Kr.s.n.a replied... "If he fights fairly, Bhîma will never succeed in gaining victory. If, however, he fights unfairly, he will surely be able to kill Duryodhana. At the time of the gambling Bhîma promised to break the thighs of Duryodhana with his mace in battle. Let him now fulfil his vow. Let him, by deception, kill the Kuru king who is the master of deception! If Bhîma does not kill him by unfair means, the son of Dhr.tarâs.t.ra will surely retain the kingdom!".....Kr.s.n.a seeing the Pân.d.avas stricken with remorse, said.... "Out of the desire to do you good, I repeatedly applied my illusory powers and caused them to be killed by various means in battle. If I had not adopted such deceitful ways, you would never have been victorious, nor could you have regained your kingdom or your wealth."
He continued, "You should not mind the fact that your enemy has been killed deceitfully. When one is outnumbered by his enemies, then destruction should be brought about by stratagem. The gods themselves, in killing the asuras, have followed the same methods. The way that was followed by the celestials may be followed by all. We have been crowned with success..."
The Mahâbhârata, translated by Chakravarthi V. Narasimhan, "Shalya Parva" [Columbia University Press, 1965, p.172 & 175]
[John 11:47] Then gathered the chief priests and the Pharisees a council, and said, "What are we to do? For this man does many signs. [11:48] If we let him thus alone, all will believe in him, and the Romans will come and take away from us both the Place and the nation." [11:49] But one of them, Caiaphas, being the high priest that same year, said to them, "You know nothing at all, [11:50] nor do you stop to consider that it is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, that the whole nation should not perish."
The Priest Caiaphas, in the Biblical quote above, is often taken as an archetype of the unprincipled person, willing to sacrifice an innocent man for the sake of expediency. Christians have been quite content with that interpretation, which makes Jesus a victim of injustice, and Jews have understandably seen the portrayal as anti-Semitic. However, both of these views are based on a misconception. Jesus can be a tragic victim of wrong without Caiaphas having been a bad person, let alone an anti-Semitic caricature. Caiaphas was in fact doing his duty, as we must construe the duty of a statesman, as opposed to the duty of a private person. There is a difference because of the characteristic moral dilemma that occurs with political power. The lives of many, the "whole nation," depend on Caiaphas; and if he must truly chose between the innocent lives of many and the innocent life of one, then, however unpleasant, disturbing, or regretable, the trust that the many have placed in him must predominate and he must do what is necessary that "that the whole nation should not perish." [note] The reality of the kind of choices Caiaphas had to make is confirmed by the fact that the "whole nation" did perish in the great revolt against the Romans, the Jewish War of 66-73 AD, when the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed and Jews were actually expelled from the city. The peril of Caiaphas' position is revealed when we find that the High Priest Ananus and his colleague Jesus ben Gamaliel were murdered by the Zealots, led by John of Gischala, in 67. This meant that the Revolt would be a fight to the death, with no compromise sought from the Romans.
The clearest expression of the kind of dilemma that Caiaphas found himself in comes in Niccolò Machiavelli's The Prince:
It must be understood, however, that a prince... cannot observe all of those virtues for which men are reputed good, because it is often necessary to act against mercy, against faith, against humanity, against frankness, against religion in order to preserve the state. Thus he must be disposed to change according as the winds of fortune and the alternations of circumstance dictate. As I have aleady said, he must stick to the good so long as he can, but being compelled by necessity, he must be ready to take the way of evil...In all men's acts, and in those of princes most especially, it is the result that renders the verdict when there is no court of appeal. [Daniel Donno translation, Bantam Books, 1981, pp.63-64]
While this passage especially has often been interpreted as advice to completely unprincipled rulers for the purpose merely of promoting their own power, Machiavelli himself did not admire tyrants and did not endorse an amoral opportunism. Thus, the implication of amorality or immorality in the passage above, although very limited if it is read carefully, contrasts with a passage in Machiavelli's own Discourses:
...those are held to be infamous and detestable who extirpate religion, subvert kingdoms and republics, make war on virtue, on letters, and on any art that brings advantage and honour to the human race, i.e. the profane, the violent, the ignorant, the worthless, the idle, the coward. [I:10, Leslie J. Walker translation, Penguin Books, p. 135]
The problem for Machiavelli is not that the amoral are somehow better statesmen, but that,
...almost all men, deceived by the false semblance of good and the false semblance of renown, allow themselves either wilfully or ignorantly to slip into the ranks of those who deserve blame rather than praise; and, when they might have founded a republic or kingdom to their immortal honour, turn their thoughts to tyranny, and fail to see what fame, what glory, security, tranquility, conjoined with peace of mind, they are missing by adopting this course, and what infamy, scorn, abhorrence, danger and disquiet they are incurring. [ibid.]
"Machiavellian" has become a term for vicious opportunism, and the terms "necessity," "raison d'état," and "Realpolitik" have become shameless pretexts for multiple crimes, as when Lenin wrote to Trotsky in February 1920, "If it must be so, then let thousands die as a result, but the country must be saved" [Nicolas Werth, "A State against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union," The Black Book of Communism, Harvard University Press, 1999, p.89]. This superficially looks like another statement by Machiavelli in the Discourses:
For when the safety of one's country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious. [op.cit., III:41, p. 515]
Lenin can be said to be a true disciple of this maxim, since he shrank from no injustice or cruelty to achieve his goals. However, he was no disciple of Machiavelli just because of those goals. The quote just given is immediately followed by:
On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that alternative should be wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and preserve the freedom of one's country. [ibid.]The life and freedom of the country, in fact, were not saved, but destroyed, by Lenin, who achieved for himself the "infamy, scorn, abhorrence" that we have seen Machiavelli describe elsewhere. Only the Bolsheviks were saved, so that they could continue slaughtering the workers and peasants in whose name they had seized power.
There is a legitimate use for all of the terms -- "necessity," "raison d'état," and "Realpolitik" -- and Machiavelli himself knew the difference. He admired republics, especially the Roman Republic; he admired and revered Marcus Aurelius. He did not admire tyranny; he did not admire, but despised, Caesar. He would have had no difficulty recognizing Lenin and Trotsky, or Hitler and Stalin, for the monsters that they were -- all of whom made "war on virtue, on letters, and on any art that brings advantage and honour to the human race." His advice can be misused, as any principles of prudence can be misused for improper ends; but this does not change the difference between prudence and folly, wisdom and evil.
A genuine moral dilemma arises when a wrong must be committed, not just for any purpose, but unavoidably for a genuinely good purpose. If the purpose of a prince or leader is simply his own personal or dynastic ambition, regardless of the cost to his country or its citizens, this is not a worthy purpose, and we have an evil, not a dilemma. Machiavelli does say that "it is often necessary to act against mercy, against faith, against humanity, against frankness, against religion in order to preserve the state," which does seem to say that the state, and not personal or dynastic ambition, is the proper end of statecraft. Perhaps so, but this also depends on what the state is supposed to be. If the state is an end in itself, then a dilemma does not arise if some individuals must be sacrificed to it. This again turns "raison d'état" into an amoral principle, using real individuals for the sake of an abstract, collective entity. But if the state is not an end or a good in itself, but an instrumental good to some truly moral end, then a genuine dilemma can arise, as the service of the moral end of the state may conflict with the means that become necessary for its pursuit.
The essence of the dilemma for Caiaphas was simply the existence of one in comparison to the existence of many, the "whole nation." In the Discourses, again, Machiavelli says:
...and it is beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all that promotes it is carried out; and, however much this or that private person may be the loser on this account, there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in consequence. [ibid., II:2, p.275]
Machiavelli is not sophisticated enough to know how rent seeking can corrupt even republics to the service of private interest, but his point can be well taken that the many will be better served in a government that is accountable to the many. If the good of the many, or the common good, could be realized without harm ever occurring to the innocent interests of individuals, that would be wonderful; but life does not always operate that way, which is the problem.
We see the moral dilemma of the state and the individual clearly over the course of Robert Heinlein's science fiction novel of lunar revolution in 2076, The Moon Is A Harsh Mistress [1965, 1966, A Tom Doherty Associates Book, New York, 1996]. We find the "rational anarchist," libertarian purist Professor Bernardo de la Paz asking our narrator, Manuel:
"...under what circumstances may the State justly place its welfare above that of a citizen?" ...."Prof, as I see, are no circumstances under which State is justified in placing its welfare ahead of mine."
"Good. We have a starting point." [p.82]
Later, while the revolution is being prepared, Manuel is worried about how they are getting the money for it:
"Still doesn't say how to pay for what we are doing now.""'How,' Manuel? You know how we are doing it. We're stealing it. I'm neither proud of it nor ashamed; it's the means we have. If they ever catch on, they may eliminate us -- and that I am prepared to face. At least, in stealing, we have not created the villainous precedent of taxation." [p. 303]
Of course, to the strictest liberatarian, taxation is stealing, so the Professor is doing what states do anyway. Has not this violated the Professor's principles? We see the rationale next:
He chuckled. "Dear Manuel! Has it taken you all these years to decide that I am a hypocrite?""Then you admit it?"
"No. But if it makes you feel better to think that I am one, you are welcome to use me as your scapegoat. But I am not a hypocrite to myself because I was aware the day we declared the Revolution that we would need much money and would have to steal it. It did not trouble me because I considered it better than food riots six years hence, cannibalism in eight. I made my choice and have no regrets." [pp. 303-304]
To Professor de la Paz, stealing money for the Revolution is "the means we have" to avoid food riots and cannibalism (because, by the way, limited lunar water was being steadily shipped to earth as grain). This is Machiavellian in the best sense. These are not means to preserving the state, but means to preserving people. Professor de la Paz is not troubled by the immorality of theft because the preservation of human lives is more important. In these terms, the question would not be whether the state has the right to tax, but whether taxation is necessary to the means effecting the purpose of the state in protecting and preserving the lives of the citizens. The discussion in Mistress is not about sacrificing individuals against their will, but with his poetic license Heinlein has spared the Professor the travail of facing a case of that. But if he is willing to steal, which he regards as an unambiguous crime against natural rights, to prevent cannibalism, the magnitude of the end will be no different if he is required by necessity to sacrifice some individual, or small number of individuals, to prevent the deaths of many more. He may be troubled and unhappy, properly, about that, but he has already conceded the principle -- or rather the exceptions to the principle. Fate, with no poetic license, was not so kind to Caiaphas and the later leaders responsible for the survival of the Jewish nation.
The supreme metaphysic of the state as an end in itself is that of Hegel, for whom the state is simply more real and more divine than any individual. The life, growth, and glory of the state thus would have an absolute claim on any individual; and one could even argue that the conquests of Napoleon and Hitler, although ephemeral and vicious, nevertheless accrued memorable and so indisputable glory, of a sort, to their states, with both regimes the continuing objects of study, fascination, literature, and art. Although few of sound mind would take that "glory" seriously today in regard to Hitler (who, unlike Napoleon, may be said to have created a Hell on earth), in fact we face the unsettling threat of the fame of Stalin reasserting itself in Russia and redirecting that unhappy country back into the ways of tyranny. Indeed, in late 1999, the Russian press is so far back under the control of the government as to contribute no more than cheerleading to the Russian reconquest of Chechnya, whose entire population was once deported by Stalin for suspected disloyalty during the brief German occupation of 1942.
The liberal ideal of Locke, and the basis of morality for Kant, is the individual. The moral basis of the government of the United States is set out in the Declaration of Independence, where Thomas Jefferson affirms the existence of natural, individual rights and then says, "That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed..." Thus, the state is not an end in itself but merely the means to "secure these Rights." If a government fails to do that, Jefferson says, as Locke said earlier, "it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it." Nothing could be further from the statism, and state worship, of Hegel, let alone Napoleon, Lenin, Hitler, and Stalin.
"Necessity" is itself written into the Constitution of the United States, since Article I, Section 8 says that "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper to carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States..." Now, this "necessary and proper clause" was viewed with suspicion by the Anti-Federalists, and reasonably so, since it was suspected as a device for improperly expanding the power of the federal government. Indeed, I do not think that any law has ever been voided for not being "proper." The greatest damage, however, was effected by the word "necessary" itself being misconstrued by John Marshall, who denied that it meant "without which not," the proper logical meaning of necessity, and decided that a "necessary" means is "any means calculated to produce the end." The sophistry and dishonesty of this has been examined elsewhere. The danger then became, not that the federal government would do what was necessary, but that it could do anything "calculated to produce the end." That is a prescription, not for preserving the life and freedom of the nation, but for implementing the kind of tyrannies that we see now.
In addition to these legal and institutional usurpations of liberty, the attacks on individualism itself by socialism and communism have continued under the guise of "communitarianism," and trendy thinkers now like to say that only as much freedom as "possible" should be allowed given the fundamental priority of the state, of "society as a collective unit" (they know that they will sound like Nazis if they start talking about "the state," so they say "society" instead). It is not, indeed, that freedom must never be abridged, but it is a very different matter to see this as a choice by necessity in a moral dilemma rather than as an unproblematic pursuit of a fundamental "collective" good. If the abstract entity (the "state," "society," or the "collective") has the moral priority, then the even permanent abridgment of any amount of freedom is no moral wrong. What the state giveth, the state taketh away.
What about Machiavelli? He lived prior to when the debate between statism and individualism started and so does not articulate its terms, though the idea of the subordination of the individual to the state already existed in Classical political thought (the sort of thing we find in Plato's Crito). Machiavelli could have insensibly gone along with that, or he may have given more thought to what even a Classical state was supposed to accomplish for its citizens. Although not clearly delineated, Machiavelli often does speak as though the worthy and glorious state is the one, not only of secure and substantial dominion, but one where the lives, property, and prosperity of its citizens are secured.
Still it cannot be called virtue to slay one's fellow citizens, to betray one's friends, to act without faith, without pity, without religion. By such methods one may win dominion but not glory. [The Prince, op.cit., p.36]
Thus, although Cesare Borgia is often thought of as the archetype of the amoral opportunist, Machiavelli's praise of him (The Prince, Chapter VII) in great measure depends on his judgment that he had secured "the good will of all the inhabitants of Romagna, who were beginning to get a taste of good government" [ibid., p.31]. Borgia is contrasted with the previous rulers of Romagna, who were "impotent lords who had been more inclined to despoil than to govern their subjects" [ibid.].
Machiavelli's advice on the treatment of one's citizens is the most revealing:
A prince...ought to encourage his citizens peaceably to pursue their affairs, whether in trade, in agriculture, or in any other human acitivity, so that no one will hesitate to improve his possessions for fear that they will be taken from him, and no one will hesitate to open a new avenue of trade for fear of taxes. [ibid., p.79]
Even in America, much investment is daunted by the fear of taxes. Elsewhere it is altogether halted. Indeed, it is the hallmark of tyranny in the 20th century that the property, let alone the persons, of citizens is not secure. But a ruler who is basically a robber, or who uses his power to take women, will come to be hated. Hatred and contempt, says Machiavelli, are the worst things that can happen to a ruler, the former because nothing else be needed to motivate opposition, even assassination, while the latter means that few will fear to act in opposition. Machiavelli is famous for claiming that it is better for a ruler to be feared than loved by the people (cf. ibid., Chapter XVII), but this is for the very sensible reason that in times of crisis, it is essential that a ruler be obeyed. A ruler who is loved but not feared may not be obeyed in need, which could spell disaster for all. A ruler need not be loved to rule well, but he must be feared to the extent that he will be obeyed.
Still a prince should make himself feared in such a way that, though he does not gain love, he escapes hatred; for being feared but not hated go readily together. Such a condition he may always attain if he will not touch the property of his citizens and subjects, nor their women. [ibid., p. 60]
A ruler who is both feared and hated may be successful -- as Machiavelli says, "one may win dominion" -- but the foundations of success will be unsound: Shihuangdi died unchallenged in power and dominion, but his son reigned only two years before universal rebellion overthrew the Qin Dynasty. Stalin had achieved similar status, but three years after his death he was denounced by Khrushchev for his crimes (the "secret" speech of 1956), and the legitimacy of the Soviet regime was shaken in the minds of many who had been true believers. Many Russians now remember Stalin fondly because it is easy to forget the murders and tortures but comforting to remember his strength, making him fearful in Machiavelli's sense but not hateful.
One way in which a ruler can avoid hatred is for him to give the citizens some sense that he respects and depends on them. There is no clearer way that this can be done than to trust them with arms.
This is an issue that has become increasingly important in modern democracies, where the forms of police state authority that have been increasingly put into place are inherently hostile to armed citizens. Large segments of the population, not just in European democracies but now even in America, are deceived by this tyrannical program, under the influence of a press and intelligentsia that has long been dominated by statists, who have always sought to deny to citizens the means of resisting the state. In this case, Machiavelli's observations and recommendations are the most revealing for the nature of government and the purpose of the state. There is nothing more necessary for the preservation of the state than the military, which is why Machiavelli says:
A prince must have no other objective, no other thought, not take up any profession but that of war, its methods and its discipline, for that is the only art expected of a ruler. [ibid., pp. 53-54]
So what is the proper relation of a citizen to the military power of his country? a power that can be used to oppress him, as well as to effect the necessary and proper defense of the nation? This may even be the very essence of the dilemma of statecraft, wherein the existence of the state may contradict the freedom of the individual. How are "necessity" and freedom to be reconciled? This must be examined in some detail, beginning with Machiavelli's advice to a prince:
For by arming your subjects, you make their arms your own. Those among them who are suspicious become loyal, while those who are already loyal remain so, and from subjects they are transformed into partisans. [ibid., p. 73]
There is no more telling hallmark of tyranny and malevolence than a ruler or a government that sets about to disarm the citizens. In Germany and Russia, the policy was to put the people at the mercy of the government. And when the Nazis wanted to massacre the Jews, or the Soviets their "class enemies," resistance was no longer possible. Nor were totalitarian governments alone in this. The democracies of Europe and America now pursue their project of dependent and helpless citizens with relentless attacks on the right of citizens to bear arms or defend themselves.
When you disarm your subjects, however, you offend them by showing that, either from cowardliness or from lack of faith, you distrust them; and either conlcusion will induce them to hate you. [ibid., p. 73]
Democratic governments get away with this by telling the public "you are the government" and buying them off with "benefits," even while people are systematically looted and subjugated for the sake of rent-seeking political and bureaucratic interest groups. As Jefferson wisely said, "they will purchase the voices of the people, and make them pay the price." Although the Founders of the country were on the watch for this, people are now dumbed-down and indoctrinated by "public education" not to notice. Stupified with their "benefits," people now do not appreciate this "Machiavellian" principle:
There can be no proper relation between one who is armed and one who is not... [ibid., p. 54]
But even dictatorial governments have gotten away with disarming citizens through a sufficiently dense ideological smokescreen.
What Machiavelli wanted, like the Founding Fathers of the United States, for the defense of the state was a citizen militia. The alternative in the Italy of Machiavelli's day was an army of mercenaries, which he recognized as worthless.
Anyone searching for the first cause of the ruin of the Roman Empire will find that it began with the hiring of mercenaries. From that point the strength of the Roman Empire started to decline, and all the valor it lost was transferred to the Goths. [ibid., p. 53]
Although Machiavelli was quite right about mercenaries, militias have often not worked out well, since they tend to be insufficiently disciplined or hardened as fighting forces. That was the case when the citizens of Renaissance Italian cities attempted to resist foreign armies (French and Spanish), and it was the case in American history, mainly in the War of 1812, when Militia forces often performed badly. By the time of the Civil War, units were raised and trained specifically for the war. Although the Militia Act of 1792 made every "free able-bodied white male citizen" of 18 a member of the Militia, in time, the idea lapsed that the Militia should be the actual body of the citizenry, especially when the Southern States did not want new color-blind Federal civil rights principles, enforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, arming the mass of freed slaves. So in 1903 the Dick Act established the National Guard 
as a volunteer organization on a much more restricted basis than the old Militia. Indeed, it must be emphasized and remembered that the motivation for this was, in great measure, racism: an extension of the Segregationist regime that intended to crush the means of resistance among Southern blacks.
Those who now prefer to see the "right of the people to keep and bear arms" of the Second Amendment as discharged by the National Guard, however, must overlook (or explain away) the circumstance that National Guardsmen are in fact not allowed to "keep" their arms. Weapons are kept in National Guard Armories, and Guardsmen bear them only in service, under military discipline. Nor are officers elected, as they usually were in Militias, or even in many Civil War regiments. The National Guard, like the Regular Army, is now part of the establishment of a Standing Army, which the Founders feared as a threat to freedom (they would have called it merely a "select militia"). Even worse, the lapse of the Militia has meant that armed citizens are no longer available for the posse comitatus, where ordinary citizens become deputy sheriffs of their county to enforce the law. This means that increasingly para-military police departments (which orginally were prohibited from carrying arms) have become virtual armies of occupation in American cities, vulnerable to many of the abuses practiced by any such armies.
This is where the dilemma of statecraft emerges in a fundamental way. Militias are too weak for the security of the state, while standing armies are dangerous temptations to tyranny and foreign adventures -- Americans will have noticed that several undeclared wars have been fought since the United States began to maintain a large standing army and that recent involvements -- Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the continuous bombing of Iraq -- have been undertaken without any clear idea of how the involvement was to be wrapped up. This is a degree of foolishness that the Founders thought they were preventing by giving Congress the power to declare war. A President, as Commander-in-Chief, with an army already in existence, can send it into battle without a declaration of war.
Clearly, a regular army is necessary for the security of a state; but it cannot be so big as to represent a temptation to foreign adventures or internal repression. Indeed, after the Civil War, Congress prohibited the use of the regular army for internal police matters. A militia, however, cannot provide a ready or reliable enough back-up for the regular army in case of emergencies. Reserves of some form, whether as adjuncts of the regular army or as national guard units, or both, are essential. But there still must be a militia, which would stand to the national guard in the same sense that Army Reserves stand to the regular army. The "weekend warriors," a derisive term for National Guardsmen, would be just a rather more organized and trained fraction of an armed citizenry, which also means that they would keep their own basic military weapon with them. More basic members of the militia would be more like "vacation warriors."
Nothing is so essential to the legitimate purpose of the state than the protection of its citizens, both from conquest and from tyranny. The dilemma is how we maintain an effective military force, which must be as disciplined and hardened as possible, that will consist of free citizens and not pose a danger to a free civil society. These seem like incompatible purposes, though they are simply of a piece with having a state whose purpose is the protection of individual rights but whose requirements are often, of necessity, abridgement of those rights and the sacrifice of some individuals. This incompatibility seems nowhere clearer than when it comes to conscription, by which "involuntary servitude" is imposed on citizens in order to use them, in the judgment of generals and politicians, for the preservation of the state. Although many people fled Europe for the United States in order to avoid conscription, it has now been put in force several times in America on the principal that it is "necessary" for the preservation of the individual freedom that would otherwise be permanently endangered by foreign conquest. It can even be argued that a conscript army, full of men resentful of their loss of freedom, will constantly remind the generals and politicians that there are limits to what the men will tolerate, both in terms of their treatment and in terms of the use to which they are put.
| 1 | Regular Army | Federal |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Army Reserve | |
| 3 | National Guard | State |
| 4 | County Militia | |
| 5 | Unorganized Militia | |
There is no more sobering a corrective for the false path upon which the democracies have entered than to realize that the replacement of the Militia by the National Guard in America was probably motivated in part by racism and the desire to oppress freed slaves, and that the advice that Machiavelli himself gives even to autocrats is to arm their own citizens. The tyrannical, statist purposes behind the "gun control" movement are thus revealed, as are the principles of Machiavelli's viewpoint, where the most successful rulers must be those who achieve good government, while good government is that which fosters the liberty, security, and prosperity of the citizens.
...nor is it reasonable to expect that one who is armed will voluntarily obey one who is not, or that the latter will feel secure among servants who are armed. [ibid., p. 54]
Thus, Machiavelli expects disarmed citizens to be vulnerable and insecure, which is precisely what statists and tyrants wish.
These reflections began above with one man who, out of his responsibility for the many, thought it necessary to sacrifice another innocent man for their sake -- a sacrifice, ironically, that Christianity interprets as willingly accepted by the victim in order to morally and religiously redeem all of humanity. By an examination of Machiavelli's theory about this, we have come to the theory of such institutional arragements as would preserve the proper purpose of the state, to serve the liberty of its citizens, and to protect citizens who might be targeted, either by unjust rulers or by the tyranny of the majority, for oppression and unnecessary, improper sacrifice. If the only force that a ruler, or any government, can muster is the voluntary mass of the citizens, then no policy can be pursued to which the mass of the citizens does not consent. Thus, the military adventures, and social enginnering within the military, of the Clinton Presidency have resulted in poor retention and recruitment rates. In the voluntary military, this indicates that something is wrong. The fear that it endangers national security leads many to think that conscription should be reintroduced. This, however, treats one evil with another evil. The truth is that the regular military is too large anyway, but that even so it could be easily maintained without the discouraging actions into which the military has been sent and the oppressive social policies for which the military was made a laboratory.
The voluntary military is therefore a check and a balance against foolish government. At the same time, good government sometimes requires that the people be led rather than just followed. When Neville Chamberlain decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to Hitler, ridiculously hoping to satisfy all his desires, public opinion, equally foolish, was behind him completely. But the appeasement of Hitler violated one of Machiavelli's wisest precepts:
...one should never permit a disorder to persist in order to avoid a war, for war is not avoided thereby but merely deferred to one's own disadvantage. [ibid., p. 20]
The disadvantage of deferring war against Hitler was bitter and substantial. But, although we could blame this case on the sentiment of the people, rather than just on Chamberlain, Machiavelli himself said, "Government by the populace is better than government by princes" [Discourses, op.cit., p. 256]. One reason for this is stated thus:
For a licentious and turbulent populace, when a good man can obtain a hearing, can easily be brought to behave itself; but there is no one to talk to a bad prince, nor is there any remedy except the sword. [ibid., p. 256].
In the same way that a misbehaving crowd can be calmed, a foolish and ill advised populace can be directed towards wisdom by the proper leadership. This, to be sure, calls for great gifts. A Churchill or a Reagan who can rally a nation to the wise and prudent path is rare, while a demagogue who can urge the people down a foolish and improper path by pandering, like a Roosevelt or a Clinton, is more common. Which kind of leader becomes available is unfortunately left to the happenstance of history, where demagogues definitely are in greater supply.
Machiavelli's own explanation for why the righteous do not succeed as rulers is of interest.
...for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin, since there are so many men who are not good. [The Prince, op.cit., p. 56]
Similarly,
It follows, then, that a wise prince cannot and should not keep his pledge when it is against his interest to do so and when his reasons for making the pledge are no longer operative. If all men were good, this would be a bad precept, but since they are evil and would not keep a pledge to you, then you need not keep yours to them. [ibid., p. 62]
Now, if a prince knew that an ally was not evil, but good and faithful, it would certainly be foolish to break faith and estrange such a one, except in extraordinary circumstances. The assumption that most princes, and men, however, will simply act out of self-interest is not likely to lead one too far astray. Interestingly, a determination to break faith with those who break faith sounds very much like the "tit for tat" strategy in game theory, where good faith is rewarded with good faith, and bad faith with bad faith. That approach makes for a prince, or a leader, who is neither treacherous nor a sucker, who is faithful to the faithful but on guard and prepared against the unfaithful. It was one of the most painful aspects of Neville Chamberlain's naivety that he actually perceived Adolf Hitler as a man of good faith. His disillusionment came far too late to catch Hitler before he had acquired such advantages as made the war as desperate a business as it proved to be.
There is nothing easy or happy about the dilemmas of statecraft. Desperate times call for desperate measures, but it often demands uncommon wisdom to recognize a desperate situation and to know what actually is necessary. Caiaphas cannot be expected to have believed that Jesus was the Son of God. What he can be expected to appreciate is the overwhelming force of Roman power and the danger of the rebellion that was always simmering just below the surface in Judea, urged on by many Messianic figures much like Jesus. His reasons and actions in that respect are not open to serious reproach. Nor can the comparable actions of any political figure. Churchill was right that Bolshevism should have been "strangled in its cradle." That the means and will were not available for that is one thing, that the Soviet Union was accepted by Roosevelt as a progressive and democratic regime, which could be trusted to occupy Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe, is another thing -- a foolish and idiotic thing, which condemned thousands to hopeless torture and death and many more to poverty and tyranny for decades. Only Truman awakened to the danger, to the continuing disgust of the Left. Similarly disillusioned, somewhat too late again, was Jimmy Carter.
The hardest thing to accept may be that there are moral dilemmas and that often choices must be made between good ends and what otherwise would be the dictates of justice and righteousness. A naive gullibility, like that of Wilson, Roosevelt, or Carter, is ultimately of no benefit to justice, when those who are treacherous by preference triumph over those who would rather lose than respond in kind. Machiavelli is still supreme as the sage and theorist of what is required in such real, unforgiving historical situations.
Machiavelli's View of Government
Curiously, Caiaphas actually states, intentionally or not, a fundamental prinicple of Christian theology: Jesus must die in order to save all of humanity -- the "people" (laós) in the largest sense -- to redeem us from our sins. Now, Caiaphas would not have had such an end in view, but it is simply a generalized version of the terms he does consider. Caiaphas works to preserve Israel. Jesus accepts the necessity of this, but with the correction and enlargement that it will mean all humanity, and Israel will be simply all those who accept Christ. Now, it often happens that those who intend evil sometimes unintentionally do good, and traditionally Caiaphas might have been thought of in this way. But this need not be the case in this instance. Caiaphas is willing to sacrifice Jesus for the same reason that Jesus is willing to sacrifice himself, with the only difference being the size of the "whole nation."
| 1 | Army | Navy | Air Force | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 480,000 | 360,877 | |||
| 2 | Army Reserve | Navy Reserve | Air Force Reserve | |
| 205,000 | 73,764 | |||
| 3 | Army National Guard | Coast Guard | Marines | Air National Guard |
| 35,587 | 172,240 | |||
| Coast Guard Reserve | Marine Corps Reserve | |||
| 350,623 | 8,000 | 39,624 | 106,744 | |
For perspective, the Armed Forces of the United States as of 30 September 2000 had the strengths given at right. The Marines are, though they don't like it, technically under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy -- the very meaning of the word "marine" is, of course "at sea." In wartime, the Coast Guard is also under the authority of the Navy.
It is noteworthy that there is no National Guard organization corresponding to the Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard. That the Coast Guard is listed in the place of a Naval National Guard is in part for convenience and in part because the Coast Guard in fact functions as a kind of Naval National Guard -- as "Coastal Defense" in terms of old Naval war doctrine. Since the Coast Guard is a full-time, active service it does have its own Reserve. The Air Force National Guard shares some of the operational ambiguity of the Coast Guard. Many Air Force National Guard units are always on active duty. The fighters that were scrambled (too late) on 11 September 2001 to intercept the airliners hijacked by terrorists were from the Air National Guard. Also, the rescue helicopter, of The Perfect Storm book and movie fame, that had to ditch on 30 October 1991 was an Air National Guard rescue helicopter -- under the doctrine that the Air National Guard handles air rescues at sea beyond the range of Coast Guard helicopters. The Air Guardsmen were then rescued by Coast Guardsmen.