Omayyad Caliphate in Spain -- if there was even a concern with precedent.
| The Marînid Amîrs of Morocco | |
|---|---|
| 'Abd al-Ḥaqq I | 1195-1217 |
| 'Uthmân I | 1217-1240 |
| Muḥammad I | 1240-1244 |
| Abû Bakr | 1244-1258 |
| 'Umar | 1258-1259 |
| Ya'qûb | 1259-1286 |
| Yûsuf | 1286-1307 |
| 'Âmir | 1307-1308 |
| Sulaymân | 1308-1310 |
| 'Uthmân II | 1310-1331 |
| 'Alî | 1331-1351 |
| Fâris | 1351-1358 |
| Muḥammad II | 1358-1359 |
| Ibrâhîm | 1359-1361 |
| Tâshufîn | 1361 |
| 'Abd al-Ḥalîm | 1361-1362 |
| Muḥammad III | 1362-1366 |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz I | 1366-1372 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1372-1374 |
| Aḥmad | 1374-1384, 1387-1393 |
| Mûsâ | 1384-1386 |
| Muḥammad V | 1386 |
| Muḥammad VI | 1386-1387 |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz II | 1393-1396 |
| 'Abd Allâh | 1396-1398 |
| 'Uthmân III | 1398-1420 |
| 'Abd al-Ḥaqq II | 1420-1465 |
| The Waṭṭâsid Amîrs of Morocco | |
| Yaḥyâ I al-Waṭṭâsî | regent, 1428-1448 |
| 'Alî | regent, 1448-1458 |
| Yaḥyâ II | regent, 1458-1459 |
| interregnum, Idrîsid Shurafâ, 1465-1471 | |
| Muḥammad I | 1472-1504 |
| Muḥammad II | 1504-1526 |
| 'Alî | 1526, 1554 |
| Aḥmad | 1526-1545, 1547-1549 |
| Muḥammad III | 1545-1547 |
| The Sa'did Sharîfs of Morocco | |
| Muḥammad I al-Qâ'im al-Mahdî | 1510-1517 |
| Aḥmad al-A'raj | 1517-1543 |
| Maḥammad ash-Shaykh | 1517-1557 |
| 'Abdallâh | 1557-1574 |
| Muḥammad II | 1574-1576 |
| 'Abd al-Malik | 1576-1578 |
| Aḥmad | 1578-1603 |
| Zaydân | Fez, 1603-1604; Marrakech, 1609-1627 |
| 'Abdallâh | Marrakech, 1603-1606; Fez, 1606-1609 |
| Maḥammad | Fex, 1606-1613 |
| 'Abdallâh | Marrakech, 1606-1609; Fex, 1609-1623 |
| 'Abd al-Malik ash-Shaykh | Fez, 1623-1627 |
| 'Abd al-Malik an-Nâṣir | Marrakech, 1627-1631 |
| Muḥammad al-Walîd | Marrakech, 1631-1636 |
| Maḥammad ash-Shaykh | 1636-1655 |
| Aḥmad ash-Shaykh | 1655-1659 |
| The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sulṭâns, & Kings of Morocco, 1640-present | |
| The Ḥafṣid Amirs, Caliphs, or Sulṭâns of Tunisia | |
|---|---|
| Yaḥyâ I | 1229-1249 |
| Muḥammad I | 1249-1277 |
| Seventh Crusade by St. Louis IX, 1270 | |
| Yaḥyâ II | 1277-1279 |
| Ibrâhîm I | 1279-1283 |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz | 1283 |
| Aḥmad | 1283-1284 |
| 'Umar I | 1284-1295 |
| Muḥammad II | 1295-1309 |
| Abû Bakr I | 1309 |
| Khâlid I | 1309-1311, d.1313 |
| Zakariyâ' I | 1311-1317 |
| Muḥammad III | 1317-1318 |
| Abû Bakr II | 1318-1346 |
| Aḥmad I | 1346-1347 |
| 'Umar II | 1347 |
| Marînid rule, 1347-1350 | |
| al-Faḍl | 1350 |
| Ibrâhîm II | 1350-1369 |
| Khâlid II | 1369-1370 |
| Aḥmad II | 1370-1394 |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz | 1394-1434 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1434-1435 |
| 'Uthmân | 1435-1488 |
| Yaḥyâ III | 1488-1489 |
| 'Abd al-Mu'min | 1489-1490 |
| Zkariyâ' II | 1490-1494 |
| Muḥammad V | 1494-1526 |
| Muḥammad VI | 1526-1534, 1535-1542 |
| Ottoman occupation, 1534-1535; vassal of Charles V, 1635-1569 | |
| Aḥmad III | 1542-1569 |
| Ottoman rule, 1569-1573 | |
| Muḥammad VII | 1573-1574 |
| vassal of Spain, 1573-1574; Ottoman conquest & direct rule, 1574-1705 | |
| The Zayyânid or Ziyânid Amîrs of Algeria | |
|---|---|
| Yaghmurâsan ibn Ziyân or Zayyân | 1236-1283 |
| 'Uthmân I | 1283-1304 |
| Muḥammad I | 1304-1308 |
| Mûsâ I | 1308-1318 |
| 'Abd ar-Raḥmân I | 1318-1337 |
| Marînid rule, 1337-1348 | |
| 'Uthmân II & al-Zaîm | 1348-1352 |
| Marînid rule, 1352-1359 | |
| Mûsâ II | 1359-1389 |
| 'Abd ar-Raḥmân II | 1389-1394 |
| Yûsuf I | 1394 |
| Yûsuf I | 1394-1395 |
| Muḥammad II | 1395-1400 |
| 'Abdallâh I | 1400-1402 |
| Muḥammad III | 1402-1411 |
| 'Abd ar-Raḥmân III | 1411 |
| Sa'îd | 1411 |
| 'Abd al-Wâḥid | 1411-1424, 1428-1430 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1424-1428 |
| Aḥmad I | 1430-1462 |
| Muḥammad V | 1462-1469 |
| Abû Tâshufîn | 1469 |
| Muḥammad VI | 1469-1504 |
| Muḥammad VII | 1504-1517 |
| vassal of Spain, 1512 | |
| Mûsâ III | 1517-1528 |
| Ottoman presence, 1518 | |
| 'Abdallâh | 1528-1540 |
| Muḥammad VIII | 1540-1541 |
| Aḥmad II | 1541-1543, 1544-1550 |
| Spanish occupation, 1543-1544 | |
| al-Ḥasan | 1550-1555 |
| Ottoman conquest, 1555; Barbary States | |
| French occupation, 1830-1871; French annexation; 1871-1962; Republic of Algeria, 1962-present | |
These tables are based on both The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996] and the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002]. Bosworth has all of the rulers listed, while Morby gives only the Marînids [p.183] and Ḥafṣids [p.185]. Morby has a clearer presentation, but Bosworth also has a brief discussion of the history.
With the Crusades, Francia begins to develop the seapower that enables it to return to North Africa. On the Seventh Crusade in 1270, St. Louis IX of France lands in Tunisia, formally as a preparation to return to Egypt but apparently simply at the self-interested urging of his brother, Charles of Anjou, who wanted to enlarge his Mediterranean empire. He dies instead and accomplishes nothing for Charles -- it is also the last Crusade.
After completing the expulsion of Islâm from Spain, both Spain and Portugal become intent on expanding into North Africa. Various cities get taken and held for a time, and local rulers become temporary vassals, but nothing permanent gets accomplished and it seems impossible to establish a durable or extensive presence on the continent.
It is not Europe but Turkey that actually does this. Both the Ḥafṣids and Ziyânds come to an end with the Turkish conquest. Indeed, in the last stages, the local rulers sometimes relied on the Christians as allies against the Turks. North Africa thus became a theater of the larger conflict between Christendom and the Ottomans.
North Africa, however, was a long way from Constantinople. And as the Turkish reach slackened with time, local governors and princes began to run their own operations. This came to mean piracy and slaving. We enter the period of the Barbary States, a good three hundred years, when corsairs, from Algeria especially, were a plague on the surrounding seas, with ship after ship taken, and Christian crews and passengers sold on the slave markets. After 1604, when English pirates taught them Atlantic navigation, Barbary ships ranged as far as Newfoundland and even captured ships in Plymouth harbor. 
Between 1609 and 1616, they captured 446 English ships and sold more than 7000 English captives as slaves. Some such captives might be ransomed, but many others were lost the rest of their lives.
At right we have a sculpture, "The Greek Slave," by Hiram Powers [1844], which is supposed to be a Greek women captured by the Turks and sold into slavery. At the opposite end of the Mediterranean, and after the relevant era, she would probably not be a captive of the Barbary Pirates, but slavery in Islam was not confined to them and there is nothing ahistorical or untrue about imagining Greek slaves of the Ottomans, as Powers himself imagined her a captive because of the revolt of the Greeks. Such a sculpture might serve several purposes. One would be to publicize the reality of the Muslim slave market, whether in North Africa or elsewhere. It also does this with an example of the humiliating exposure of a helpless victim, which raises slavery as a sexual issue. We might see this as part of an extreme subset of the business, but it is not a falsehood. The sexual slavery practiced recently (2014/2016) by Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a conspicuous revival of the practice -- the leader of Boko Haram publicly boasted of what he was doing. At the same time, we can also see "The Greek Slave" as an opportunity to engage in a bit of mild pornography, with the image of the helpless women actually appealing to sexual fantasies. This could be called a form of "Orientalism," by which the East is fictionalized and sexualized by what are essentially Western desires. However, since there is nothing inaccurate about portrayals of sexual slavery in Islam, accusations of "Orientalism" can be seen as a self-interested and dishonest way of deflecting and concealing attention from the realities of Islamic civilization. Nor, as noted, is this merely a matter of historical interest. In Nigeria, Iraq, and Syria, even as I write, women are being constantly raped by Jihadists, a situation that curiously seems to draw relatively little attention, and less ire, from Western feminists, whose own animus may be directed elsewhere.
Christian states were scandalized by the piracy and slave trade, but punitive expeditions were usually no more successful than they had been since St. Louis. An English expedition against Algeria in 1620 was a failure, but one in 1637 was more successful, seizing the city of Salee, with 300 captives freed. Nevertheless, it was easier to pay for "protection" and buy off the pirates (who also sometimes could be used as allies against other European powers). This was never more than partially effective, since, as the saying goes, once you pay the Danegeld, you can't get rid of the Dane (very similar kinds of pirates and slavers, as pagans, in their day).
The situation became especially infuriating to the new but distant United States of America. After paying $2,000,000 in extortion money, Thomas Jefferson had had enough and in 1801 sent the U.S. Navy and Marines against the city of Tripoli (actually just east of Tunisia, in modern Libya). This brought at least a temporary respite, and contributed a phrase ("the shores of Tripoli") to the Marine Hymn. The piracy and slaving did not really and fully end, however, until the French landed in Algeria, intent upon conquest, in 1830. They had a hard fight against the local charismatic leader, Abd al-Kader, from 1832 to 1847, but they accomplished the task. Fighting there would often be in French Algeria, for which the legendary Foreign Legion would be created, but local pirates would no longer plague the seas or harvest Christian merchants and travellers for hostages and slaves. This is now entirely forgotten by people who want to blame Europeans, or even specifically Americans, for slavery (or "imperialism"), with the idea that they invented it just to oppress Africans. It is often actually Africans who must remind anti-American Americans that the slave trade originated with Arabs and Africans themselves. The following section throws yet another light on this.
| The Keita Kings of Mali | |
|---|---|
| Mari Sun Dayâta (Mârî Jâṭâ) I | 1230-1255 |
| Mansâ Ulî/Ule | 1255-1270 |
| Mansâ Wâtî | 1270-1274 |
| Mansâ Khalîfa | 1274-1275 |
| Mansâ Abû Bakr I, Bata-Mande-Bori | 1275-1285 |
| Sabakura/Sâkûra | freedman, 1285-1300 |
| Mansâ Gaw/Qû | 1300-1305 |
| Mansâ Mamadu/Muḥammad | 1305-1310, d.1312 |
| Mansâ Abû Bakr II | 1310-1312 |
| Mansâ Mûsâ I | 1312-1337 |
| Mansâ Maghan/Maghâ I | 1337-1341 |
| Mansâ Sulaymân | 1341-1360 |
| Mansâ Kamba/Qanba/Qâsâ | 1360-1361 |
| Mansâ Mari Dyâta/Mârî Jâṭa II | 1361-1374 |
| Mansâ Mûsâ II | 1374-1382 |
| Mansâ Maghan II | 1382-1388/89 |
| Sandigi/Ṣandiki | usurper, 1388/89-1390 |
| Mansâ Maghan III, Maḥmûd | 1390 |
| succession strife, ascendancy of Songhay | |
The Islam that the Kings of Mali did want rigorously enforced was the prohibition of taking Muslims as slaves. Slavers from North Africa usually regarded all black people, Muslims or not, as fair game, and this became a matter of continuing annoyance, outrage, and reproach over time. The recent self-righteous expressing indignation over the European slave trade from the coast of West Africa usually forget that the trade began and long continued, in much the same volume, across the Sahara to the Arab north. There are few descendants of those slaves in Arab countries today, reflecting the harshness of their treatment, including the castration of the men.
Today this area suffers from an advance of the desert that has continued through all historical time. The Sahara has only gotten worse in the last five thousand years and more. The mediaeval kingdom thus enjoyed considerable rainfall and arable land now lost. The modern Republic of Mali, although encompassing some of the same territory as the old Kingdom, nevertheless has no direct connection to it and is named just in commemoration of it.
The fury and anaesthesia of Islamic Fascism have now come to historic and fabled Timbuktu. In late June, 2012, Islamist fanatics, such as the "Ansar Dine" group, have by pick-axes, hoes, and fire destroyed the tombs of the Mediaeval Muslim Saints Sidi Mahmoud, Sidi Moctar, and Alpha Moya in Timbuktu, previously called the "city of 333 Saints." 
This is consistent with the vandalism visited on cultural and religious artifacts by Jihadists, as most notoriously seen in the destruction of Buddhist art and monuments in Afghanistan; but it may surprise some that Islamic monuments, in this case ones designated by UNESCO as "world-heritage" sites, are now the target. But the Wahhabist inspired Islam of modern zealots regards the veneration or even commemoration of saints as un-Islamic, and they scruple at no death or destruction to enforce their particular fundamentalism. Since their fire also burned priceless manuscripts in the tombs, they are also indifferent to traditions of Islamic literature and historiography. In short, they are savages and barbarians, in the fullest senses of those terms. It is extraordinary that the modern world still has to deal with people like this. Much worse, such movements seem to be admired and supported by many Muslims, while Barack Obama, while taking some measures against them, continues to express complacency about the level of threat they represent --
| The Si & Askiya Kings of Songhay | |
|---|---|
| Sonni 'Alî Ber, the Great | 1464/1465-1492 |
| Abû Bakr/Bakari/Baru | 1492-1493 |
| Muḥammad I Ture Askiya/Sikiya | 1493-1528, d.1538 |
| Mûsâ | 1528-1531 |
| Muḥammad II Benkan | 1531-1537 |
| Ismâ'îl | 1537-1539 |
| Isḥâq I | 1539-1549 |
| Dâwûd | 1549-1582 |
| Muḥammad III | 1582-1586 |
| Muḥammad IV Bani | 1586-1588 |
| Isḥâq II | 1588-1591 |
| Muḥammad V Gao/Kawkaw | 1591-1592 |
| conquest by Morocco, 1591-1592 | |
Mali was the scene of an attempted coup in March, 2012, and this unleashed the anarchy and fanaticism that now are in play in the north of the country. Many more tombs in Timbuktu are vulnerable to destruction; but the intervention of French troops later secured the situation for the time being.
The successor to Mali on the Niger River, Songhay had begun a good bit earlier, back in the 9th century. However, there really are no dates before the Si (or Sonni) dynasty, beginning with 'Alî Golom (or Kolon) around 1275. Songhay is then a vassal of Mali. After that, things are still obscure, with few dates and even poorly attested names for the rulers until Sonni 'Alî "the Great," who definitively established the ascendency of Songhay in the area. In short order Muḥammad I Ture Askiya founds a new dynasty, which continues until the Morocco conquest. The Moroccans had the advantage at this point of firearms, but their ability to hold the area was limited. Even the presence of a Moroccan governor in Timbuktu seems to have lapsed around 1660. The region fell into disorder.
The kings of both Mali and Songhay are from Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, pp.122-125].
| THE MAMLÛK SULṬÂNS OF EGYPT, 1252-1517 | |
|---|---|
| Baḥrî line, 1252-1390 (usually Turkish) | |
| Aybak al-Turkumânî | 1250, 1252-1257 |
| 'Alî I | 1257-1259 |
| Qutuz al-Mu'izzî | 1259-1260 |
| Baybars I al-Bunduqdârî | 1260-1277 |
| Defeats Mongols, 1260 | |
| Baraka/Berke Khân | 1277-1279 |
| Salâmish/Süleymish | 1279 |
| Qalâwûn al-Alfî | 1279-1290 |
| Khalîl | 1290-1293 |
| Fall of Acre, 1291; End of Outremer | |
| Baydarâ(?) | 1293 |
| Muḥammad I | 1293-1294, 1299-1309, 1310-1341 |
| Kitbughâ | 1294-1296 |
| Lâchîn/Lâjîn al-Ashqar | 1296-1299 |
| Pharos Lighthouse collapses after earthquake, 1303 | |
| Baybars II al-Jâshnakîr (Burjî) | 1309-1310 |
| Abû Bakr | 1341 |
| Kûjûk/Küchük | 1341-1342 |
| Aḥmad I | 1342 |
| Ismâ'îl | 1342-1345 |
| Sha'bân I | 1345-1346 |
| Ḥâjjî I | 1346-1347 |
| al-Ḥasan | 1347-1351, 1354-1361 |
| Ṣâliḥ | 1351-1354 |
| Muḥammad II | 1361-1363 |
| Sha'bân II | 1363-1377 |
| 'Alî II | 1377-1382 |
| Ḥâjjî II | 1382, 1389-1390 |
| Burjî line, 1382-1517 (usually Circassian) | |
| Barqûq al-Yalburghâwî | 1382-1398, 1390-1399 |
| Faraj | 1399-1405, 1405-1412 |
| 'Abd al-'Aziz | 1405 |
| al-Musta'în | 1412 |
| 1406-1414, Caliph | |
| Shaykh al-Maḥmûdî al-Ẓâhirî | 1412-1421 |
| Aḥmad II | 1421 |
| Ṭâṭâr | 1421 |
| Muḥammad III | 1421-1422 |
| Barsbay | 1422-1438 |
| Yûsuf | 1438 |
| Chaqmaq/Jaqmaq | 1438-1453 |
| 'Uthmân | 1453 |
| Inâl al-'Alâ'î al-Ẓâhirî | 1453-1461 |
| Aḥmad III | 1461 |
| Khushqadam | 1461-1467 |
| Yalbay | 1467 |
| Timurbughâ | 1467-1468 |
| Qâyit Bay al-Ẓâhirî | 1468-1496 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1496-1498 |
| Qânṣawh I | 1498-1500 |
| Jânbulâṭ | 1500-1501 |
| Ṭûmân Bay I | 1501 |
| Qânṣawh II al-Ghawrî | 1501-1516 |
| Ṭûmân Bay II | 1516-1517 |
| Ottoman Conquest by Selîm I Yavuz; line of Mamlûks actually continues until 1811 | |
, Mamâlîk, literally "possessed" (singular 
, Mamlûk), i.e. "slaves," represent one of the strangest political institutions in world history, compared by Machiavelli to nothing so much as the Papacy. This was because of the non-hereditary nature of the succession, though the Mamlûks were by no means celibate -- that would be foreign to Islâm.
| THE ABBASID PUPPET CALIPHS OF EGYPT, 1261-1517 AD, UNDER THE MAMLÛKS | |
|---|---|
| Aḥmad al-Mustanṣir | 1261 |
| Aḥmad al-Ḥâkim I | 1261-1262 in Aleppo |
| 1262-1302 in Cairo | |
| Sulaymân al-Mustakfî I | 1302-1340 |
| Ibrâhîm al-Wâthiq I | 1340-1341 |
| Aḥmad al-Ḥakîm II | 1341-1352 |
| Abû Bakr al-Mu'taḍid I | 1352-1362 |
| Muḥammad al-Mutawakkil I | 1362-1377, 1377-1383, 1389-1406 |
| Zakariyyâ' al-Mu'taṣim | 1377, 1386-1389 |
| 'Umar al-Wâthiq II | 1383-1386 |
| 'Abbâs or Ya'qûb al-Musta'în | 1406-1414 |
| Sulṭân, 1412 | |
| Dâwûd al-Mu'taḍid II | 1414-1441 |
| Sulaymân al-Mustakfî II | 1441-1451 |
| Ḥamza al-Qâ'im | 1451-1455 |
| Yûsuf al-Mustanjid | 1455-1479 |
| 'Abdul'Azîz al-Mutawakkil II | 1479-1497 |
| Ya'qûb al-Mustamsik | 1497-1508, 1516-1517 |
| al-Mutawakkil III | 1508-1516, 1517 |
| 1517, Caliph removed to İstanbul by Ottoman Sulṭân Selîm I Yavuz, later credited with assuming Caliphate | |
Slave troops at first were Turkish, but then preference shifted, as it did with the Ottomans, to originally Christian boys from the Caucasus, especially Circassians. Although Cairo was a major terminus for the African slave trade, black boys were not used for this purpose -- they were generally castrated and used as harem eunuchs, or even at the shrines in Mecca and Medina.
Although the Mamlûk Sulṭânate formally and by reputation was non-hereditary, it does turn out that many of the Sulṭâns were sons or brothers of others. This can be seen in Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [pp.76-78] and, rather more clearly, in the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John. E. Morby [Oxford, 2002, pp.189-190] -- note that a genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasid Caliphs is given above.
Mamlûk Egypt for many years was the principal state of Islâm. The defeat of the Mongols in 1260 and then the establishment of an Abbasid line of Caliphs in Cairo gave the regime a respect and status that others could not match. The architectural monuments of Mamlûk Cairo are still impressive, and it is noteworthy that the great collection of Mediaeval Islâmic stories, the Alf Layla wa Layla, This collection, including stories that must have been circulating for many centuries, is noteworthy for the social, cultural, and religious attitudes it reveals. While fiercely pro-Islâmic, with stories even about questions of Islâmic Law, and a very long and boring one about fighting the Romans (with nice touches like the notion that Christian incense is made from the excrement of Bishops), we find things that now seem rather un-Islâmic. For instance, there is a great deal of wine drinking, which seems to be casually accepted, even while its irreligion, strictly speaking, is noted.
Thus, in one story, a character swears off wine in order to purify himself for the Pilgrimage. In another story, a man discovers that his wife has been having sex with a gorilla. With a shocking touch of racism, this affair is said to have commenced after a previous black lover had died (which fits the surviving stereotype of black sexual prowess but betrays ignorance of the anatomy of gorillas, which actually have smaller genitals than humans). We might expect that the proper thing to do about this would be to kill the wife. However, the wife's unnatural lust is extraordinarily treated as a medical disorder, and a physician is employed to cure her, which he does. Besides the wine drinking, there seems to be considerable ease and interest in unsanctioned sexual activities. Even those eunuchs who have been deprived of their testicles but not their penises boast of their ability to have sex with their mistresses. One real world consequence of that was the custom of only using black eunuchs, who typically had amputated penises, in the harîm.
Although the story of the Mamlûks is easily thought to end in 1517 with the Ottoman conquest, the amazing truth is that the Mamlûk garrison was not abolished by the Turks and that, as Ottoman authority weakened, Egypt ended up again under the de facto rule of the same "peculiar institution." Thus, when Napoleon arrived in Egypt in 1798, it was the Mamlûks with whom he had to contend. When he defeated them at the Battle of the Pyramids, he may not have stopped to think (so distracted by all the Egyptian stuff) that he had beaten victors over the Mongols. Nevertheless, this was still not the end of the Mamlûk story. They retreated up the Nile from the French and were again contesting the rule of Egypt when Muḥammad 'Alî deceived, trapped, and exterminated them in 1811.
What did end in 1517 was the line of Abbasid Caliphs. The last was taken off to Constantinople. Ironically, this was al-Mutawakkil III -- the same title as the Caliph who was assassinated by his own Turkish guard in 861. It is not clear whether the Ottomans had any intention of continuing the line, as useful figureheads, as the Mamlûks had, for the Caliph and any possible descendants simply disappear from history. Later, when the Sulṭâns got to thinking about it, they claimed the Caliphate for themselves.
(Thousand Nights and a Night, i.e. the Thousand and One Nights), achieved definitive form in Cairo around 1400. Modern translations, however, often include some stories that are not in the original Arabic edition.
| The Hûdids of Murcia | |
|---|---|
| Muḥammad ibn Hûd al-Mutawakkil | 1228-1238 |
| Conquest of Valencia by Aragón, 1238 | |
| Muḥammad al-Wâthiq | 1238-1239, 1264-? |
| al-'Azîz Ḍiyâ'ad-Dawla | 1239-1241 |
| Muḥammad Abû Ja'far Bahâ'ad-Dawla | 1241-1262 |
| Muḥammad ibn Abî J'afar Muḥammad | 1262-1264 |
| occupation by Granada, ?-1266 | |
| Conquest by Aragón, 1266 | |
| THE NAṢRID SULṬÂNS OF GRANADA | |
|---|---|
| Muḥammad I al-Ghâlib, ibn al-Aḥmar | 1232-1273 |
| Muḥammad II al-Faqîh | 1273-1302 |
| Muḥammad III al-Makhlû' | 1302-1309 |
| Naṣr | 1309-1314 |
| Ismâ'îl I | 1314-1325 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1325-1333 |
| Yûsuf I al-Mu'ayyad | 1333-1354 |
| Muḥammad V al-Ghani | 1354-1359, 1362-1391 |
| Ismâ'îl II | 1359-1360 |
| Muḥammad VI al-Ghâlib, el Bermejo | 1360-1362 |
| Yûsuf II al-Mustahgnî | 1391-1392 |
| Muḥammad VII al-Mustâ'în | 1392-1408 |
| Yûsuf III an-Nâṣir | 1408-1417 |
| Muḥammad VIII al-Mustamassik, al-Ṣaghîr, el Pequeño | 1417-1419, 1427-1429 |
| Muḥammad IX al-Ghâlib, al-Aysar, el Zurdo | 1419-1427, 1429-1432, 1432-1445, 1447-1453 |
| Yûsuf IV, Abenalmao | 1432 |
| Muḥammad X al-Aḥnaf, el Cojo | 1445, 1446-1447 |
| Yûsuf V, Aben Ismael | 1445-1446, 1462 |
| Muḥammad XI, el Chiquito | 1451-1455 |
| Sa'd al-Musta'în, Ciriza, Muley Zad | 1454-1464 |
| 'Alî, Muley Hácen | 1464-1482, 1483-1485 |
| Muḥammad XII al-Zughûbî, Boabdil el Chico | 1482-1483, 1486-1492, d. 1533 |
| Mu.hammad ibn Sa'd al-Zaghal | 1485-1490 |
| Conquest by Castile & Aragón, end of Islamic Spain, 1492 | |
The Alhambra (a redundant expression, since "al" already means "the") survives out of its time as a living fossil of Islâmic Spain -- with its name transported to a city in Southern California, where at least the climate is similar. Another echo of Islamic Spain lives in California, however, where the Mission San Gabriel Arcángel 
reflects, on a more humble scale, architectural elements of the Great Mosque of Cordova (which survived through its conversion into the church). The builder of the Mission, it seems, was from Cordova. The buttresses unique to California Missions, unfortunately, have not always preserved San Gabriel from earthquake damage. An image of San Gabriel has recently been proposed for the Seal of the County of Los Angeles, since the City of Los Angeles was originally founded in 1781 as an asistencia or outlier of the Mission.
| THE SULṬÂNS OF MALACCA/MELAKA | |
|---|---|
| Parameshvara | 1403-1414 |
| Chinese suzerainty, 1409 | |
| Megat Iskandar Shâh | 1414-1424 |
| Shri Maharâjâ Sulṭân Muḥammad Shâh | 1424-1445 |
| last Chinese fleet visit, 1433 | |
| Râjâ Ibrâhîm Shri Paramesvara Deva Shâh | 1445-1446 |
| Râjâ Qâsim Sulṭân Maẓaffar Shâh | 1446-1459 |
| Râjâ 'Abdallâh Sulṭân Manṣûr Shâh | 1459-1477 |
| Sulṭân 'Alâ' ad-Dîn Ri'âyat | 1477-1488 |
| Sulṭân Maḥmud Shâh | 1488-1510, 1510-1528 |
| Sulṭân Aḥmad Shâh | 1510 |
| Portuguese conquest, 1511; dynasty continues in Johor, 1528; Dutch, 1641; British, 1824 | |
At the beginning of the line of the Sulṭâns of Malacca, it was Siam that exerted influence. But then in 1409 the Chinese arrived. Admiral Zheng He and his great fleets, projecting the new power of the Ming Dynasty, established a base at Malacca, and the Sulṭân became a tributary of China. He even sailed to China to pay homage to the Emperor. A Chinese cantonment protected, stored, and shipped goods from China and those obtained on the further expeditions into the Indian Ocean. On nearby Sumatra, a Chinese governor was installed at Palembang after a Chinese pirate was defeated, captured, and sent back to China for execution. In northern Sumatra (near Acheh), troops were put ashore to install one king and execute his rival. A king in Ceylon was defeated and sent to China, but then the Emperor returned him to his kingdom (thought he evidently was unable to recover his throne). Some of Zheng He's detachments went into the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and even down the coast of Africa, perhaps as far as Zanzibar. This impressive exercise ended abruptly in 1433, when the xenophobic Confucian faction became dominant at the Chinese Court. China was cut off from the external world and began to lose its ability to deal with that world, either culturally, economically, or militarily.
Arriving next by sea and by trade would be the Portuguese (led by Afonso de Albuquerque), Dutch, and British, all of whom were also interested in secure bases for their activities. So Malacca became a European colony. Under the British, it became part of the Straits Settlements, which was a string of cities along, indeed, the Straits of Malacca, between Malaya and Sumatra. British Malaya was otherwise a group of client kingdoms, including some whose rulers were actually descendants of the Sulṭâns of Malacca.
In 1972 I was looking through some books that were on sale at the University of Hawai'i bookstore. Among them I found two small pamphlets that looked 
like children's primers written entirely in the Arabic alphabet. I had no idea what these could be, or what they were doing in Hawai'i. They were, however, published in Singapore by the "Malaysia Press Ltd." This was the clue; for, as I soon learned, and as is generally characteristic in Mediaeval Islamic converts, the Arabic alphabet is adopted to write the local language, which was Malay, 
, Melayu. This grew up as a trade language of Malaya and Indonesia,
| THE SULṬÂNS OF ACHEH/ATJEH/ACEH | |
|---|---|
| 'Inâyat Shâh | c.1450-? |
| Muẓaffar Shâh | d.1497 |
| Shams ad-Dîn Shâh | ?-c.1496 |
| 'Alî Mughâyat Shâh | c.1496-c.1530 |
| Ṣalâḥ ad-Dîn | c.1530-c.1537 |
| Ri'âyat Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn al-Qahhâr | c.1537-1571 |
| appeals to Ottoman Sulṭân for aid against the Portuguese, 1563 | |
| 'Alî/Ḥusayn Ri'âyat Shâh | 1571-1579 |
| Sultan Muda | 1579 |
| Sultan Shri 'Âlam | 1579 |
| Zayn al-'Âbidîn | 1579 |
| Manṣûr Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1579-c.1586 |
| 'Alî Ri'âyat Shâh Râjâ Buyung | c.1586-c.1588 |
| Ri'âyat Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | c.1588-1604 |
| 'Alî Ri'âyat Shah/Sultan Muda | 1604-1607 |
| Iskandar Muda Makota 'Âlam | 1607-1636 |
| Mughâyat Shâh, Iskandar Thânî 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1636-1641 |
| Ṣafiyyat ad-Dîn Shâh Tâj al-'Âlam | 1641-1675 |
| Naqiyyat ad-Dîn Shâ'h Nûr al-'Âlam | 1675-1678 |
| Zakiyyat ad-Dîn Shâh 'Inâyat | 1678-1688 |
| Zînat ad-Dîn Kamâlat Shâh | 1688-1699 |
| Sharîf Hâ'shim Jamâl ad-Dîn Badr al-'Âlam | 1699-1702 |
| Perkasa 'Âlam Sharîf Lamtuy | 1702-1703 |
| Badr al-Munîr, Jamâl al-'Âlam | 1703-1726 |
| Amîn ad-Dîn Shâh, Jawhar al-'Âlam | 1726 |
| Shams al-'Âlam, Wandi Tebing | 1726-1727 |
| Aḥmad Shâh, Maharâjâ Lela Melayu, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1727-1735 |
| Jahân Shâh, Potjut Auk, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1735-1760 |
| Maḥmûd Shâh, Tuanku Raja | 1760-1781 |
| Muḥammad Shâh, Taunku Muḥammad, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1781-1795 |
| Jawhar al-'Âlam Shâh, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1795-1824 |
| Muḥammad Shâh | 1824-1836 |
| Manṣûr Shâh | 1836-1870 |
| Maḥmûd Shâh | 1870-1874 |
| capital at Kutaraja captured by Dutch, 1874 | |
| Muḥammad Dawud Shah, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1874-1903 |
| Dutch conquest of Acheh, 1903 | |
, khabar, "news, information, report." Malay is now the national language of Malaysia (Bahasa Malaysia), Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia), and Singapore (Bahasa Melayu). The British and the Dutch introduced systems of Romanization -- e.g. "u" in Malaya was "oe" in Indonesia -- which now have been reconciled to a universal standard, with the Dutch idiosyncrasies eliminated. 
The use of the Arabic alphabet had been dying out, but not entirely.
As initially in Persian, it was necessary to introduce some extra letters into the alphabet to write all the sounds of Malay. These would be, most importantly, letters for the velar nasal "ng" and the palatal nasal "ny" (or "ñ"). 
A small problem arose with writing three dots over the "chair" for an "n" with "ny." In the final or independent position, the letter would be distinctive. Written initially or medially, however, the letter would look like the Arabic "th." Thus, in the initial or medial positions, the three dots for "ny" are written under rather than over the "chair." This, however, would then look like the Persian "p." Malay also needed a "p," so the "chair" of Arabic "f" was used, with three dots, for the "p." Otherwise, we get the variation that "g," borrowed from Persian, might be written with a dot rather than an extra line; and Arabic "w," pronounced "v" in Persian, could be left alone to mean "w" in Malay or written with a dot to mean "v." Otherwise, "ch" was also borrowed from Persian.
The way things are going in Islâm, it may well be that the use of the Arabic alphabet will increase; but little of it had been left in public life.
Acheh at the northern end of Sumatra, just across the Straits from Malacca, was a larger and more durable realm. We see less in the way of Sanskrit names and titles, though there are some local names and references, as with Aḥmad Shâh (1727-1735), who is called Maharâjâ Lela Melayu -- i.e. "the Malay." We also see something very unusual in Islam, a number of female rulers.
In 1563 Sulṭân Ri'âyat Shâh of Acheh wrote to the Ottoman Sulṭân, in this case no less than Suleiman the Magnificent, requesting help against the Portuguese. This episode reveals the extent of the Oecumene of Islâm, and the recognition of the common enemy. Turkey at the height of its power, and willing to help, nevertheless had some difficulty projecting that power as far as Indonesia. After a delay of some years, and not until after the death of Suleiman, an Ottoman fleet of 19 ships sailed from Egypt. Only two ships reached Acheh, however, the rest having been diverted to bolster Ottoman authority in Yemen. The aid finally delivered to Acheh was thus minimal and, as it happened, ineffective.
While it is tempting now to think of Indonesia as a unified realm, not only were there multiple sovereignties in earlier days, but their subjugation by the Dutch was a process that took some time. Thus, the last Sulṭân of Acheh held out for many years, and the Dutch conquest was not complete until 1903. We see much the same process in Bali, where Dutch conquest was not complete until 1906, amid scenes of great slaughter, something like 3600 Balinese falling.
Acheh entered the news late in 2004 with a great earthquake, magnitude 9.0, the largest on Earth in forty years, off the coast of Sumatra. This was bad enough, but the tsunami, We are thus unpleasantly reminded of the geological forces at work under Indonesia, where many great earthquakes and some of the largest volcanic eruptions in the geological record have occurred. For instance, the eruption of Mt. Tambora in 1815 put so much material into the atmosphere that it darkened the sky world wide and produced "the year without summer" in 1816 -- producing the cold and rains in Europe that enforced the leisure for Mary Shelley to write Frankenstein [1818].
Not as large but better known was the eruption of Karakatoa (Krakatau, between Java and Sumatra) in 1883. This blew away the small island of Karakatoa itself, with a blast that was actually heard as far as 1000 miles away. There have been few such eruptions anywhere in historical times. Ice cores show a spike of volcanic gasses for 535 AD. It was long not known if this was one of the Indonesian volcanoes. They were the best candidates; but now it turns out that this must have been Mt. Ilopango in El Salvador, which would have been an eruption as large or larger than Tambora. Such eruptions did have some serious historical consequences. There is much comment in Roman records of the time about the dim sunlight of 536 AD and the failure of crops thereafter. The cooling may have precipitated the plague that arrived in Egypt in 541. The "Dark Ages Cooling" was thus another heavy blow against the diminishing Roman Empire.
Prehistorically, Sumatra may have been the place of the largest volcanic eruption in the history of the human species. When Mt. Toba erupted 74,000 years ago, it was perhaps 10,000 times the size of the Mt. St. Helens eruption in 1980. This could have caused a 5o Celsius (9o Fahrenheit) global drop in temperature around the world. The "year without summer" might have become months or years without summer. There is some evidence that this caused a "genetic bottleneck" in human evolution, which means a large portion of human beings may have died. This was before the advent of fully modern humans, about 30,000 years ago; so, literally, people like us have not seen its like.
, generated by the earthquake inundated coasts as far away as Sri Lanka and Thailand. The death toll overall is estimated up to 200,000 people.
Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
| The State of at-Tababi'a | |
|---|---|
| al-Harith ar-Raish | 1230-1105 BC |
| Abrahah Dhul Manar | 1105-922 |
| Afrikis ibn Abrahah | 922-758 |
| al-'Abd Dhu al-Adh'ar | 758-733 |
| al-Hedhed ibn Sharahil | 733-658 |
| Balkis (Bilqis) bint al-Hedhed "Queen of Sheba"? | 658-638 |
| Nashir an-Ni'am | 638-553 |
| Shammar Yar'ish | 553-516 |
| Abu Malik | 516-461 |
| Tubba' ibn al-Akran | 461-408 |
| Dhu Jaychan | 408-338 |
| al-Akran ibn Abu Malik | 338-175 |
| Kalikarib | 175-140 |
| Ass'ad Abu Karib | 140-20 |
| Hassan ibn Tubba' | 20 BC-50 AD |
| 'Amr ibn Tubba' | 50-113 |
| 'Abid Kilel | 113-187 |
| Tubba' ibn Hassan | 187-265 |
| Marthid ibn 'Abid | 265-306 |
| Wali'a ibn Marthid | 306-343 |
| Abrahah ibn as-Sabbah | 343-416 |
| Sahban ibn Muhrath | 416-431 |
| Hassan ibn 'Amr ibn Tubba' | 431-488 |
| Dhu Shanatir | 488-515 |
| Yusuf Ash'ar Dhu-Nuwas | King of Himyar, 515-525 |
| convert to Judaism; Ethiopian invasion, 525-c.533 | |
| Dhu Jadan | 525-533 |
| Ethiopian rule, 533-575; to Himyar, 575-577; to Persia, 577-631; to Islam, 629 | |
Yemen is an ancient and noteworthy center of civilization. It was long off the beaten track, at the entrance to the Red Sea, and rarely the focus, or the target, of major political events; but it certainly deserves more attention than it customarily receives. For instance, the recent and enormous (911 pages) Ancient History, from the First Civilizations to the Renaissance, by J.M. Roberts [Duncan Baird Publishers, London, 2004], contains nothing whatsoever about Yemen, and neither the name, nor "Saba," nor "Sheba," even appear in the index. This is a grotesque but not unusual oversight.
If there were no ruins or no records, this neglect might be expected; but there are both. South Arabia, indeed, has its own derived version of the alphabet, which survives today in its Ethiopian
version. As for inscriptions and literature, Joan Copeland Biella says, in her Dictionary of Old South Arabic [Harvard Semitic Museum Studies 25, 1982]:
....thousands of texts in Sabaean, Minnaean, Qatabanian and Ḥaḍramitic have been published, ranging in type from brief graffiti to substantial historical annals. [p.vii] |
One would never know this from treatments of ancient history like Roberts' book.
The ruins are extensive and include unique structures, like the extraordinary Ma'rib Dam (Sadd Ma'rib, 
, in Arabic), built from cut stone in the Wadî Sadd (or Wadi Saba'). This was 1,800 feet long and was not alone, except in scale and fame, in the irrigation of the region. Much is left of the structure, including its spillway system.
The Ma'rib Dam should have rated as one of the Seven Wonders of the World. Its final and catastrophic break, however, which entered into Islâmic legend, represented the definitive decline of the area and also the uncertainties of Yemeni history, since the event cannot be well dated -- just between the 5th and the 7th centuries AD.
The name of Yemen itself is of interest. The Romans called the area Arabia Felix, "happy" or "fortunate" Arabia, in contrast to Arabia Deserta, "desert" Arabia, and Arabia Petraea, "rocky" Arabia (where the Romans annexed the remarkable city of Petra). As it happens, Yemen in Arabic, 
, al-Yaman, is from a verb, 
, yamana, that can mean "to be lucky, fortunate." Yaman can also mean "right side or hand" and "south." This can be contrasted with shâm, which can mean "north," "Syria," and "Damascus" but from a root that can also mean "evil omen," "ominous," "calamity," and "misfortune." The actual word for left in Arabic is different, shamâl -- which can also mean north (we don't get the sinister associations with this root). Indeed, if one faces east, the south is on one's right and the north on the left. And Arabic is not the only language in which right (dexter) is lucky and left (sinister) threatening.
For a long time, the only proper history book in print that I have found for South Arabia is Robert G. Hoyland's Arabia and the Arabs, From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam [Routledge, 2001]. For the historiography of South Arabia, he says:
....we are equipped with some ten thousand inscriptions. Unfortunately, however, these are not dated according to an absolute era until the first century AD and they almost never allude to events outside south Arabia. Scholars have tried to arrange them in chronological order according to the style of their script, but with hardly any firmly dated examples to provide a fixed point this method can offer no more than a rough indication. [p.36]
Now there is a new book, Arabs, A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires, by Tim Mackintosh-Smith [Yale University Press, 2019]. Mackintosh-Smith has mainly been a travel writer, and he is someone who actually lives in Yemen and is apparently fluent in Arabic and familiar with classical Arabic literature. One of his travel books is already about Yemen, and occasionally we get the aside about what he can see out his window in Sana'a, 
, Ṣan‘ā’. Thus, no only do we not get the neglect of J.M. Roberts, but Mackintosh-Smith is literally on the ground where it counts. He has seen the Ma'rib Dam and knows the literature that refers to it.
| Kingdom of Saba'/Sheba | |
|---|---|
| Samahu 'Ali | c.750 BC |
| Yada'-il Dharih | |
| Yathi'-amar Watar I | |
| Yada'-il Bayin I | |
| Yathi'-amar Watar II | |
| Kariba-il Bayin | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Watar | |
| Samahu 'Ali Yanif I | |
| Yathi'-amar Bayin I | |
| Kariba-il Watar I | c.450 BC |
| Samahu 'Ali Darih | |
| Kariba-il Watar II | |
| Il-Sharah I | |
| Yada | |
| Yakrib | |
| Yathi' | |
| Karib-il | |
| Samah | |
| Il-Sharah II | |
| Dhamar | |
| Yada' | |
| Dhamar | |
| Karib-il Watar IV | |
| Il-Karib Yuhan'im | |
| Karib-il Watar V | |
| Wahb-il | |
| Anmar Yuhan'im | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Darih | |
| Nash'a-Karib Yuhamin | |
| Nasir Yuhan'im | |
| Wahb-il Yahuz | |
| Karib-il Watar Yuhan'im | |
| Yarim Ayman I | c.80-c.60 BC |
| 'Alhan Nahfanc | 60-? |
| Far'um Yanhab | |
| Yarim Ayman II | c.35-c.25 |
| Sha'irum Awtar | c.25 BC-? |
| Yazil Bayin | c.25 BC-? |
| Ilasharah Yahdub | c.25 BC-? |
| To Himyar | |
| Kingdom of Saba'/Sheba | |
|---|---|
| Yada'il Yanif ben Kariba-il | c.755-c.740 |
| Samahu 'Ali Darih I ben Yada'il Yanuf | c.740-715 |
| Yathi'-amar Bayin I | |
| Dhamar 'Ali I | |
| Kariba-il Watar I | c.685-c.675 |
| tribute paid to Assyria, 685 | |
| Samahu'Ali I | |
| Yada'il Darih I | |
| Samahu 'Ali Yanuf I | |
| Darih | |
| Yathi'-amar Watar | |
| Yada'il Bayin I | |
| Karib-il Bayin I | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Watar | |
| Samahu'Ali Yanuf II | c.545-c.525 |
| Yathi'-amar Bayin II | c.525-c.495 |
| Kariba-il I | |
| Yada'il I | |
| Yathi'-amar I | |
| Kariba-il II | |
| Samahu'Ali II | |
| Yada'il II | |
| Yathi'amar II | |
| Yada'il Bayin II | |
| Samahu'Ali Yanuf III | c.410-c.380 |
| Yathi'-amar Watar I | |
| Yaqrub Malik Darih | |
| Samahu'Ali Yanuf IV | |
| Yada'il Bayin III | |
| Yaqrub Malik Watar I | |
| Yathi'-amar Bayin III | |
| Karib-il Watar II | c.320-c.270 |
| Yada'il Bayin IV | |
| Yaqrub Malik Watar II | |
| Dhamar'Ali Yanuf | |
| Yathi'-amar Bayin IV | |
| Samahu'Ali Darih II | c.200-c.175 |
| Karib-il Bayin II | |
| Yathi'-amar III | |
| unknown, c.140-c.116; to Himyar, 116-55 | |
| Samahu'Ali Yanuf V | c.55 |
| Yada'il Watar I | c.30 |
| Dhamar'Ali Bayin I | c.25 |
| Yadail Darih II | c.10 BC-c.10 AD |
| Yathi'-amar Watar II | c.10-20 |
| Yada'il Watar II | c.20-30 |
| Dhamar 'Ali Bayin II | c.30-60 |
| Karib-il Watar Yuhan'im | c.60-75 |
| Dhamar'Ali Darih | c.75-85 |
| Ilasharah Yahdub | c.85-100 |
| to Himyar, Gurat, & Marib | |
The only lists of kings I have found are in Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies. Where Bruce gets this stuff, I would like to know. He does say that the earliest material is "culled entirely from traditional sources," apparently meaning that it is legendary in nature and of doubtful historical value. Indeed, the earliest list he gives includes "a son of the eponymous ancestor of the Habiru (Hebrew) nomadic peoples." This is part of legendary genealogy, not history. I have skipped that list. But what I do give first, the list of kings of Tababi'a above, begins with reigns that are more than a century long. When it comes to the kings of Saba', the classic kingdom of Yemen, Gordon says, "sources I have for early Yemeni states disagree to a large extent, and cannot be reconciled with any clarity." Thus, he simply gives two different lists for Saba'. They are presented side by side here. They both do end with the same king, Ilasharah Yahdub, but one dates him close to the beginning of the Christian Era, the other a good century later. This is like the degree of uncertainty and variation that one gets with thinly historical material like that of nearby early Ethiopia or even the (contemporary and equally remote) Greek Kingdom of Bactria. It is also noteworthy that Old South Arabic did not write vowels. Genuine Sabaean texts are without vowels. The names of the kings given in these lists thus cannot have been derived directly from Yemeni epigraphy or annals. I am left wondering how much of Sabaean history actually can be reconstructed from contemporary sources, and how much of this derives from later texts and legends. Although Hoyland mentions the latter, he does not discuss the nature of their use or value.
The legends, indeed, extend to the Old Testament. The kingdom of Saba' is the Biblical Sheba. Here the reign of Solomon is dated 970-931 BC. This antedates the beginning of either list here for Saba', and all the reasonable reigns even for at-Tababi'a -- though Balkis is the candidate for the Biblical "Queen of Sheba." Hoyland suspects that the reference to Sheba "may only have been slipped in at a later date" [p.39]. It was long doubtful that developed states even existed in that era; but Hoyland says that now it seems more likely that things were happening by Solomon's 10th century, though we don't have texts appearing until the 8th. The rulers of Saba' were kings (mlk, Arabic malik, ) or "unifiers" (mkrb, Arabized rendering mukarrib, 
). It is not clear what the relationship was between these titles, and the mukarribs are often regarded as early priest-kings or as later "emperors." There are a couple of female rulers given in the lists, so it is conceivable that there was a Queen of Sheba as in the Biblical story. Her visit to Jerusalem, of course, is also part of Ethiopian legend, since her son by Solomon is supposed to have been Menelik, the founder of the Abyssinian state. There is little doubt that these stories, whatever their historicity, reflect the existence and development, even if in later periods, of sophisticated states in South Arabia and adjacent Africa.
The early development of Saba' and the other states in the area was on the inland, the eastern slopes of the mountains. The wadî dammed at Ma'rib thus flows into a desert basin; and the city of Ma'rib itself, capital of the Sabaeans, is at the foot of the mountains. This is very different from what we might expect, which would be a watershed flowing west into the Red Sea, with the cities concentrated there. But that is not what we see. Development occurring in this way was coupled to the caravan routes, which headed up inland. Even from later history it is noteworthy that Mecca, a caravan center itself, is well in from the coast. Part of the considerations for all this may have been the danger of pirates in the Red Sea. Coastal depots, unless sufficiency fortified, could be attached with complete surprise, by enemies who could vanish to distant and unknown sources -- like Somali pirates in our own day.
In three voyages between 117 and 109 BC, however, Eudoxus of Cyzicus is supposed to have learned how to use the monsoons to sail all the way from (Ptolemaic) Egypt to India and back. One might have suspected South Arabians to have known about this already, but the evidence that they didn't may be that the seaports in the region only developed subsequently. The caravan routes continued, but a sea trade developed that continued into the modern era -- later the lifeblood of realms like Oman. But then Oman was poorly placed to join the caravan routes in Yemen and the Hejaz.
Toward the end of this period, or right at the end, depending on the chronology, the Roman Emperor Augustus is supposed to have sent an expedition down to Arabia Felix under Gaius Aelius Gallus. According to Strabo, this was launched in 26 BC, but was treacherously guided by the Nabataean Syllaeus. The Romans suffered in the desert and did not arrive until the year 24. They were sick and wasted but nevertheless captured some cities and began besieging the city of Marsiaba. Lack of water prevented success, however, and Gallus had to retreat. No effort was made again to project Roman power or impose Roman sovereignty -- until Justinian found an ally nearby.
| Dhu-Raydan/Himyar | |
|---|---|
| Haris ar-Ra'ish | c.120-c.90 BC |
| Zu-l-Karnain | c.90-? |
| Abrahah Zu-l-Mamur | |
| Africis | |
| Zu-l-Adjar | c.20 BC-10 AD |
| Sharah-bil | |
| Bilkis | |
| Shammar Zarash | |
| Abu Malik | |
| Yasir Yuhasdiq | c.80-c.100 |
| Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir I | c.100-c.120 |
| Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im | |
| Shammar Yuharish I | ?-c.160 |
| To Saba, c.160-c.195 | |
| Laziz Yuhnaf Yuhasdiq | c.195-c.200 |
| Yasir Yuhan'im I | |
| Shammar Yuharish II | |
| Kariba'il Yuhan'im | |
| Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im | c.230-c.250 |
| Dhamar 'Ali Watar Yuhabir II | |
| Amdan Bayin Yuhagbid | |
| Yasir Yuhanim II | |
| Shamir Yuhar'ish III | c.290 |
| Kingdom of Himyar & Saba' | |
|---|---|
| Nash'a-Karib Yamin Yuharhib | c.1 AD |
| Watar Yuhamin | Era of Himyar, year 1 = 110 BC = -109 AD |
| Yasir Yuhasdiq | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir I | |
| Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir II | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Bayin | |
| Karib-il Watar | |
| Halk-amar | |
| Dhamar 'Ali Dharih | |
| Yada'-il Watar | c.200-? |
| Il-Adhdh Naufan Yuhasdiq | c.245-? |
| Yasir Yuhan'im II | |
| Shamir Yuhar'ish III | c.290 |
| conquers Hadramawt; "King of Saba and Dhu Raydan and Hadramawt and Yamanat," 299 AD = 409 Era of Himyar | |
| Yarim Yarhab | |
| To Abyssinia, c.310-c.378 | |
| Ela Amida of Axum | c.340-c.378 |
| Malik-Karib Yuhamin | c.378-c.385 |
| Abi-Karib As'ad (Kamil ut-Tubba) | c.385-c.420 |
| accepts Judaism | |
| Warau-amar Ayman (Hasan Yuhan'im) | c.420-c.433 |
| Sharah-bil Ya'fur | c.433-? |
| Ma'ad-Karib | |
| 'Abd-Kilal | |
| Sharah-bil Yakuf | 464-? |
| Nauf | |
| Lahi-'Athra Yanuf | |
| Marthad-ilan Yanuf | 496-? |
| Ma'adi-Karib Ya'fur | c.500-c.517 |
| invasion by Abyssinia | |
| Masruq Dhu-Nuwas (Yusuf Ash'ar) | c.517-525 |
| convert to Judaism, occupation by Abyssinia, 525-c.533 | |
| Sumu-Yafa' Ashwa' (Esimfey, Esimiphaeus) | 526-c.533 |
| Dhu Jadan of Himyar | 525-533 |
| Abrahah (al-Ashram) of Abyssinia | c.533-570 |
| Era of Himyar 669, 559 AD, last dated South Arabian text | |
| Yaksum | 570-577 |
| Masruq ibn Abraha (Ma'adi-Karib) | 577-587 |
| Sayf ibn Dhi-Yazan (Abu Murra) | 587-599 |
| installed by Persia; Persia rule, 599-629 | |
| Khorre-Khusrau | 599-620 |
| Badan | c.620-629 |
| To Islam, 629 | |
Shamir Yuhar'ish, indeed, appears to be the first fully historical ruler in the region, and we even get absolute dating in a Himyarite Era, whose Year 1 Benchmark would have been 110 BC. This also happens to be the era in which Abyssinia, centered at Axum, converts to Christianity (c.305 AD) and helps, at least, in ending the long running kingdom of Kushite Ethiopia (c.355). Indeed, Abyssinia begins to intervene in South Arabia itself. The list for Himyar notes an Abyssinian occupation c.310-c.378 AD.
We now begin to get political events on a larger scale that impact South Arabia. While Abyssinia, apparently, hardly needed encouragement to project its power, it got some anyway. Its own conversion to Christianity went along with a process in which tribes and domains in Arabia converted both to Christianity and to Judaism. A number of Yemeni Kings converted to Judaism. This was annoying to the distant Roman Emperor Justinian, who encouraged the Ethiopians to do something about it. The complaint was that the Yemenis were persecuting Christians, but then persecution often accompanied perceptions that Christian were agents of Rome. Who was initially to blame for this is anyone's guess. Under the Sassanids, Armenians and other Christians were often suspect also.
The Ethiopian Emperor Ella Asbeha responded by invading Yemen, 523-525. The occupation lasted a few years longer, and an Abyssinian governor, Abrahah, later established himself in his own right -- though Hoyland describes him as installed by the Himyarites and merely tributary to Ethiopia. Attracting distant Roman attention, Yemen even became an object of more distant Persian interest. According to Hoyland, discontent with Ethiopian rule (by the son of Abrahah), let to solicitations of the Sassanid Shâh Khusro II to intervene. Where Alexander the Great had planned to conquer Arabia by sea, Khusro actually did so. At first installing his own candidate, outright conquest and Persian governors then followed (599). With this wrapped up, Khusro (temporarily) occupied Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor in a great (and foolish) war against Rome. While Heraclius defeated Khusro in the north, Persian domination in Yemen was brought to an end from a very different and portentous quarter -- the forces of the Prophet Muḥammad.
No more profound a change would happen in the history of Yemen and South Arabia than would now happen. The language, the alphabet, the age old civilization of the happy South would disappear as the area would be assimilated to the ecumenical civilization of Islâm. Fortunately, much of what was distinctive would survive, under constant siege from Islâm, in the daughter civilization of Ethiopia. In its homeland, the Yemeni past would survive in legend, in ruins, and in some practices, but it would become something alien to the new values and beliefs.
In the final group of Yemeni Kings, the sequence of events narrated by Hoyland does not match very well the sequence in Gordon's king list. I have tried to tidy things up, but Hoyland's description isn't complete enough to know what all is going on in the list -- another case where I find myself frustrated and annoyed with historians who apparently don't think that their narrative histories need to be supplemented with chronological framework in tables or lists (or, when possible, genealogies). As already noted, Hoyland's opaque reference to "lists of Sabaean rulers" raises more questions than it answers.
The neglect this civilization still suffers is tragic. Part of the problem was the self-imposed isolation of the later Yemeni Kingdom, and then many years of political instability and civil war. Subsequently, a great deal of archaeology was undertaken, and I have noticed much more about Yemen in documentaries at places like The History Channel than I have in accessible scholarly history books. Travel was easier, despite some terrorism, and I have a friend who has inspected the ruins of the Ma'rib Dam. I was hoping that the archaeologists in the documentaries would eventually begin to fill in the gaps, clarify the uncertainties, and in general provide definitive histories of the area.
Unfortunately, civil war has returned to Yemen, drawing in Saudi Arabia on the Sunni side and Iran, as in the days of Khusro, on the Shi'ite side. The geopolitical stakes are high, and so that sort of conflict that no one else would pay much attention to has become a matter of international interest.
| RASSIDS, 860-1226 | |
|---|---|
| al-Qâsim al-Ḥasanî ar-Rassî | d.860 |
| al-Ḥusayn | |
| Yaḥyâ al-Hâdî ilâ 'l-Ḥaqq | 897-911 |
| Muḥammad al-Murtaḍâ | 911-913, d.922 |
| Aḥmad an-Nâṣir | 913-934 |
| Yaḥyâ | 934-956 |
| Yûsuf al-Manṣûr al-Dâ'î | 968-998,d.1012 |
| al-Qâsim al-Mansur | 998-1003 |
| al-Ḥusayn al-Mahdî | 1010-1013 |
| Ja'far | 1022-1035 |
| al-Ḥasan | 1035-1040 |
| Abu'l-Fatḥ al-Daylamî an-Nâṣir | 1045-1062? |
| Ṣan'â' captured by Ṣulayḥids, 1062 | |
| Ḥamza | ?-1066 |
| al-Fâḍil | 1067-1068 |
| Muḥammad | ?-1085 |
| Yaḥyâ | 1117-1137 |
| 'Alî | 1137-1138 |
| Aḥmad al-Mutawakkil | 1138-1171 |
| Hamdânid occupation, 1171-1174, Ayyûbid occupation, 1174-1229 | |
| 'Abdallâh al-Manṣûr | 1187-1217 |
| Yaḥyâ Najm ad-Dîn al-Hâdî ilâ'l-Ḥaqq | 1217 |
| Muḥammad 'Izz ad-Dîn an-Nâṣir | 1217-1226 |
| Rasûlids | |
| Aḥmad al-Mahdî al-Mûṭi' | 1248-1258 |
Despite this egalitarian doctrine, the Zaydî sect in Yemen began with al-Qâsim al-Ḥasanî, who claimed descent from Alî's eldest son Hassan. During the reign of al-Ma'mûn (813-833), Al-Qâsim moved from Medina and established himself at Ṣa'da in northern Yemen. This became the center of the Zaydî Mission, whose work (for a while) was far ranging, and in time assumed secular authority in competition with other local rulers. Thus, the Imâms by no means dominated Yemen. Their rule became seriously compromised when the Ṣulayḥid dynasty occupied Ṣan'â' (which has become the modern capital of Yemen) in 1062 and then the Hamdânids in 1171. After 1258, the line of Imâms continued without any political role. Nevertheless, the Imâms reemerged with secular authority in the later Qâsimid line. The name of his initial line, the Rassids, derived from ar-Rass in the Hijaz, is used more by Western scholars than by Yemenis.
I have not given the dynasty of Hamdânids here because their predominance is brief.
| AYYÛBIDS | |
|---|---|
| al-Mu'aẓẓam Shams udDîn Tûrân Shâh | 1173-1181 d. 1186/7 |
| al-'Azîz Zahir udDîn Tughtigin | 1181-1197 |
| Mu'izz udDîn Ismâ'îl | 1197-1202 |
| anNâṣir | 1202-1214 |
| alMu'aẓẓam (alMuẓaffar) Sulaymân | 1214-1215 d. 1251/2 |
| al-Mas'ûd Ṣalâḥ adDîn Yûsuf | 1215-1229 |
| RASÛLIDS, at Ta'izz | |
|---|---|
| al-Manṣûr 'Umar I Nûr adDîn | 1229-1250 |
| al-Muẓaffar Shams adDîn Yûsuf I | 1250-1295 |
| al-Ashraf Mumahhid adDîn 'Umar II | 1295-1296 |
| al-Mu'ayyad Ḥizabr adDîn Dâwûd | 1296-1322 |
| al-Mujâhid Sayf ad-Dîn 'Alî | 1322-1363 |
| al-Afḍal Ḍirghâm adDîn al-'Abbâs | 1363-1377 |
| al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl I | 1377-1400 |
| an-Nâṣir Salâḥ adDîn Aḥmad | 1400-1424 |
| al-Manṣûr 'Abdallâh | 1424-1427 |
| al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl II | 1427-1428 |
| az-Ẓâhir Yaḥyâ | 1428-1439 |
| al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl III | 1439-1442 |
| al-Muẓaffar Yûsuf II | 1442-1450/1 |
| al-Afḍal Muḥammad | 1442 |
| an-Nâṣir Aḥmad | 1442 |
| al-Mas'ûd Salâḥ adDîn | 1443-1454 |
| al-Mu'ayyad al-Ḥusayn | 1451-1454 |
Although, like the Ayyûbids, the Rasûlids were Sunnis, and we might expect local opposition of a religious nature, they nevertheless endured more than two centuries with a prosperous and culturally productive realm. From the port of Aden trade extended as far as East Africa, India, and China. Indeed, we arrive at the era in which Chinese fleets sailed in the Indian Ocean (1405-1433), and a Rasûlid embassy to China itself is recorded. Chinese ships undoubtedly called at Aden. But the Chinese disappeared, soon to be followed by an equally unexpected power.
The chronology of the Rassids is from Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, p.96]. The subsequent Islâmic dynasties are given by Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, which were initially transcribed but are here corrected and supplemented (as with diacritics) from Bosworth. The New Islamic Dynasties gives many other local dynasties, but here I have tried to confine things to a central succession.
| ṬÂHIRIDS, at al-Miqrâna and Juban | |
|---|---|
| az-Ẓâfir 'Âmir I Salâḥ adDîn | 1454-1460 |
| al-Mujâhid 'Alî Shams adDîn | 1454-1478 |
| al-Manṣûr 'Abd al-Wahhâb Tâj adDîn | 1478-1489 |
| az-Ẓâfir 'Âmir II Salâḥ adDîn | 1489-1517 |
| to Mamlûks, 1517, then Ottomans, 1517-1635 | |
| QÂSIMIDS | |
|---|---|
| al-Qâsim I al-Manṣûr | c.1592/97-1620 |
| Muḥammad I al-Mu'ayyad | 1620-1644 |
| Ṣan'â' occupied, 1629; Ottomans ejected, 1635 | |
| Ismâ'îl al-Mutawakkil | 1644-1676 |
| Aḥmad I al-Mahdî | 1676-1681 |
| Muḥammad II al-Mutawakkil | 1681-1686 |
| Muḥammed III an-Nâṣir al-Hâdi | 1686-1718 |
| al-Qâsim II al-Wutawakkil | 1718-1727 |
| al-Ḥusayn al-Manṣûr | 1727-1748 |
| al-'Abbâs I al-Mahdî | 1748-1775 |
| 'Alî I al-Manṣûr | 1775-1806 |
| Aḥmad II al-Mahdî | 1806-1808 |
| Aḥmad III al-Mutawakkil | 1808-1816 |
| 'Abdallâh I al-Mahdî | 1816-1835 |
| 'Alî II al-Manṣûr | 1835-1837, 1844-1845, 1849-1850, 1857 |
| 'Abdallâh II an-Nâṣir | 1837-1840 |
| Muḥammed IV al-Hâdî | 1840-1844 |
| Muḥammed V al-Mutawakkil | 1845-1849 |
| Ottoman attack on Ṣan'â', 1849 | |
| 'Abbâs II al-Mu'ayyad | 1850 |
| Ghâlib al-Hâdî | 1850-1857 |
| Civil War, 1857-1871; to Ottomans, 1871-1918 | |
| Muḥammed VI al-Manṣûr | 1890-1904 |
| Yaḥyâ al-Mutawakkil | 1904-1948 |
| Independent Kingdom, 1918 | |
| 'Abdallâh (III) al-Hâdî | 1948 |
| Aḥmad (III) an-Nâṣir | 1948-1962 |
| Muḥammad al-Manṣûr al-Badr | 1962, d. 1996 |
| the United Arab Republic, 1958-1961; Civil War, 1962-1970; Republic, 1962-present | |
As with the early days of Sheba, there is a conflict between sources for some of the Qâsimi Imâms. Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, p.96-97] leaves out several rulers given by Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies -- but also adds a few. Where Gordon does not give diacritics or honorifics (laqab, like "al-Manṣûr"), and Bosworth creates confusion by only giving the first year of a reign, I have followed the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002, p.194], which may in fact be Gordon's source, but does give diacritics and honorifics. I have retained one feature in Bosworth, that there are two Aḥmads between 1806 and 1816, not just one.
By the middle of the 19th century there are serious problems. The Turks, despite their general lethargy, are back, and the Wahhâbîs, no doubt taking strong objection to Yemeni Shi'ism, are intervening also. Between civil war and invasion, the Ottomans end up annexing the country again by 1871. But, again, their rule tends to lapse into local control, and the Imâms, whose hold on the countryside had never been entirely broken, reemerged, at least as vassals, in 1890. This was the situation when World War I shattered Ottoman power at its source. Yemen was simply cut loose, and the Imâm becomes the King of Yemen.
After another bit of conservative and Tibetan isolation, the winds of change arrive again. Yemen joined the Arab League in 1945 and then the United Arab Republic, with Egypt and Syria, in 1958. Meanwhile, the substantial Jewish population of Yemen, under increasing persecution, largely decamped to Palestine and then Israel. The King withdrew from the UAR in 1961 but then was overthrown by the Nassarite army the following year. As before, this did not break the power of the dynasty, and a long civil war followed, with the King supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Nassarites by, naturally, the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser died in 1970, but, with 150,000 dead, the King gave up and went into exile. Meanwhile, things got more complicated when the British left Aden in 1967. The new People's Republic of South Yemen soon lapsed into civil war itself and was restyled the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen when the more radical Marxists, i.e. the Communists, won the war in 1970. Bubbling with violence, the radicals kept attacking the Yemen Arab Republic, to which 300,000 refugees, disillusioned with Marxism, fled, and war broke out between them in 1979. In 1990 this got resolved by the actual unification of North and South -- now simply known as the Republic of Yemen. The unification came apart in another brief civil war, 1994-95, but things got patched back together again. Although now friendly with the West, the country became the scene for one of the Islamist terror attacks leading up to 9/11 -- the bombing of the United States destroyer Cole on 12 October 2000 in Aden harbor. Where the "Democratic Republic" had invited Soviet troops in during the 1970's, American forces now help hunt down al-Qaeda members.
In 2015 the secular government of Yemen was overthrown and the country is now the venue for civil war between Shi'ite forces, back by Iran, the Sunni al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Penninsula, backed by the lunatics of Islamic Fascism, and the Sa'udis, with support from Egypt in the background, who don't want either of such forces to control the area. The United States backs the Sa'udis, but initially tepidly, since the Obama Administration decided to further its anti-American and anti-Israeli agenda by enabling the Iranian nuclear program. The fate of Yemen thus now rides on serious Great Power problems and is a bellweather for the future of the Middle East.
In 2019 things haven't changed much. Because the Sa'udis assassinated one of their critics, the U.S. Congress has voted to cut off aid; but the Trump Administration has maintained the relationship, judging, properly, that the Sa'udis as a counter-weight to Iran are too important.
Index of Mesopotamian and Ancient Middle Eastern History
| SULṬÂNS OF OMAN AND ZANZIBAR | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Aḥmad ibn Sa'îd | c. 1754-1783 | ||
| Sa'îd ibn Aḥmad | 1783-1786 | ||
| Ḥâmid ibn Sa'îd | 1786-1792 | ||
| Sulṭân ibn Aḥmad | 1792-1806 | ||
| Treaty with British East India Company, 1798 | |||
| Sâlim ibn Sulṭân | 1806-1821 | ||
| Sa'îd ibn Sulṭân | 1806-1856 | ||
| OMAN | ZANZIBAR | ||
| Thuwaynî ibn Sa'îd | 1856-1866 | Majîd ibn Sa'îd | 1856-1870 |
| Sâlim ibn Thuwaynî | 1866-1868 | ||
| 'Azzân ibn Qays | 1868-1870 | ||
| Turkî ibn Sa'îd | 1870-1888 | Barghash ibn Sa'îd | 1870-1888 |
| Fayṣal ibn Turkî | 1888-1913 | Khalîfa ibn Barghash | 1888-1890 |
| British Protectorate, 1890 | |||
| 'Alî ibn Sa'îd | 1890-1893 | ||
| Ḥâmid ibn Thuwaynî | 1893-1896 | ||
| Ḥammûd ibn Muḥammad | 1896-1902 | ||
| 'Alî ibn Ḥammûd | 1902-1911 | ||
| Taymûr ibn Fayṣal | 1913-1932 | Khalîfa ibn Kharûb | 1911-1960 |
| Sa'îd ibn Taymûr | 1932-1970 | ||
| 'Abdallâh ibn Khalîfa | 1960-1963 | ||
| Jamshîd ibn 'Abdallâh | 1963-1964 | ||
| Independent, 1963; Sulṭân Overthown in Coup, 1964 | |||
| End of British Protection, 1967 | linked to Tanganyika as Republic of Tanzania, 1964-present | ||
| Qâbûs ibn Sa'îd | 1970-present | ||
| BRUNEI, Bendaharas | |
|---|---|
| Muḥammad | c.1514 |
| Ahmad | c.1521 |
| Sharif 'Ali | c.1526 |
| Sulaiman | |
| Bolkiah | |
| Abdul Qahhar | d.1578 |
| Saif ur-Rijal | c.1578-c.1590 |
| Shah Brunei | c.1590 |
| Raja Ghafur | c.1600 |
| Muḥammad Hassan | regent, 1601-1617 |
| Abdul-Jalil Akbar | 1617-c.1637 |
| Abdul-Jalilul Jabbar | c.1637-c.1642 |
| Haji Muhammed 'Ali | c.1642-c.1648 |
| Abdul Hakk Mubin | c.1648-1655 |
| Muhyid-Din | 1655-c.1670 |
| Nasrud-Din Husin Kamaluddin | 1670-1680 |
| Muḥammad Aliud-Din | c.1680-c.1690 |
| civil war, c.1690-c.1750 | |
| Omar 'Ali Saif ud-Din I | c.1750-1780, d.1795 |
| Muhammed Tajud-Din | 1780-1792, 1793-1806 |
| Muhammed Jamal ul-'Alam | 1792-1793 |
| Muhammed Khanzul Alam | 1806-1822 |
| Raja Api | 1822 |
| Omar 'Ali Saifud-Din II Djamal ul-Din | 1822-1852 |
| Abdul-Mumin | 1852-1885 |
| Hashim Jalilul 'Alam Akam ud-Din | 1885-1906 |
| British Protectorate, 1888-1984, British Resident, 1906 | |
| Muhammed Jamalul 'Alam II | 1906-1924 |
| Ahmad Tajud-Din | 1924-1941, 1945-1950 |
| Japanese occupation, 1941-1945 | |
| Sir Omar 'Ali Saifud-Din III | 1950-1967, d. 1986 |
| Sir Hassanul-Bolkiah | 1967-present |
the northeast coast of Borneo, and one of the wealthiest states on Earth, due to oil revenues. Formerly in control over much of the island, it became a British Protectorate 1888-1984. The present Sultan, one of the richest men in the world, is well known, if not infamous, for his luxuriant lifestyle. Good looking foreign girls and women recruited for innocent sounding jobs have reported some bad experiences.
Some details here are from Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, but the list is largely based on Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996].
| SARAWAK, BROOKE | |
|---|---|
| James | 1841-1868 |
| Charles Anthony | 1868-1917 |
| Charles Vyner | 1917-1942, 1945-1946, d.1963 |
| Japanese occupation, 1942-1945; Great Britain, 1946-1957; Malaya, 1957-1963; Malaysia, 1963-present | |
One of the stranger domains in the British Empire, perhaps the fantasy of many English boys in the 1890's. Sarawak was granted by the Sultan of Brunei to a British adventurer, James Brooke, the "White Rajah of Sarawak," who used it as a base from which to eradicate piracy in the South China Sea and headhunting in the interior. His successors continued as Rajahs until after the World War II, with a domain that ended up larger than the original Sultanate of Brunei.
Then, since the place had been so thoroughly trashed by the Japanese, C.V. Brooke ceded it to Britain. Although the Brookes were not Moslems, their subjects were, and Sarawak eventually became part of the very Moslem country of Malaysia.
The list is from Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies and Chester L. Krause and Clifford Mishler, the Standard Catalog of World Coins [Colin R. Bruce II, editor, Krause Publications, Iola, Wisconsin, 1982, p.1227].
When I lived in Beirut in 1969-70, one of the principal locations in the city was a large square downtown. It was a transportation hub. Busses and taxis left from there for Damascus and elsewhere. The place itself was commonly called the "Bourj," As it turned out, there were indeed martyrs, but it was not just in Lebanese history. On August 21, 1915, eleven suspected Arab nationalist leaders were hung on that very site in Beirut, oddly called "Liberty Square" at the time, by the Turkish military authorities, under Jemal Pasha. On May 6, 1916, the Turks executed twenty-one others, seven in Damascus and fourteen in Beirut.
Prince Fayṣal and the Sharîf Ḥusayn were Hashemites, i.e. were supposed to be descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad. At right is the complete genealogy of this descent, as reported by the family itself. I have derived this from a curious source, a book called A Prince of Arabia, the Amir Shereef Ali Haider, by George Stitt [George Allen & Unwin, London, 1948 -- this is from the personal historical library of my friend Tom Dunlap]. Ali Haider was from the senior or Zaidi branch of the Hashemite family, who had supplied most of the Amirs or Sharifs of Mecca until 1882, when the junior or 'Awni branch took over. When Ḥusayn revolted against the Turks in 1916, Ali Haider was appointed in his place by the Ottoman Sultân. Ali Haider was never able to go to Mecca and exercised no real authority under the Turks. His son did end up marrying the granddaughter of the Ottoman Sultân Murad V (1876). Histories of the period or the area rarely mention him. Unfortunately, the book about him from 1948 uses Anglicized versions of the Arabic names. I have not supplied the proper transcriptions for all the names. Other information here is from Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996], and from George Antonius, The Arab Awakening [1946, Capricorn Books, New York, 1965].
The romance of the Arab Revolt, with Lawrence of Arabia and all, and its success in sweeping all the way to Damascus, as the British advanced into Palestine, came to be fully balanced by bitterness at the British betrayal of assurances for Arab independence after the war. The British had made promises elsewhere, to the French and to the Zionists, and not a lot of care had been taken in the desperate days of the war to keep all these undertakings consistent with each other. Initially, the worse betrayal seemed to be over Syria. With Fayṣal in possession of Damascus, he was elected King of Syria in 1920; but in short order the French, to whom the British had handed control of Lebanon, as they had honestly warned the Arabs they would, moved in force to occupy Damascus and the rest of Syria, which the British had agreed with them, but not with the Arabs, that they could do. Fayṣal was tossed out. The French commemorated this victory by carving a stele in the rock at the Nahr al-Kalb (the Dog River) in Lebanon, joining earlier stelae by the Egyptians, Assyrians, and others. After the Vichy French were overthrown in Lebanon and Syria, in turn, in World War II, the stele naturally was attacked and mutilated beyond recognition.
The Hashemites, 1827-present
, which means "tower" -- usually written and even pronounced as though it were French. There was no tower, but evidently there had been, and the name had stuck. The official name was the "Places des Martyrs," which at the time seemed to be about something else equally non-existent, since my fellow students and I could not imagine what kind of "martyrs" there ever could have been in Lebanese history.
On hearing the news of the latter, Prince Fayṣal, son of the Sharîf Ḥusayn of Mecca, who was visiting near Damascus, is supposed to have thrown down his headress and exclaimed, "Death has become sweet, Oh Arabs!" Fayṣal returned to Mecca, and the Arab Revolt against the Turks, long in preparation by Fayṣal's father, commenced on the 5th of June.
| The Hâshimites, 1827 AD-present | |
|---|---|
| Mecca and Ḥijâz | |
| 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib |  ,Sharîf of Mecca, 1827, 1851-1856, 1880-1882 |
| Muḥammad | 1827-1851, 1856-1858 |
| 'Abdullâh | 1858-1877 |
| al-Ḥusayn | 1877-1880 |
| 'Awn al-Rafîq | 1882-1905 |
| 'Alî | 1905-1908 |
| Ḥusayn | 1908-1916 |
| Arab Revolt against Turkey, 1916-1918 | |
| , King, 1916-1925 | |
| , Caliph, 1924-1925, d. 1931 | |
| 'Ali | King, 1925, d. 1934 |
| Overthrown by Ibn Sa'ûd | |
| "Greater Syria" | |
| Fayṣal | King, 1920 |
| Overthrown by France | |
| Iraq, British Mandate | |
| Fayṣal I | King, 1921-1933 |
| Independence, end of British Mandate, 1932 | |
| Ghâzî | 1933-1939 |
| Fayṣal II | 1939-1958 |
| pro-German coup suppressed, 1941; King overthrown & killed in Coup, 1958 | |
| Transjordan, British Mandate | |
| 'Abdullâh I | , Amîr, 1921-1946 |
| End of British Mandate, 1946 | |
| King, 1946-1951, assassinated | |
| Arab Legion enters Palestine, 1948; Kingdom of Jordan, annexation of the West Bank, 1949 | |
| Ṭalâl | 1951-1952, d. 1972 |
| Ḥusayn | 1952-1999 |
|
Six Day War, Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, 1967; "Black September," Palestinian guerrillas ousted from Jordan, 1970; peace treaty with Israel, 1994 | |
| 'Abdullâh II | 1999-present |
One of Ḥusayn's other sons, 'Abdullâh, even led a small force north, evidently to contest Syria with the French. However, before 'Abdullâh crossed the French border, he was persuaded that perhaps he should stay where he was, just across the Jordan River, in a area of vague jurisdiction. This was at the time considered part of Syria, but the French evidently had no use for it, and its proximity to Palestine put it more or less in the British sphere of influence. So 'Abdullâh settled down as the Amîr of the Transjordan, filling in the space between British Palestine and British Iraq.
This did not improve the humor of 'Abdullâh's father, whose leadership turned out to be not much better than his diplomacy. When Kemal Attatürk abolished the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 (the Sulṭânate had already been abolished in 1922), Ḥusayn decided that if it was anyone's business to be Caliph, it was his. Indeed, the last bona fide Abbasid Caliph had been carted off to Constantinople in 1517, and it was only after three hundred years or so that the Ottoman Sulṭâns began to claim that the office had been passed on to them. This unlikely and irregular transmission, however, eventually came to be accepted by many Moslems, and the abolition of the office left Islâm without somebody to claim it for the first time in Islâmic history. From a dynasty that had served as the Guardians of the Holy Cities for some time, and which was accepted as belonging to the Hashimite clan of the Prophet himself, it must have seemed quite reasonable to Ḥusayn, as it still seems fairly reasonable in retrospect, that the office should fall to him.
At the time, however, nobody was buying this, and Ḥusayn's reputation was badly damaged. Ibn Sa'ûd and his Wahhabi fundamentalists began protesting and threatening, and Ḥusayn had put himself in no good position to resist them. When consensus is so important in the tradition of Islâmic Law, Ḥusayn would have been better advised to first solicit opinions from respected jurists about whether there needed to be a Caliph, who would be appropriate for it, etc. In 1925 he abdicated in favor of his eldest son 'Alî, but this did not stop Ibn Sa'ûd. The Ḥijâz soon joined the Sa'ûdî central Arabian domain of Najd in the new Kingdom of Sa'ûdî Arabia. Then Ibn Sa'ûd's British subsidies soon gave way to income of a different sort, when vast oil reserves were discovered under the Arabian sands. But Ḥusayn and 'Alî could only flee to the welcome of 'Abdullâh's court in the Transjordan to live out the rest of their lives.
Britain's other conflicting promises, over Palestine, prepared the way for the most dangerous and intractable problem in all of 20th Century politics, diplomacy, and war, as Jewish colonists sought, and achieved, the creation of a Jewish State, Israel, in Palestine. The best showing by an Arab army in the 1948 war was, ironically, the British commanded Arab Legion of 'Abdullâh, at that point King of the Transjordan. Yet 'Abdullâh had no particular animus against either Jews or Zionists, and rumor maintains that in a secret meeting with Golda Meir he actually proposed some kind of condominium over Palestine between the Zionists and himself. This was rejected, but then 'Abdullâh subsequently annexed the Palestinian territory that he ended up occupying, creating simply the Kingdom of (the) Jordan. Since the Palestinian fire-eaters were all ready to found their own radical Palestinian republic in the land preserved from Israel, this move earned 'Abdullâh his own assassination. Now, ironically, by conquering Jordanian Palestine in 1967, the Israelis have ended up with the fire-eaters in their own house, setting off bombs.
The throne of Jordan soon passed over 'Abdullâh's mentally incompetent son Ṭalâl to his grandson Ḥusayn. In 1999, Ḥusayn, having endured every war, revolution, and upheaval since, died after a long fight with cancer. Thus passed a man of astonishing durability in the merciless politics of the Middle East, although hated by many Arabs for his suppression of armed Palestinian organizations in Jordan (in "Black September"). Ḥusayn, the namesake of his great-grandfather and eyewitness to his grandfather's assassination, was the last living link to the Arab Revolt. Although he was long denigrated as a reactionary, who wasn't in tune with all the great new Marxist Arab Nationalism of the 50's, 60's, and 70's, Ḥusayn survived into a era when it is hard to tell the Marxists from the Mujâhidûn (Islâmic fighters in the Holy War), and where the folly of each is, or should be, fairly obvious. To everyone's surprise, Ḥusayn had, just a couple weeks before his death, disinherited his brother Ḥassan, the Crown Prince for 34 years, and left the Throne to his son 'Abdullâh, who thus becomes King 'Abdullâh II of Jordan. (One hopes this was not entirely a surprise to Ḥassan.) Ḥusayn's second cousin, King Fayṣal II of Iraq, unfortunately, was overthrown and murdered in 1958, sending Iraq down a path to a despotism which it was doomed to long endure. Only now, in 2003, after three wars, has the dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, been overthrown, thanks to an American and British invasion of the country.
The 1st Gulf War was initiated by Hussein in 1980, hoping to seize the east bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab (the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates) from Irân, whose military had been weakened by purges of the Shah's officers. By 1982 the Iranians managed, with suicidal "human wave" attacks, to throw Hussein back, and he was willing to call it quits; but the Ayatollah Khomeini refused to let up. It didn't do much good, and, even though Khomeini said he would rather "drink poison," he finally accepted a ceasefire in 1988. The 2nd Gulf War was initiated by Hussein in 1990, invading and occupying Kuwait. Just a year later a coalition of American, Arab, and European forces threw Hussein out of Kuwait. Although warned that it might precipitate a global ecological disaster, Hussein ordered the torching of over 600 oil wells as Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait. Fortunately, although it was a terrible mess, the disaster was of more limited consequence. Iraqi territory itself was not occupied, and revolts by Shi'ites in the south of Iraq and Kurds in the north were brutally suppressed by Hussein. Iraq subsequently was under UN sanctions until the destruction of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs could be certified. American and British air power patrolled "no fly zones" in the north and south of the country. This didn't really make much difference in the south, but in the north it protected what had become an autonomous Kurdish domain. UN inspectors could not certify that Hussein had destroyed his unconventional weapons, and they even left the country in 1998 after Iraqi non-cooperation. In 2003, the 3rd Gulf War was initiated by the United States and Britain, principally, with the determination, apparently, that it was simply high time to resolve the matter and get rid of Hussein -- especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Hussein was overthrown, later captured, tried, and finally executed -- shamefully taunted at his hanging by Shi'ite executioners.
Iraq itself, however, although now (2007) with a democratically elected government, in which all groups managed to participate, nevertheless is a place of constant violence. The Sunni minority, with Baathist diehards, began an "uprising" rather than live under governments dominated by the Shi'ite majority. Although this is portrayed, often by Western sympathizers, as a national struggle against American occupation, most of the casualties have been civilian victims of suicide bombers and car bombs. There have also been attacks against Islamic sites, like the Golden Mosque in Samara, which was associated with Shi'ism. These tactics in part are the inspiration of al-Qa'ida and effected by an influx of foreign Jihadists. Substantial parts of the Sunni community are now tiring of this, especially since the Shi'ites have answered in kind, with help from the Shi'ite motherland, Iran. Since the Shi'ites and Iran have little more sympathy for America than they do for the Sunnis, American (and British) forces tend to get caught in the middle. Nevertheless, it is the interest of the West, the International Community, and Iraq that neither Sunnis nor Shi'ites have an outright victory, and the only way to prevent that and mediate a settlement is for a third party (the Americans) to maintain the balance. Meanwhile, the Kurds, although provoking Turkey by supporting Kurdish terrorists there, have been relatively safe and prosperous in their part of Iraq -- now behind a dike to inhibit terrorist infiltration. They have even paid for commercials on American television with thanks for American efforts. With many in American politics cynically and opportunistically hoping to benefit from a defeat in Iraq, however, as they benefited from defeat in Vietnam (along with Isolationists and simple anti-American Leftists), those efforts may not continue much longer. Meanwhile, all the major communities seem to have joined in an ethnic purge of Iraqi Christians, the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, Chaldeans and Assyrians. As with the persecution of Christians anywhere, this draws little attention from the Western Press (whose template is that Christians are as bad as Muslim Jihadists), and the numbers of Iraqi Christians are too small to figure in most geopolitical calculations.
The whole area around the Bourj in Beirut was destroyed in the Lebanese civil war of the 70's and 80's. Plenty of new martyrs were created, though it is not clear what the cause was supposed to be when the Lebanese largely destroyed their own country and slaughtered each other, opening the door to a Syrian occupation of much of the country, something that no Lebanese of any faction really wanted. After some years of relative peace, chaos has returned as Syria evidently continues to promote its interests (starting with key assassinations) and both radicalized Shi'ites and Sunni Jihadists display little desire to live peaceful, ordinary lives.
The Ambassador answered us that it was founded on the laws of their Prophet; that it was written in their Koran; that all nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners; that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners; and that every Mussulman [ Letter by John Adams & Thomas Jefferson, March 28, 1786, to John Jay, U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs (under the Articles of Confederation), concerning an interview in London with the ambassador from Tripoli, Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja.
Modern Morocco, Tunisia, & Tripoli
1640-presentWe took the liberty to make some enquiries concerning the ground of their pretentions to make war upon nations who had done them no injury, and observed that we considered all mankind as our friends who had done us no wrong, nor had given us any provocation.
, i.e. Muslim] who was slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise. He said, also, that the man who was the first to board a vessel had one slave over and above his share, and that when they sprang to the deck of an enemy's ship, every sailor held a dagger in each hand and a third in his mouth; which usually struck such terror into the foe that they cried out for quarter at once.
| The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sulṭâns, & Kings of Morocco | |
|---|---|
| Muḥammad ash-Sharîf | 1631-1659 |
| Muḥammad I | 1635-1664 |
| ar-Rashîd | 1666-1672 |
| Ismâ'îl | Sulṭân, 1672-1727 |
| Aḥmad | 1727-1728, 1728-1729 |
| 'Abd al-Malik | 1728 |
| 'Abd Allâh | 1729-1734, 1736, 1740-1741, 1741-1742, 1743-1747, 1748-1757 |
| 'Alî | 1734-1736 |
| Muḥammad II | 1736-1738 |
| al-Mustaḍî' | 1738-1740, 1742-1743, 1747-1748, d.1760 |
| Zayn al-'Abidîn | 1741 |
| Muḥammad III | 1757-1790 |
| Anti-Praicy Treaty with United States, 1786 | |
| Yazîd | 1790-1792 |
| Hishâm | 1792-1798, d.1799 |
| Sulaymân | 1798-1822 |
| 'Abd ar-Rahmân | 1822-1859 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1859-1873 |
| al-Ḥasan I | 1873-1894 |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz | 1894-1908, d.1943 |
| 'Abd al-Ḥâfiẓ | 1908-1912, d.1937 |
| French Protectorate, 1912-1956 | |
| Yûsuf | 1912-1927 |
| Muḥammad V | 1927-1953, 1955-1957, King, 1957-1961 |
| Muḥammad VI | 1953-1955, d.1976 |
| al-Ḥasan II | 1961-1999 |
| Muḥammad VII | 1999-present |
| The Ḥusaynid Beys of Tunisia | |
|---|---|
| Ḥusayn I | 1705-1735 |
| 'Alî I | 1735-1756 |
| Muḥammad I | 1756-1759 |
| 'Alî II | 1759-1782 |
| Ḥamûda | 1782-1814 |
| 'Uthmân | 1814 |
| Maḥmûd | 1814-1824 |
| Ḥusayn II | 1824-1835 |
| Muṣṭafâ | 1835-1837 |
| Aḥmad I | 1837-1855 |
| Muḥammad II | 1855-1859 |
| Muḥammad III as-Ṣâdiq | 1859-1882 |
| French Occupation, 1881-1883; Protectorate, 1883-1956 | |
| 'Alî III | 1882-1902 |
| Muḥammad IV | 1902-1906 |
| Muḥammad V | 1906-1922 |
| Muḥammad VI al-Ḥabîb | 1922-1929 |
| Aḥmad II | 1929-1942 |
| Muḥammad VII al-Munṣif | 1942-1943, d.1948 |
| Muḥammad VIII | 1943-1957, d.1962 |
| Rashâd al-Mahdî | King, 1957 |
| Republic of Tunisia, 1957-present | |
From the colonial foundation of Algeria, France began to lean on Morocco and Tunisia. As Britain embarked on a long term occupation of Egypt in 1882, France, which had backed off joining the British move, consolidated control over Tunisia instead. The Ḥusaynid Beys then lasted, as French clients, all the way to independence. Briefly, it looked like the dynasty might survive independence, but the nationalist leader, Habib Bourgiba (Ḥabîb Bû Ruqayba), in the tradition of many other familiar dictators, did not need a tradtionalistic rival to his authority.
The Moroccan experience was different. While France moved steadily to consolidate its influence, this was not without complaint from other European powers. World War I nearly started early with the Agadir incident in 1911, as Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II offered hope that Germany would dispute any French designs on the Sultânate. As it happened, the War waited a couple more years and a French Protectorate was nevertheless imposed in 1912. Morocco then later became the scene of the mythic presence of "Rick" in the classic movie Casblanca, not far from the real life drama of American troops landing in November 1942, to precipitate French North Africa back into World War II against Germany. The Germans chased out, Morocco became the first French possession to regain independence, not in the dangerous grip of nationalist ideology, but still under the control of the traditional monarchy, the only such traditional national monarchy surviving in the Arab world from the Middle Ages.
| The Qaramânlî Beys of Tripoli | |
|---|---|
| Aḥmad I Bey Qaramânlî | 1711-1745 |
| Muḥammad | 1745-1754 |
| 'Alî I | 1754-1795 |
| Aḥmad II | 1795-1796 |
| Yûsuf | 1796-1832, d.1838 |
| First Barbary War, 1801-1805 | |
| 'Alî II | 1832-1835 |
| Ottoman direct rule, 1835-1911; Sanûsî Amîrs & Kings, 1837-1969 | |
Tripoli drifted into autonomy under a Janissary commander, Aḥmad Qaramânlî, whose name drives from some association of his or his ancestors with the former Turkish state of Qaramân in Anatolia. We also have the nice touch of the Greek origin of the name "Tripoli," whose Arabic form, for Libya, was 
, Ṭarâbulus al-Gharb, "Tripoli of the West" (as opposed to Tripoli in Lebanon). These are the rulers who ran afoul of Thomas Jefferson and the United States Marines. After paying $2,000,000 in "tribute" extortion money, Jefferson had had enough and in 1801 sent the U.S. Navy and Marines against Tripoli. This brought at least a temporary respite, and contributed a phrase ("the shores of Tripoli") to the Marine Hymn. Backing off of American shipping, the Beys were done in when the Turkish government became alarmed over the French occupation of Algeria in 1830. To forestall any French move against Tripoli, the Turks reasserted their authority, although the Sanûsî Amîrs began to drift into autonomy again.
Morocco and Tunisia now look like islands of bliss in comparison to Algeria, where dictatorship was supposed to end with elections, but then, when the elections went to Islâmic fundamentalists, the army set them aside in favor of a more moderate dictatorship. The result has been a particularly nasty kind of civil war, in which whole villages have been massacred by forces that don't even acknowledge which side they are fighting for. This frightening and perplexing dilemma is beginning to seem all too common in the Islâmic world, where the most vicious radicals nevertheless seem to command genuine popularity and prestige. It is thus an example of the challenge of Islamic Fascism that is beginning to characterize our era.
These tables are based on both The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996] and the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002]. The 'Alawid Sharîfs and Ḥusaynid Beys are treated by both sources. Morby has a clearer presentation, but Bosworth also has a brief discussion of the history.
Islâmic Index
The House of Su'ûd & Saudi Arabia,
1735-present
| The House of Su'ûd | |
|---|---|
| Su'ûd ibn Muḥammad | Amîr of Dir'iyya, d.1735 |
| Muḥammad I | 1735-1765 |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz I | 1765-1803 |
| Su'ûd I | 1803-1814 |
| 'Abdallâh I | 1814-1819 |
| Egyptian Occupation, 1818-1822 | |
| Turkî | 1822-1834 |
| Mushârî | 1834 |
| Fayṣal I | 1834-1838, 1843-1865 |
| Egyptian Occupation, 1838-1843 | |
| Khâlid I | Vassal of Egypt, 1838-1841 |
| 'Abdallâh II | Vassal of Egypt, 1841-1843 |
| 'Abdallâh III | 1865-1871, 1874?-1887 |
| governor, 1887-1889 | |
| Su'ûd II | 1871-1874 |
| Muḥammad II | 1887 |
| Conquest and rule by Rashîdîs, 1887-1902 | |
| 'Abd al-Raḥmân | governor, 1889-1891 |
| Muḥammad III | governor, 1891 |
| Direct rule by Rashîdîs, 1891-1902 | |
| 'Abd al-'Azîz II | Amîr, 1902-1926; King of Najd and Ḥijâz, 1926-1932; King of Sa'ûdî Arabia, 1932-1952 |
| Su'ûd III | 1952-1964 |
| Fayṣal II | 1964-1975 |
| Khâlid II | 1975-1982 |
| Fahd | 1982-2005 |
| 'Abdallâh IV | 2005-2015 |
| Salman | 2015-present |
The realm was permanently liberated from outside control by a formidable ruler, 'Abd al-'Azîz (II) ibn Su'ûd. In his long reign (1902-1952), 'Abd al-'Azîz transformed the fortunes of his realm, by diplomacy, by war, and by extraordinary good fortune. Thus, a cash subsidy from the British meant that he was in the right place and at the right time to take advantage of the falling out between the British and the new king Ḥussayn of the Hijaz, the erstwhile leader of the Arab revolt against the Turks in World War I. By deposing Ḥusayn in 1925, 'Abd al-'Azîz was soon able to unify the central Arabian Peninsula from the Persian Gulf right across to the Red Sea. This then became the Kingdom of Sa'ûdî Arabia. Before long the British subsidies were no longer necessary, since the discovery of vast oil reserves in the Persian Gulf soon brought in wealth such as the bare lands of Arabia had never seen before. The Najdi capital of Riyadh was at first so miserable that foreign embassies had been confined to Jiddah. Now "Arab" became a byword for "wealth."
Despite incredible wealth, kicked into overdrive by the Arab oil boycott in 1973, Sa'ûdî Arabia remained deeply conservative and religiously fundamentalist, as in the early days of the Wahhâbîs. Alcohol is prohibited in the Kingdom. Women cannot drive cars without the company of a man. Nor can women work in mixed company or appear on television without a veil. The full rigors of Islâmic law mean that fornication (let alone adultery) can be punished by death (beheading) and theft by the amputation of a hand. A special religious police force looks after moral improprieties, including even excessive laughter in one's home.
The rigors of Islâm, however, did not necessarily strike other Arabs as the most objectionable thing about Sa'ûdî Arabia. Revolutions in Iraq, Syria, and especially Egypt, with promulgation of ideologies like Nasser's "Arab socialism," led to the desire and expectation that the "reactionary regimes," i.e. monarchies and pro-Western governments, would eventually all be swept away. The Sa'ûdîs had some natural advantages against this. 'Abd al-'Azîz begat literally dozens of children, and this formed a tight family corporation for the control of the country. At the same time, the Nasserites and socialists, by their close association with the Soviet Union, handed the Sa'ûdîs a powerful card: the atheism of the Communists, of no particular concern to Nasser, was anathema to the fundamentalists. For many years beyond the time it made the slightest bit of sense, the Kingdom always linked Israel and the Soviets as the twin pillars of Communist atheism.
In more institutional terms, since a military coup was always the most serious threat to a Middle Eastern state, the Sa'ûdîs created two entirely separate military establishments, the regular military and a national guard, that could serve as checks on each other. The Kingdom thus rode out the high tide of Arab revolution. As Egypt and Jordan made peace with Israel, and then Iraq threatened the Sa'ûdîs with a surprise conquest of Kuwait (another "reactionary" Emirate), the Kingdom found itself in a grand alliance of Egypt, Syria, Britain, France, and the United States to liberate Kuwait. Meanwhile, a threat to the Sa'ûdîs had come from a very different kind of revolution, the Iranian upheaval of the Ayatollah Khomeini. With the beginning of the Islamic year 1400, in December 1979, Iranian inspired fanatics took over the Great Mosque in Mecca, which houses the Ka'aba, the House of God, built by Abraham, the most sacred place in all of Islâm. A bloody firefight, damaging the building, was necessary to defeat the fanatics. Henceforth, Iranians were closely watched and controlled while on pilgrimage (nothing new, actually, in Orthodox Mecca, where Richard Burton, impersonating a Moslem, observed much the same thing in the 19th century).
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In 2001, the Sa'ûdîs, still ruled by sons of 'Abd al-'Azîz (he had 43 or more of them, from 1900 to 1947), seemed secure enough. When OPEC drives up oil prices, the Kingdom wins browny points with the West (and makes extra money) by underselling Cartel prices. Conservative Islâm is under no threat from any non-Western sources, though the occasional wild Prince, like the one with the nude statuary with painted pubic hair at his house in Beverly Hills, must be intensely embarrassing. I always wonder about the Sa'ûdî girls I knew in Beirut in 1969-1970, who used to change into see-through blouses on the flights from Jiddah to Beirut. Either they live a private life secure from the religious police (police invasions of domestic privacy common in the West would provoke serious bloodshed in Arabia), or they have moved to the West. As conservative guardians of the Holy Cities of Islâm, Sa'ûdî Arabia is probably in an ideologically position stronger than for most of the 20th century. Islâm everywhere has tended to gravitate toward the Wahhâbî positions, rather than away from them.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11/2001 put conservative Islâm in a somewhat different light. Sa'ûdî subsidies to Islamic schools in countries like Pakistan have helped breed a generation of fanatics with a great hatred of modernity and the West. The mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama ben Ladin, was himself a Sa'ûdî millionaire, stripped of his citizenship, who had created a state-within-a-state in Ṭâlibân Afghanistian. Ṭâlibân itself ominously means "students," i.e. students from the Pakistani Islâmic schools. The Sa'ûdîs are (officially) mortified by all this; but many Americans, particularly but not exclusively those sympathetic to Israel, are suddenly suspicious of a presumably friendly regime whose consistent actions have tended, not surprisingly, to promote anti-Americanism. There is undoubtedly an inner inconistency in Sa'ûdî policy, which is overtly friendly, indeed dependent (with American troups stationed in the country), with the country whose culture represents the whole threat of freedom and modernity to Wahhâbî conservatism and the theocratic aspect of the Sa'ûdî state. Where previously the threat to the Sa'ûdî state had been from the Left, things like Nasser's "Arab Socialism," now the threat may be from the Right, from people who view any remnant of secular pragmatism and Realpolitik in Sa'ûdî policy as irreligious -- the people who have created the present ideology of Islamic Fascism. This is an unusual position for the House of Su'ûd, and it may force some unpleasant choices upon them.
The death of King 'Adballâh in 2015 meant that the resevoir of sons of 'Abd al-'Azîz is beginning to run dry. The Crown Prince, Muqrin, at 69, is now the youngest surviving son. His successor will be from the next generation of Su'ûdîs, already designated as the Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed, son of Prince Nayef. In updating the page here for these changes, I noticed that my previous source, Robert Lacey's The Kingdom, Arabia & the House of Sa'ud [Avon Books, 1981, 1982] actually failed to include the new King, Salman, among the sons of 'Abd al-'Azîz. Also, consulting Wikipedia and other sources, the birth dates for several Princes are different from those given by Lacey. I do not know if the problems with Lacey were his own carelessness or the difficulty of getting accurate information out of the Su'ûdîs. I have made some corrections but have not examined the dates and names for all the Princes. Many have died whose fate I have not yet recorded.
The paradox of the position of the Su'ûdîs continues. Whether we call it Islamic Fascism, Radical Islam, Terrorism, Islamism, Jihadism, or whatever, the Su'ûdîs are themselves responsible the promotion of the reactionary and fundamentalist ideas that have fueled it. Yet they are alarmed and threatened by the result. 
The "Arab Spring," with the promise of democratization, was as much as threat to Su'ûdî autocracy as it was to any other regime, but the collapse of the "Spring" into chaos, civil war, or radicalization everywhere except Tunisia has actually given the Su'ûdîs some breathing room. No sensible person wants the Monarchy overthrown just to end up with a bunch of raging Jihadists.
Of course, in that respect, one wonders about the policy of Barack Obama, whose tepid support for allies like both Israel and Saudi Arabia, and his apparent eagerness to strike even a bad nuclear deal with radical Iran, make one wonder about his commitment and even his intentions. After his infamous bow to King 'Abdallâh, many wonder now if Obama has simply lost interest because of the complexity and intractability of the situation. He continues to boast of withdrawing American forces from both Iraq and Afghanistan, beyond the point where this seemed prudent -- as it definitely proved not to be in Iraq when the "Islamic State" (ISIS or ISIL) captured Mosul and much of the rest of the country in 2014. The Iraqi Army, purged of Sunnis, broke and fled, while the Kurds were stuck with a desperate Goal Line Defense. After foolish dithering, Obama agreed to some airstrikes and adivsors, but the Kurds were still not receiving direct military aid. Rumors float that Israel and the Su'ûdîs are secretly planning what to do about Iran's nuclear program if Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry sell everyone out to Iran. Many are surprised that Israel has not already struck Iran's nuclear facilities, as it previously has attacked such things in both Iraq, under Hussein, and Syria, more recently. The number of nuclear sites and their exteme range make it a difficult operation for the Israeli Air Force. It would all be a lot easier if the Su'ûdîs provided bases and support. Yet that probably could only be done secretly. Saudi Arabia cannot openly side with Israel at a time when pure hatred of Jews may be at its highest in the Islamic world. A feudal anachronism of desert sheiks thus continues to walk a thin line as a major player in 21st century politics.
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