The Polynomic Theory of Value
after Immanuel Kant, Friedrich von Schiller, & Leonard Nelson
The diagram displays the polynomic ("many laws") or polynomological ("reckoning many laws") theory of value. In each domain of value positive and negative value (e.g. good and bad) can vary independently of other domains. Morally right action can lead to bad consequences; morally wrong action can lead to good consequences; the beautiful can be produced through morally wrong action or be itself bad in a non-moral sense; and the ugly can be produced through morally right action or be itself good in a non-moral sense. This sort of theory was originally suggested by Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), as a correction to Kant's ethics, and was more recently advocated and developed by Leonard Nelson (1882-1927), in his System der Ethik, 1932 [System of Ethics, Yale, 1956].
| THE GOOD |
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| ETHICS | Aesthetics, the beautiful and the ugly: theory of art & beauty, the worth of things independent of human purposes, "disinterested" value, the worth of nature, the relation of value and being, things good-in-themselves: Optatives -- wishes |
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| MORALITY | Ideal or Euergetic Ethics, the good and the bad(/evil): non-moral worth in human life, the good of teleological ethics, the worth and meaning of life -- happiness, fulfillment, etc. -- things good-for-us: Hortatives -- exhortations |
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| Morality, right and wrong: ethics of obligation and virtue; justice, the freedom and dignity of persons, the balance between self and others, moral goodness: Imperatives -- commands |
Graphic Version of Table
The wrap-around feature of the diagram indicates the generality of the term "good." The morally right is an ethical good, and both moral and non-moral ethical goodness are good and beautiful. Moral goodness concerns right and wrong actions; ethical goodness concerns what is good for human life, including right actions; and aesthetic goodness concerns what is simply good-in-itself, whether morally, in human life, or quite generally. The distinction between morality and ideal, or euergetic, ethics is motivated by "The Generalized Structure of Ethical Dilemmas." For teleological ethics and for moralistic (see below) deontological ethics, there would be no dilemmas -- the goodness of the ends or the rightness of the means would be all that counts. The existence of a sense of dilemma is therefore evidence for the distinction between the two domains of value and so for the basic thesis that value is polynomic.
Aesthetic valuation in general is pluralistic, latitudinarian (relatively relativistic -- see below), and not systematizable. The aesthetic valuation of individual objects cannot be completely reduced to rules or definitions, for the concrete individual contains more than any rule can encompass and cannot be defined qua individual by finite predication. This is the aesthetic uniqueness and dignity of individual objects, endowing them with a specific non-relativistic value as goods-in-themselves, regardless of whether they appear beautiful or ugly.
Ideal ethical evaluation (which can also be called "euergetic ethics," from euergeteô, "to do good") shares in aesthetic pluralism, although in relation to the purposes of persons. This was called "ideal" ethics by Nelson, but that implies too narrow a range for it. Everyone does good in their own way, and so ideal (or hortative) valuation is relative to everyone's own purposes and desires. This poses a difficulty for teleological systems of morality (such as Utilitarianism), which must prejudge and predetermine goods for others. Such goods cannot be prejudged. Hortative valuation reduces to aesthetic valuation in the sense that persons and their purposes form independent aesthetic wholes which are goods-in-themselves. The attainment of the "good life" or "happiness" is a condition that is both pleasurable and aesthetically satisfying to persons. How we can benevolently provide for the happiness for others when we cannot predetermine what they will find good or pleasurable makes for a general problem for hortative value (as it is often a problem when trying to buy Christmas presents). The moral framework of capitalism in the free market, as we will see, provides the answer to that problem.
It is awkward to call hortative or aesthetic value "relativistic," since this would seem to be saying that moral relativism is true, when actually moral relativism, just because of the existence of some moral absolutes, is false. It is therefore better to call hortative and aesthetic value "latitudinarian," since it allows a "latitude" of goods and denies that there is a best life or a supreme good across a range of goods for human life. That range is not unlimited as in strict relativism, and we might therefore say it is "relatively relativistic," which is a more honest relativism anyway. The term "latitudinarian" appropriately hearkens back to the progress of Toleration in the 17th century, when the legal enforcement of religious belief and public morality came to be restrained and moderated, especially in the Netherlands and England. The opposite of "latitudinarianism" is "rigorism," which is appropriate for morality as such, i.e. that there is no "latitude" or exceptions to the true moral rule. Although we may be restrained in practice because of our sense of ignorance in Socratic absolutism and Socratic situationism, morality as such admits of no exceptions.
Moral evaluation is a case of a non-relative good-in-itself embedded in aesthetic and ideal value: it is absolute and systematizable, reducible to the system of respect for the autonomy of persons. Morality fundamentally concerns the acceptable means towards the ends of action. Ideal ethics is the evaluation of ends, purposes, and consequences of action. Morality itself is a subcase of such ends. The force of evaluation of means and ends may become roughly balanced in that the force of obligation of morality, which is the only true obligation, stands over and against the existence of the consequences of action. The existence of bad consequences may be regarded as of significance comparable to the force of moral obligation to do what is right, creating moral dilemmas.
Ideal ethics contains not just goods as ends but also goods as non-moral virtues of character. These "hortative virtues" are often traditionally called moral virtues, but they really are not because they are not duties -- they are not commanded by morality. Hortative virtues may be goods for the self or goods for others. As goods for the self they are 
virtues of prudence. As goods for others they are virtues of manners or virtues of humanity. Virtues of prudence include all qualities, over and above moral virtues, that contribute to one's success in life with respect to one's own self-interest: thriftiness, sobriety, frugality, providence, reliability, forethought, industriousness, punctuality, enterprise, etc. [note]. Virtues of manners generally involve some consideration for others, especially for the feelings of others, over and above what is morally required: politeness, courtesy, kindness, etiquette, propriety, i.e. good manners. Virtues of humanity involve more substantial consideration for others, bestowing supererogatory benefits through compassion, charity, liberality, etc. Virtues of humanity are often thought of, not as hortative virtues, but as proper moral or legal obligations. This issue will be considered elsewhere in relation to non-contractual obligations of commission and moralistic altruism [note].
Good manners were an enormously important part of Confucian ethics (the virtue of 
, "propriety, etiquette, the rites") and previously of all proper upbringing. Politeness, however, took a direct hit in the 60's, where authenticity became the ideal, no matter how rude or crude. All sympathies then were in effect with the claim of the Tao Te Ching, the fundamental text of Taoism, that those who act on the basis of Confucian "propriety" are ready to resort to force if they cannot get their way.
A man of highest benevolence [
] acts, but from no ulterior motive. A man of the highest justice [
] acts, but from ulterior motive. A man most conversant in etiquette [] acts, but when no one responds, rolls up his sleeves and resorts to persuasion by force. Hence when the way [
, the Tao] was lost, there was virtue [Te , 
]; when virtue was lost, there was benevolence []; when benevolence was lost, there was justice []; when justice was lost, there was etiquette []. Etiquette is the wearing thin of conscientiousness [
] and sincerity [
] and the beginning of disorder [
]. [Chapter 38:82-83, trans. after D.C. Lau]
Note well that this is a criticism, not a statement, of Confucianism. Now it turns out that rude and crude people cause a lot of unnecessary friction and conflict. One response has been attempts to make lack of consideration for the feelings of others where racial or sexual relationships are concerned a moral or even a legal wrong ("hate speech"). This actually confirms the fears that Confucians are ready to resort to force (the coercion of law). Nevertheless, hortative virtues of good manners are real and important enough: neither insignificant as many thought in the 60's nor the proper matter of moral or legal sanction. Striking the balance may seem too subtle, but there is a real difference between what is merely, but actually, offensive and what is a moral wrong. It helps to appreciate that they are in polynomically distinct domains of value. The great traditional remedy to the rude and the crude was that they do not belong in polite company: we do not associate with them. If they persist in associating with us, against our wishes (coercion through harassment, stalking, etc.), then that is a moral and properly a legal wrong.
In my classes, anyone should feel that a relevant, sincere belief can be expressed about any matter, however offensive it may seem to some; but for there to be orderly discussion a certain level of civility must be maintained. That requires a certain exercise of good manners, without insults, personal hostility, etc. Otherwise, there may not be a moral or political crime, but there is a failure to have a viable forum for discussion or disputation; and I can ask anyone to leave who is not able to maintain decorum.
The independence of manners from moral goodness is revealed in life and in literature by people who have good manners but are morally evil, and by those with very bad manners who are morally good. An example of the former, now even the paradigmatic example, would be the cannibalistic murderer Hannibal Lecter of the novel and 1991 movie Silence of the Lambs. As played by Anthony Hopkins, Lecter is polite himself and expects it of others (or he kills and eats them). When he escapes from custody, the FBI agent who had been dealing with him, Clarice Starling (played by Jody Foster), is warned that he might come after her. She knows he won't, because "he would consider that rude."
A classic example of the opposite is Mr. Darcy in Jane Austin's immortal Pride and Prejudice. First encountering him at a dance, Elizabeth Bennett overhears him talking to his friend, Mr. Bingley. Darcy refuses to dance because, "there is not another woman in the room [besides Bingley's sisters], whom it would not be a punishment to me to stand up with" -- this within hearing of Elizabeth, who has sat out two dances for lack of a partner. When Bingley indicates Elizabeth herself, Darcy says:
'Which do you mean?' and turning round, he looked for a moment at Elizabeth, till catching her eye, he withdrew his own and coldly said, 'She is tolerable; but not handsome enough to tempt me; and I am in no humour at present to give consequence to young ladies who are slighted by other men....'
Darcy thus brutally offends the very woman with whom he will later fall in love, and who rejects his own proposal for marriage, a proposal so undiplomatically offered that Elizabeth responds,
'I might as well enquire,' replied she, 'why with so evident a design of offending and insulting me, you chose to tell me that you liked me against your will, against your reason, and even against your character?'
Darcy is shaken by this sudden revelation of how others could see him. Elizabeth also had gotten the impression that Darcy behaved badly in more substantial ways. This turned out to be wrong, and when Elizabeth came to discover that Darcy was, despite his manners, actually a very good man, she came to regret the haste and decidedness with which she had judged and rejected him. Meanwhile, however, Darcy took Elizabeth's view of his manner seriously and wished to redeem himself. Darcy learns to be more of a gentleman, and Elizabeth learns to wish that his attentions might be renewed, which, happily, they are. It is then Elizabeth's father who is astonished at the revolution, and Elizabeth must inform him, "He is perfectly amiable. You do not know what he really is..."
It always makes for interesting characters in fiction, or sometimes even in life, when they are other than they seem, and manners are how people first appear to and affect others. What this reveals here is the independent variability of polynomically independent categories of evaluation.
Continued in: The Fallacies of Moralism and Moral Aestheticism
Chinese Virtues
Typology of Chinese Virtues
Ethics
Value Theory
Home Page
The Polynomic Theory of Value, Note 1
| 1 | Temperance | Eat not to Dullness; Drink not to Elevation |
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| 2 | Silence | Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself;
Avoid trifling Conversation |
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| 3 | Order | Let all your Things have their Places;
Let each Part of your Business have its Time. |
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| 4 | Resolution | Resolve to perform what you ought;
Perform without fail what you resolve. |
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| 5 | Frugality | Make no Expense but to do good
to others or yourself: i.e. Waste nothing. |
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| 6 | Industry | Lose no Time. Be always employ'd in something useful.
Cut off all unncessary Actions. |
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| 7 | Sincerity | Use no hurtful Deceit. Think innocently and justly;
and, if you speak, speak accordingly. |
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| 8 | Justice | Wrong none, by doing Injuries or omitting
the Benefits that are your Duty. |
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| 9 | Moderation | Avoid Extremes. Forbear resenting Injuries
so much as you think they deserve. |
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| 10 | Cleanliness | Tolerate no Uncleanness in Body, Clothes or Habitation |
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| 11 | Tranquility | Be not disturbed by Trifles,
or at Accidents common or unavoidable. |
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| 12 | Chastity | Rarely use Venery but for Health or Offspring;
Never to Dullness, Weakness, or the Injury of your
own or another's Peace or Reputation. |
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| 13 | Humility | Imitate Jesus and Socrates. |
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The Boy Scout Law and the Seven Cardinal Virtues, given elsewhere, are examples of virtues that are both moral virtues and virtues of prudence. A list that is largely virtues of prudence is one made up by Benjamin Franklin, given at left, with Franklin's descriptions of what the virtues are about. The two Cardinal virtues that figure here are given in color. "Temperance" already has much of its purely modern meaning, about drinking, and so "Moderation" is highlighted as more like the traditional meaning.
Franklin's intention was to concentrate on each virtue a week at a time to try and perfect himself. Originally there were twelve in the table, but Franklin added "humility" when friends pointed out that it had been omitted. The virtue with the longest description, Chastity, may be the one with which Franklin had the most trouble -- he had an illegitimate child just before his marriage, and later lived many years in England without his wife but not without, it seems, female companionship. Franklin later became famous (or infamous) for his liaisons while he was the American representative in France during the Revolutionary War (which scandalized John and Abigail Adams), but these now mostly seem harmless flirtations, since Franklin was too old and ill, and his lovers too diffident, for matters to go very far.
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The Polynomic Theory of Value, Note 2
The Chinese virtues shown in this diagram match up nicely not only with the categories of virtues shown (including virtues of moral intention) but with a typology that can be constructed around Chinese and Kantian ethics.
Here I might address the issue treated by Plato in the Republic: Why be just? In other words, what reason have we got to be good and do the right? Or, in the morality of intentions, why should we mean well, be of good faith and good will, and try to do the right thing? What purpose does it serve?
Plato's own answer is actually one of Prudence: To be happy. The just man is the happy man, or "virtue is its own reward," as the Stoics would subsequently assert. Perhaps feeling that not everyone would believe this, Plato added, to gain reward and avoid punishment in the afterlife. This becomes a popular reason to motivate morality, as we find Jesus saying, "But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou has shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly" [Matthew 6:6]. A reward in life or in Heaven is the promise of Christianity and other religions, as we also see through the doctrine of karma.
The answer we find in Kant and in Confucius is rather different, that We do what is right for its own sake, just because it is right. Kant's calls this the "categorical imperative," a command without ulterior motive or self-interested purpose. We also see something similar expressed in the Bhagavad Gita, where Krishna says, "Set thy heart upon thy work, but never on its reward. Work not for a reward; but never cease to do thy work" [2:47]. The idea that goodness earns a Reward in Heaven Krishna dismisses with, "...their heaven is a selfish desire...the reward of which is earthly rebirth" [2:43].
A third motive for right action might be Embarrassment. Propriety is about appearances. You avoid wrongful action because you might not want people to think ill of your family, your parents, or perhaps your origins. There is a saying in Japanese, that when you are away from home, the neighbors do not know what you are doing. This is often said to express the standards of a culture of shame rather than of guilt. What you may have done is of no concern, as long as people think well of you. You have your honor to uphold, which means that an insult may be more objectionable than substantive harm to person or property. Insult, by you or to you, is avoided through good manners.
A fourth motive for right action is Sympathy. This eloquently stated by Schopenhauer, who says, "All love (agápê, caritas) is compassion or sympathy" [The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, §66, Dover Publications, 1966, E.F.J. Payne translation, p.374]:
...such a man, recognizing in all beings his own true and innermost self, must also regard the endless sufferings of all that lives as his own, and thus take upon himself the pain of the whole world. No suffering is any longer strange or foreign to him. [ibid., §68, p.379]
This is not unfamiliar from Confucius, who says that is to "Love others" [Analects 12:22], or Jesus, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" [Matthew 19:19]. Now, one cannot choose how to feel, so love as a feeling cannot be morally commanded. While love may motivate moral action, it is not a duty and is not choice, so, as Kant says, "this by itself cannot be reckoned as a particular merit of the person." It is just the way they are. If, however, one does feel sympathy for others, then the motive for moral action is obvious: to avoid inflicting pain.
The basic answer to Plato's question is that one does what is right just because it is right. The other motives, prudence, propriety, and sympathy, are indeed goods, but they are not duties and are not morally laudable. Since they are not duties, someone may not think that there are good reasons why they should even care about them. Prudence is an appeal to self-interest, and that may actually strike many as a motivation contrary to morality, which limits self-interest. Propriety means worrying about what other people think, but the judgments and perhaps the bigotries of others are no sure guide to value. As Richard Feynman's wife told him, "What do you care what other people think?" Finally, sympathy, while it seems the humane accompaniment to moral action, which might seem rather cold otherwise, is not necessary to it and may actually lead one astray with an indulgent attitude towards the moral weaknesses of others. The naively sympathetic person can be manipulated by others who have learned to avoid responsibility by appearing helpless. The proper response to that may appear distinctly unsympathetic, i.e. "tough love." One would certainly be accused of being uncaring.
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