Six Domains of thePolynomic System of Value
Six Domains of theThe table below summarizes the theory of the polynomic or polynomological system of value, where most domains of value are subsumed under larger domains. Each encompassing domain is ontologically stronger and deeper, but each nested domain is logically stronger and has a more definable content. Note that every form of value is a good, even though "good and bad" are specifically listed for non-moral ethical goods. There are also non-moral uses for "right and wrong," as one says of a mathematical mistake, "That's not right," or asks the mechanic, "What's wrong with my car?" The diagram above at right gives the elements of the table in terms of the underlying system of metaphysics explained elsewhere.
| THE ABSOLUTE GOOD | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| THE PHENOMENAL GOOD | Religion, the sacred and the polluted: the view of transcendent reality or of the ultimate meaning of all existence, free of space and time, and the meaning of death; no rational content; not subject to non- contradiction; forms of obligation completely historical and contingent apart from subsumption of forms of value listed below: obligation: pietatives (religious obligations, of piety) | ||||
| ETHICS | Aesthetics, the beautiful and the ugly: theory of art & beauty, the worth of things independent of human purposes, "disinterested" value, the worth of nature, the relation of value and being, things good-in- themselves. Pluralistic and relativistic aesthetic variety, limited by forms of obligation below and by indefinable principles of taste: obligation: optatives (wishes) | ||||
| MORALITY | Ideal Ethics, the good and the bad: non-moral worth in human life, the good of teleological ethics, the worth and meaning of life--happiness, fulfillment, material well being, pleasure etc.--things good-for-us. Pluralistic and relativistic aesthetic variety, limited by forms of obligation below and specified by personal preference: obligation: hortatives (exhortations) | ||||
| PERSONS | Morality of things, right and wrong: ethics of property, contract, government, and public order; moral force of legislation, restricted by requirements of morality of persons & subject to utilitarian falsification on the basis of ideals; liberties and duties of the marketplace and of public life; bridge between hortatives and imperatives: obligation: jussives (commands) | ||||
| WILL | Morality of actions, right and wrong: ethics of justice and injustice; evaluation of actions in their own right; causes of judicial penalty and retribution. obligation: imperatives | ||||
| Morality of intentions, good and ill will: ethics of intention and virtue; moral evaluation of intentions; "mere" morality: obligation: imperatives (commands) | |||||
Since each domain of value can vary independently of the others,
| WILL | ACTION | OBJECTS | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PERSONS | THINGS | GOODS | BEAUTY | RELIGION | |
 |  |  |  |  |  |
| INTERNAL | EXTERNAL | ||||
The effect of this, of course, is that good intentions do not necessarily lead to right action or to good consequences -- "the path to Hell is paved with good intentions". The protection of personal rights may, nevertheless, violate property rights, or the other way around. Beautiful things, or good art, may be, in some sense, bad things (e.g. The Triumph of the Will). And, as a saying goes in Japanese, "even a fish head can be an object of veneration," i.e. some ugly, nasty object may be sacred. This independent variation is what produces ethical dilemmas.
| WILL | ACTION | OBJECTS | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PERSONS | THINGS | GOODS | BEAUTY | RELIGION | |
 |  |  |  |  |  |
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