, ISLAMIC BYZANTIUM, 1453-1922, Era of Diocletian 1170-1639, 469 years
V. FIFTH EMPIRE, OTTOMANS
| Osmanli Oghullarï | |
|---|---|
| 'Osman I | 1290-1326 |
|
defeats Romans near Nicomedia, Ottoman conquest begins, 1302; Seljuks overthrown, 1307; Bursa [Prusa] taken, 1326 | |
| Orkhân | 1326-1359 |
| defeats Andronicus III, 1329; I.znik [Nicaea] taken, 1331; I.zmid [Nicomedia] taken, 1337; Gelibolu [Kallipolis] taken, 1354; Ankara [Angora] taken, 1354 | |
| Murâd I | 1359-1389 |
| Edirne [Adrianople] taken, 1369; Konya [Iconium] taken, 1387; Thessalonica taken, 1387; battle of Kosovo, "Field of the Blackbirds," Sult.ân killed defeating Serbs, 1389 | |
| Bâyezîd I Yïldïrïm, the "Thunderbolt" | 1389-1402 |
| seige of Constantinople, 1394-1402; Battle of Nicopolis, Sigismund of Hungary defeated, 1396; Battle of Ankara, Sult.ân defeated, captured & imprisoned by Tamerlane, 1402 | |
| Meh.med I | 1402-1421 |
| Civil War, 1402-1413, between Meh.med, Süleymân, & Mûsâ; Thessalonica ceded to Romania, 1403 | |
| Murâd II | 1421-1451 |
| Seige of Constantinople, 1422; Thessalonica captured from Venice, 1430 | |
| Meh.med II Fâtih. the "Conqueror" | 1451-1481 |
| I.stanbul [Constantinople] taken, 1453; conquest of Bosnia, 1463; Khanate of Crimea becomes a Vassal, 1475; Seige of Rhodes repulsed, 1480 | |
| Bâyezîd II | 1481-1512 |
| Selîm I Yavuz, "the Grim" | 1512-1520 |
| Conquest of Syria and Egypt, 1516-1517 | |
| Süleymân I, the Magnificent | 1520-1566 |
| Fall of Rhodes, 1523; Battle of Mohács, Conquest of Hungary, death of Louis II of Hungary & Bohemia, 1526; First Siege of Vienna, 1529; Conquest of Mesopotamia, 1534; Appeal arrives from Sult.ân of Acheh for aid against the Portuguese, 1563; Siege of Malta, 1565 | |
| Selîm II | 1566-1574 |
| Peace of Adrianople, tribute from Austria, 1568; conquest of Cyprus, 1571; Battle of Lepanto, naval defeat by Spain, Venice, & Malta, 1571 | |
| Murâd III | 1574-1595 |
| inconclusive war with Austria, 1593-1606 | |
| Meh.med III | 1595-1603 |
| Ah.med I | 1603-1617 |
| Mus.t.afâ I | 1617-1618 |
| 'Osmân II | 1618-1622 |
| Ah.med I (restored) | 1622-1623 |
| Murâd IV | 1623-1640 |
| Ibrâhîm | 1640-1648 |
| Meh.med IV | 1648-1687 |
| Naval defeat by Venice & Malta at Dardanelles, 1656; War with Austria, 1663-1664; Conquest of Crete from Venice, 1669; Second Siege of Vienna, 1683; Austrian conquest of Hungary, 1686-1697 | |
| Süleymân II | 1687-1691 |
| Parthenon destroyed in explosion, 1687 | |
| Ah.med II | 1691-1695 |
| Mus.t.afâ II | 1695-1703 |
| Russia takes Azov, 1696; Loss of Hungary, 1697; Peace of Karolwitz, 1699 | |
| Ah.med III | 1703-1730 |
| Recovery of Azov, 1711; War with Austria, 1716-1718; Loss of Banat, Serbia, & Little Wallachia, 1716-1718; Peace of Passarowitz, 1718 | |
| Mah.mud I | 1730-1754 |
| War with Austria, Recovery of Serbia & Wallachia, 1737-1739; Peace of Belgrade, 1739 | |
| 'Osmân III | 1754-1757 |
| Mus.t.afâ III | 1757-1774 |
| 'Abdül-H.amîd I | 1774-1789 |
| Russian conquest of Crimea, 1774-1783 | |
| Selîm III | 1789-1807 |
| Odessa annexed by Russia, 1791; Revolt of Serbs, 1804-1813; Russian invasion, occupation of Moldavia & Wallachia, 1806-1812; Sult.ân overthrown by Janissaries, 1807 | |
| Mus.t.afâ IV | 1807-1808 |
| Mah.mûd II | 1808-1839 |
| Treaty of Bucharest, Russia ceded Bessarabia, 1812; Serbian autonomy, 1813; Greek Revolt, 1821-1829; Sult.ân massacres Janissaries, 1826; Russian invasion, occupation of Moldavia & Wallachia, 1828-1829; Treaty of Adrianople, Greek Independence, Danube Delta to Russia, autonomy of Moldavia & Wallachia, 1829 | |
| 'Abdül-Mejîd I | 1839-1861 |
| Crimean War, 1853-1856; Russian invasion, 1853; Britain, France, & Austria enter against Russia, 1854; Austria occupies Moldavia & Wallachia, 1854-1857; Siege of Sebastopol, 1854-1855; Peace of Paris, recovery of Danube Delta, Wallachia & Moldavia combined as Romania, with part of Bessarabia, 1856 | |
| 'Abdül-'Azîz | 1861-1876 |
| Revolts in Bosnia & Bulgaria, 1875-1876 | |
| Murâd V | 1876 |
| 'Abdül-H.amîd II, "the Damned" | 1876-1909 |
| Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; Congress of Berlin, Serbia, Romania, & Montenegro Independent, Bulgaria autonomous, Bessarabia to Russia, Dobruja to Romania, Cyprus to Britain, Bosnia, Herzegovina & Novipazar, Austrian Protectorate, 1878; British Occupy Egypt, 1882; Bulgaria annexes East Rumelia, 1885; Revolt of the Young Turks, 1908, Sult.ân overthrown | |
| Meh.med V | 1909-1918 |
| First Balkan War, 1912-1913; Italy occupies Libya & the Dodecanese, 1912; Second Balkan War, recovery of Adrianople, 1913; World War I, 1914-1918 | |
| Meh.med VI | 1918-1922 |
| Armenian Republic conquered, 1920-1921; Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922 | |
| 'Abdül-Mejîd II | Caliph only, 1922-1924 |
The Sultânate of Rûm had been dormant for some years, failing even to capitalize on the victory of Myriocephalum (1176). After vassalage to the Mongols (1243), the domain finally disintegrated (1307). Meanwhile, however, the Turkish presence in Anatolia was actually invigorated with refugees from the Mongol advance. The new domains that resulted were the Oghullar or "sons" of Rûm. These included many ghuzâh (sing. ghâzin), or fighters for Islâm (otherwise mujâhidûn), particularly frontier fighters. 'Osman Ghâzî (now just Osman Gazi) found himself on the frontier of Roman Bithynia, across from his Christian military counterparts, the akritai (sing. akritês). He defeated the Roman army at Bapheus in 1302 but is best remembered for breaking through into Bithynia and captured Prusa (1326), which became Bursa, the first capital of the Ottoman Emirate.
"Osman" is from Arabic 'Uthman, the name of the Third Caliph. With the /th/ becoming a /t/, we get "Ottoman," henceforth the name of the dynasty of Osman.
Thereafter Ottoman progress was steady and often spectacular. The most fateful moment may have been in 1354, when Turkish forces were ferried across to Europe to help in a war between Venice and Genoa. I think John Cantacuzenus was responsible for this. When Orkhân took Kallipolis, to become "Gelibolu" in Turkish but better known as "Gallipoli" in Italian, the Ottomans achieved a fateful foothold in Europe whose importance would still echo in World War I -- and still belongs to Turkey today. While Ankara would be taken in the same year, this is not a city that would be of political importance until Atatürk chose it to be the capital many years later. Instead, when Adrianople was captured in 1369, the Ottomans transferred their capital there from Bursa. The Ottoman capital was now on the continent of Europe, where it would remain, with a switch to Constantinople, all the rest of the dynasty. In short order Turkey became a European as much or more than an Asian power, a duality that persists, even when Turkey's modern holdings in Europe are a shadow of the former Empire. 
As the Anatolian Roman Empire was known in Arabic and Turkish as Rûm, intitial Ottoman possessions in Europe became Rumelia.
Steady Ottoman conquest and victory suffered a stunning setback in 1402. Bâyezîd I, known as the "Thunderbolt" (Yïldïrïm), who had obtained a diploma from the Abbasid Caliph in Egypt as Sult.ân of Rûm, was defeated and captured by Tamerlane at the Battle of Ankara. He died in captivity, Tamerlane restored some of the Oghullar, and Bâyezîd's sons, whimsically named after the founders of Judaism, Christianity, and Islâm, fell out among each other in a fraternal civil war (note that 'Îsâ is Arabic for Jesus, as Mûsâ is for Moses). With poetic suitability, Meh.med I, named, of course, after Muh.ammad, won the Throne. He then initiated a grim Ottoman custom. New Sult.âns henceforth, until 1603, murdered all their many brothers (of their polygamous fathers) to prevent such civil wars. This had a more durable evil effect. Ottoman heirs were raised as prisoners in the Harem, with no exposure to the outside world or real political education. Even a Sult.ân without rivals, and even a Sult.ân who no longer murdered his brothers, would have little of the knowledge or experience to be an effective ruler. It is hard to know how much this contributed to Ottoman stagnation and decline, but the effect was likely considerable.
It took a couple of generations for the Ottomans to recover from Tamerlane. When a young Meh.med II came to the Throne, however, the Empire was ready and the new Sult.ân went straight for Constantinople. On May 29, 1453, its walls breached for the first time by modern cannonballs, Constantinople fell -- exactly 1123 years and 19 days after the City was dedicated by Constantine I on May 11, 330 AD. The last Roman Emperor, Constantine XI, died anonymously in the fighting. 
His body may or may not have been recovered, leading to legends that he still sleeps under the Golden Gate of modern Istanbul. Europeans now seem loath to admit, as contemporaries then were well aware, that this was the last of the Roman Empire (Romania), which had effectively guarded the flank of Christendom and preserved the heritage of Classical Civilization all through the Middle Ages. With the Ottomans already on the Danube, there was nothing left to block their advance into Central Europe.
At Meh.med II's death, the Ottoman Empire looked much the way Romania had in the 11th Century. Selîm I "the Grim" did what the old Emperors had never been able to do, restore Syria and Egypt to the empire (from the Mamlûks). Süleimân I then added areas that had never been permanent parts of the Roman Empire, Iraq and Hungary. Picking up the Roman conflict with Irân, the Turks for the first time since Alexander the Great removed Iraq from Iranian possession (the map shows the pre-Safavid Aq Qoyunlu or White Sheep Turks). The conquest of Hungary was the first penetration of Islâm into Francia since the conquest of Spain.
)
The Ottoman Empire was at its height for about 150 years. It had at that point, however, reached the limits beyond which it could not easily project its power. One reason for this was that much of the Ottoman army, like Medaeval armies, was still a matter of temporary annual levies. No modern conquests could have been made at all with such an army, but the spearhead of the Ottoman military consisted of the famous Janissaries (Turkish Yeniçeri, "new soldiers"). This was a corps of wholly modern outfit and training, at least for the 15th and 16th centuries. However, it was also limited in size by a very Mediaeval aspect of its constitution: Its ranks were filled with slave boys taken from Christian families in the Caucasus, largely Circassians, and converted to Islâm. The use of slave troops for an Imperial guard went back to Abbasids and was currently the practice, as it had been for centuries, of the Mamlûks in Egypt (where mamlûk means "possessed," i.e. a slave). The ultimate threat of such an elite body of troops is always that it will become a Praetorian Guard whose interest is more political and personal than it is faithful and disinterested. Thus, while Abbasid Caliphs were sometimes prisoners of their guards, the Mamlûks had actually overthrown their original employers, the Ayyûbid Sult.âns, and replaced them. The height of the evil influence of the Janissaries may be when they overthrew the reforming Sult.ân Selîm III in 1807. They met their end in 1826 when the vigorous Sult.ân Mah.mûd II turned the guns of his new artillery corps on the Janissary barracks and massacred them. It would prove difficult, however, for the Ottomans to find a replacement, since an effective modern military depended on an effective modern economy, which the Ottomans would really never have. In World War I Turkish soldiers would prove themselves tough and even formidable, given proper equipment, leadership, and support -- but these were often lacking.
From the 16th to the 17th centuries, conflict continued with Austria and with Christian powers in the Mediterranean, but respective holdings didn't change much. The Sult.ân Ah.mad Mosque, or the Blue Mosque, adjacent to the site of the old Hippodrome of Constantinople, is a fitting symbol of the achievement and confidence of this period. The long delayed fall of Crete in 1669 (from Venice) then seemed like the portent of renewed conquests. The energetic Köprülü vizirs planned a new assault, after 150 years, against Vienna in 1683. But this turned into a disaster, suddenly revealing the relative weakness that had actually overcome the Empire. Even a de facto alliance with friendly France, the greatest power of the day, could not prevent a series of defeats, the loss of Hungary, and the temporary loss of southern Greece to Venice (when the Parthenon would be destroyed).
It is noteworthy at the beginning of the 17th century that Ottoman Sult.âns ceased to murder their brothers on accession. Henceforth the Throne passes, by Middle Eastern custom, to brothers and even to cousins before going to the next generation.
The threat of continuous defeat, which the beginning of the 18th century seemed to display, receded somewhat. Austria would not advance deeper into the Balkans and there was some breathing room. Nevertheless, the Ottomans were now facing the problem of catching up with the technological advances of Europe, even of relatively backward Russia, which it was in no way prepared to tackle. The problem was not any particular hostility to modern commercial culture -- merchants and markets were perfectly respectable characteristics of Middle Eastern Islâmic civilization -- but a very profound social conservativism, a satisfaction with the Mediaeval forms of life, prevented any of this from developing into modern institutions of banking, industry, and entrepreneurship. Like the Chinese, the Turks literally did not believe there was anything new to learn, much less from despised Unbelievers. The bustle and excitement of the great Istanbul Bazaar thus never led to the explosion of energy and production that was already characteristic of the Netherlands and other places in Western Europe. Turkey would always be playing catch-up but would then never actually catch up. Institutional reforms, when they were even tried, still could never go deep enough, could never actually produce a people striving and inquisitive beyond their previous habits. Peter the Great faced similar problems with another conservative society about the same time.
At the beginning of the 19th century, as Napoleon surged back and forth across Europe, the subject Christians of the Balkans became more and more restless, and Russia began to try again and again to retrieve Constantinople for Christendom and break through the Straits. The Ottomans, although achieving some successes, were not going to be able to resist this. The Empire's status as the "Sick Man of Europe" was now becoming quite established. It was Realpolitik that came to the rescue of the Sult.ân: Britain did not want Russia to be too successful and so entered into a long policy of supporting the Turks against the forces, from Russia or Egypt or wherever, that might result in the collapse of Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, Britain could not allow too much oppression of subject Christians, and as the century wore on, small Christian states, from Serbia to Greece to Bulgaria, were allowed autonomy and then independence by the agreement of the Great Powers. This did not get any of them all they wanted, and it certainly limited Russian gains, but it kept the geo-political dam from bursting and kept the Sult.ân from falling off his Throne. When Turkey joined the Central Powers in World War I, however, Britain would have had good reason to regret its policy.
Finally, it was the internal forces of Turkey that began to shake things up after a pattern that would become all too familiar in "underdeveloped" countries later: A military coup, the "Young Turks," against the detested Sult.ân 'Abdül-Hamîd II, known as "the Damned," in 1908. This did not help much when the Balkan states fell on Turkey in the First Balkan War of 1912. 
The choice of Germany as a European ally would then be fatal for the Ottoman future. Another ill effect was the transformation of the Mediaeval Cause of Islâm into a more modern Turkish nationalism. This did not work well, and never would, with the Arabs, Armenians, and Kurds living within Turkish borders. The disaffection of the first exploded in a pro-Allied revolt in World War I. Suspicion about the second led to shameful deportation and massacre about the same time. And conflict with the third continues, with campaigns of terrorism and suppression, even today. Woodrow Wilson impotently called for an independent Armenia state, in an area where there were by then few Armenians left, and soon almost none after Turkey pushed the Armenian Republic back east of the Araks (Aras) River in 1920. No Power has called for an independent Kurdish state. Meanwhile, the British and French were perfectly happy to detach the Arab lands from the Empire, not for independence, to be sure, but to further British and French imperial projects. This turned out to be more trouble than it was worth, especially when the Zionist colonization of Palestine, allowed by the British, led to the creation of Israel and to a conflict, including five major wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982), that continues until today. The settlement of World War I has thus been aptly called "the peace to end all peace."
The great Topkapï Palace occupies an area that was originally the acropolis of Byzantium. Constantine curiously left this site alone, perhaps out of persistent respect for the old gods. I am only aware of one Mediaeval institution in the area, the Church and Monastery of St. George of Mangana. The circuit wall of the Topkapï grounds essentially encompasses all of ancient Byzantium. The original Imperial Palace of the Emperors of Mediaeval Romania, the Great Palace, entered by the Chalke or Brazen Gate from the square of the Augusteum [Augusteion], was south of the Church of Hagia Sophia, down past the area of the present Sultan Ah.mad Mosque -- adjacent to the Hippodrome, where the Emperor's box was connected to the Palace -- all the way to the Sea of Marmara. Some excavation has uncovered floors and substructures in the Great Palace, which consisted of a number of buildings and so could even be construed as consisting of multiple palaces. One of those, with its own harbor on the Sea of Marmara, was the Bucoleon [Boukoleon] Palace, which sometimes gives its name to the whole of the Great Palace. "Topkapï" means the "Gate of the Cannon," literally the "Cannon [Top], its [ï] Gate [Kapï]." This may refer to the same Palace Gate that gave its name to the whole Ottoman Government, the "Sublime Porte." Thus, as today people speak of the "White House" for American government, or "Downing Street" for the British, which hearken back to calling the Emperor of Japan the "Mikado," 
, which simply means the "Honorable Gate," or the King of Egypt "Pharaoh," 
, the "Great House," the Ottoman government could simply be called "the Porte." Then, just as the last of the Roman Emperors moved to the Blachernae Palace by the city walls (leaving the Great Palace, by the time of the Palaeologi, to decay), the last Ottoman Sult.âns preferred the Dolmabahçe Palace on the Bosporus, where below we see Kaiser Wilhelm II on his visit.
Today one of the sights of Istanbul is the Fatih Camii (Fâtih. Jâmi-i), the "Conqueror's Mosque." This contains the tomb of Meh.med II, with a dedicated mosque, school, hospice, and (formerly) caravansaray. It stands on the site of the Church of the Holy Apostles, which was the burial place of the Emperor Constantine I and subsequent Emperors of Romania. Already in ruinous disrepair in 1453 (though the seat of the Patriarch of Constantinople, 1453-1455), it is not clear what the fate of all the Imperial burials was. Tombs that were above ground are certainly gone, and some anonymous sarcophagi survive at the Istanbul Archaeological Museum. The bases of some of the original walls of the Church, however, have been identified; and I wonder if burials below ground or in a crypt may actually have simply been covered over by the later construction, the way the Imperial mosaics in Sancta Sophia were simply whitewashed, preserving them for modern display [note]. A great deal of Roman Constantinople actually survives underground and invisible in modern Istanbul. What the Church of the Holy Apostles probably looked like can still be seen in a probable copy, St. Mark's in Venice.
The spelling of the names of the Ottomans is intended to indicate both the Turkish pronunciation and how they are spelled in Arabic (which no longer matters, since Turkish 
is no longer written in the Arabic alphabet, but is of historical interest). Here I have pretty much followed the usage of the Cambridge History of Islam. 
A good example is the name of the Conqueror of Constantinople, Meh.med II. This name is Muh.ammad in Arabic but is actually pronounced Mehmet in Turkish -- which is an Altaic language that is entirely unrelated to Arabic. Obviously, some compromises are made and the system is not perfect. In general, the consonants look Arabic and the vowels Turkish. Since Turkish (and Persian) reads the Arabic alphabet with three s's (Arabic s, s., and th) and four z's (Arabic z, z., d., and dh), some attempt is made to differentiate (e.g. with s for th). Modern Turkish writes c for English j and ç for English ch, but the English equivalents are used here, since most people will be completely unfamiliar with the conventions of Turkish orthography.
The main reason that Arabic writing did not work well for Turkish was the Turkish vowel system. Where Classical Arabic 
had three short and three long vowels, and Persian could match its six vowels with those, Turkish has eight vowels, as shown at left (in the official Romanization). The most intriguing thing about Turkish vowels is the system of vowel harmony. Related Ural-Altaic languages, like Mongolian and even Hungarian (though some dispute the reality of the Ural-Altaic family, or even the Altaic family, or whether Korean and Japanese are Altaic members), also have vowel harmony, but this seems to appear in Turkish in its most complete, logical, and elegant form. The rules are simply, (1) front vowels are followed by front vowels (e.g. i by e), back vowels by back vowels (e.g. u by a), (2) unrounded vowels are followed by unrounded vowels (e.g. i by e), and (3) rounded vowels are followed by high rounded (e.g. o by u) or low unrounded vowels (e.g. o by a). 
There are Turkish grammatical inflections in which the vowel is supposed to be simply either high or low, with its character otherwise determined by the preceding vowels in the word. This all was impossible to show in the Arabic alphabet without a special notation that might have been developed but, evidently, never was. There are many words in Turkish that violate vowel harmony, but by this they can be identified as foreign loan words -- for example islâm (instead of *islem), from Arabic, and istanbul (instead of *istenbil), from Greek or Arabic.
In the first book I had about Turkish, Teach Yourself Books, Turkish [St. Paul's House, Warwick Lane, London, 1953, 1975], the author, G.L. Lewis, specifically ridicules Hagopian's Ottoman-Turkish Conversation- Grammar of 1907 because, out of 215 pages, it devoted 161 to Arabic and Persian [p.vi]. Well, I have gone to some trouble to get a copy of Hagopian's Ottoman-Turkish Conversation-Grammar, and it is a very fine book. 
The section on Arabic and Persian is very much as though every English grammar book came along with Donald M. Ayers' English words from Latin and Greek elements [University of Arizona Press, 1986], which I encountered as the textbook for a popular class at the University of Texas on the Greek and Latin contributions to English. As it happens, of course, fewer and fewer American students are even taught English grammar, much less enough Greek or Latin to understand or appreciate its use of them. This is not a virtue. Nor is the nationalistic enthusiasm that seeks to purge languages of "foreign" words, which has happened in Turkish, German, French, Hungarian, and elsewhere. This kind of thing is simply an attempt to purge history itself -- along with a ugly attempt to sharpen ethnic identities and differences.
Later, Geoffrey Lewis appears to have thought better of his ridicule. Subsequent editions of Teach Yourself Turkish cut down on the dismissive remarks; and recently Lewis has published The Turkish Language Reform, A Catastrophic Success [Oxford, 1999, 2002]. Here we learn about the artificial coinages, supposedly "true" Turkish, and the confusion that has now alienated modern Turkey from its own heritage, the best of Ottoman literature. Indeed, the writings of Kemal Atatürk himself have needed more than once to be "translated" into New(er) Turkish. At a literary or technical level usage still sometimes shifts between an Arabic word, a "Turkish" neologism, or French, just to make sure that everyone can recognize one of the words. Lewis's own Turkish Grammar [Oxford, 1967, 2000] provides information to enable people to read the Ottoman language. It probably is too late to deliberately go back, but, like German returning to Telefon from Fernsprecher, perhaps Turkish usage will drift back to more of its Persian and Arabic heritage. This need have nothing to do with Islamicization, merely with remembering the history of the language.
| Turkish Republic, 1923; Presidents | |
|---|---|
| Mustafa Kemal, (1934) Atatürk | 1923-1938 |
| Ismet Inönü | 1938-1950 |
| France cedes Alexandretta & Antioch, 1939 | |
| Celal Bayar | 1950-1960 |
| Kemal Gürcel | 1961-1966 |
| Cevdet Sunay | 1966-1973 |
| Fahri Korutürk | 1973-1980 |
| Kenan Evren | 1980-1989 |
| Turgut Özal | 1989-1993 |
| Süleyman Demirel | 1993-2000 |
| Ahmet Necdet Sezer | 2000-2007 |
| Abdullah Gül | 2007-present |
who adopted the surname Atatürk, "Father of the Turks." Kemal had achieved fame during World War I with his epic defense of Gallipoli against the British, telling his men at one point, "I am not asking you to fight; I am asking you to die." With no concessions to Greeks, Armenians, or Kurds, Atatürk nevertheless abandoned most imperial aspirations. Giving up the Arabic alphabet and traditional costume (indeed, making their use even a capital offense), deposing the Ottomans, and otherwise trying to make Turkey a European, rather than a Middle Eastern, state, Atatürk simply hoped to make it the equal of other modern powers. To a considerable extent he succeeded, though Turkey is still haunted by the shadow of the military dictatorship that he himself represented, by the threat of militant Islâm, whose mediaevalism is fully triumphant in neighboring Irân, and by the disaffection of the Kurds, whose very existence was legally denied for many years. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the strongest state in the region, to the chagrin of neighboring Arabs and Christians alike. Long a member of NATO, Turkey looks foward to membership in the European Community, but still has little embarrassments like the common use of torture by police. Thus, despite Atatürk, we still have several respects in which Turkey is posed between East and West, Mediaeval and Modern, Islâm and secularism, liberalism and oppression. The application of Turkey to the European Union has been defered, but will be considered in a couple of years.The term of Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer ended on 16 May 2007, but a new President was not elected until August. The most likely candidate and eventual President, Abdullah Gül, from an Islamic Party 
(and with a wife who wears a headscarf), drew wide protest (as shown) from everyone who wished to preserve the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. There was even a warning from the Army, which has deposed the government four times since 1960, that it may not tolerate any compromise to Atatürk's ideal of secular government. The Islamic threat would seem to justify the reluctance of the European Union to expedite the admission of Turkey, an attitude that some Turks regard as simple racism. However, the defeat of the Islamic forces in Turkey should remove some European reservations. The actual election of Gül leaves all these issues rather up in the air. There is no doubt, however, that any moves toward Islamicization could provoke even a violent response from the secular population and the Army.
In March 2008 the Chief Prosecutor of Turkey's Constitutional Court filed a motion to abolish the political party of President Gül, the AK Party, and for a time ban members, like him, from serving in political office. The basis of this is the religious basis and program of the Party. At this point there are also other, equally troubling, complaints about the behavior of the government. If the Court abolishes the party, which seems quite possible, it would forestall a coup by the Army but could also precipitate violence by supporters, who won 46.6% of the vote in 2007. This is certainly the modern dilemma in Islamic countries, where democracy itself threatens the state with the forces of religious reaction. Where in Irân religious government was at first popular, opposition candidates are now kept off the ballot and it is too late for a peaceful return to secular government. In Turkey, however, Atatürk still has more influence than any living Shâh.
In historical perspective, however, it is not clear to what extent the ancient peoples even still existed by the time of the Turkish arrival. Greek assimilation, i.e. Hellenization, of Anatolian peoples had been progressing steadily for centuries, and Turkish settlement in comparison doesn't necessarily look all that different -- indeed, the surge in the Turkish population in the 13th and 14th centuries involved people fleeing the terror of the Mongols. They were refugees. Given the religious cause that the Ottomans thought they were vindicating, the Fall of Constantinople, far from sad, was one of the supreme moments of achievement in the history of Islâm. A Western, or a modern liberal, evaluation will not give that much weight, but it is not hard to imagine that the sensation it created in Islâm was not much different from that in Christendom at the capture of Jerusalem by the First Crusade, or the completion of the Reconquista in Spain. These are similarly denigrated by modern liberal opinion, but it is hard to imagine how the values at the time could have been different -- and everyone should guard against an anachronistic moral indignation (which liberal opinion tends to focus on the Crusades rather than on any Islamic Conquest, for which Islâm usually seems more excused than Christianity -- an example of the selective judgment of moralistic relativism).
The subsequent Ottoman Empire features the goods and evils characteristic of most empires, and some peculiar to those of the Middle East -- e.g. the refuge provided for Spanish Jews in 1492 (with Spanish speaking Jews living today in Turkey), as against the slavery and forced conversion of Christian children for the Janissary corps. Evils specific to nationalism emerged later, like the aforementioned genocide of Armenians and the continuing suppression of the Kurds, an Iranian people who happen to be Orthodox Moslems like the Turks. The Turks are not uniquely at fault for this, and the solution is a kind of society (liberal and capitalistic) upon which few in the world entirely agree, even in the ethnic plurality of societies like the United States. Turkey now has an especially tough time with its own identity as it is torn between the Islamic fundamentalist revival seen elsewhere and the secularism that Kemal Atatürk made the foundation of the modern state in the 1920's. None of this may make Turkey particularly lovable, but it does make the Turks mostly like anybody else; and modern Turkey has a large of population of people who seem all but indistinguishable from secular Europeans -- and reasonably disinclined to be blamed for the sins of the past. Turkey has a history that has its horrors but, indeed, also its own bit of romance and magnificience: a desire to surpass Sancta Sophia (still called Aya Sofya in Turkish, after the Greek version of the name, Hagia Sophia) produced a series of some of the most beautiful mosques in Islâm, which have inspired much of subsequent Islâmic architecture (the standard doomed mosque, starting with Muh.ammad 'Alî's Alabaster Mosque in Cairo) [note].
A discussion of general sources for this material is given under Francia and Islâm. Some additional sources include The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia (John Channon with Rob Hudson, 1995), and various prose histories, such as The Ottoman Centuries (Lord Kinross, Morrow Quill, 1977).
Modern Romania, Ottoman Successor States in the Balkans
The Shihâbî Amîrs of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD
The House of Muh.ammad 'Alî in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD
The Sanûsî Amîrs & Kings of Libya, 1837-1969 AD
The historical and international image of the Turks does not seem to be the most lovable or romantic. Most Americans probably are going to be more sympathetic to people with historic grievances against Turkey -- Greeks, Armenians, Romanians, Serbs, even Arabs. Most people may not know of all the vanished ancient peoples of Anatolia, from the Phrygians and Galatians to the Isaurians, or even the sad Fall of Constantinople; but most are likely aware of lingering outrage over the genocide of the Armenians and other Christians during World War I -- an event that Turkey still officially and stoutly denies, despite thorough historical documentation, not to mention many surviving eyewitnesses -- and more recent actions against the Kurds [note]. Not long ago it was a crime in Turkey to assert, even on the floor of the parliament, that there even were Kurds in the country -- and in 1994 four members of parliament were sentenced to 15 years in prison for giving speeches in Kurdish. Although responding in some ways to European demands for human rights improvements before being considered for admission to the European Union, since December 2001 the Turkish government has officially regarded Kurdish given names as "terrorist propaganda" and refused to register them for Kurdish children. With all this, one does not even need to see the very hostile, anti-Turkish movie Midnight Express [1978].
Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
A recent correspondent indignantly claimed that the Imperial burials had already been completely destroyed by the Crusaders. Well, the Fourth Crusade was not above looting the dead, but even if they had the energy to open all the tombs, back to Constantine, it is hard to imagine that they would have been so interested in destroying the burials that there would not have been plenty left for the Greeks to subsequently reinter. Under the Palaeologi, they would have almost two hundred years to do so. My suspicion therefore, with the most charitable regard for Meh.med II, is that some of the burials may still lie under the great mosque. Some future archaeology may be allowed to test this.
Not all who deny the existence of the Armenian genocide are Turkish, as I have heard from recent correspondents. Anyone sincerely sceptical or confused about the matter should consult Death by Government [Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1995, pp.209-239], by R.J. Rummel, one of the greatest living experts on mass murder. Rummel estimates the number of Armenians murdered in the main organized genocide program (there were others), from 1915-1918, as 1,404,000 persons. Some of the eyewitness testimony to this included reports by the American Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (whose son, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., would be Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury), and by other American consular officials, at a time when the United States was still neutral in World War I. Morgenthau's account was published in 1919 as Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. I believe there is an accusation that Morgenthau's book was ghost-written by Armenians. Even if that were true, it still does not mean that the accounts were not correct (Armenians in exile would tend to be living evidence of what the Turks did), and much of the evidence associated with Morgenthau consists of diplomatic records that are contemporaneous with the events.
Nor need we dismiss the endless pornographic fantasies that revolve around the Harîm of the Sult.ân's Topkapï Palace. 
Fascination with this is now often disparaged as "Orientalism," i.e. the projection of unrelated and hostile imaginings onto misunderstood institutions; but there is no doubt of the extraordinary and bizarre characteristics of the Imperial Harîm. I think some Turks are torn between condemnation of what can be seen as a dated and decadent insitutition, everything bad about the Ottomans, and a defensiveness that is both politically correct and nationalistic, despite its incommensurability with Atatürk's reforms. But if it was diverting for the Sult.ân, I don't see why it should not continue to be so to the curious modern. An honest and informed treatment of this can be found in Harem, The World Behind the Veil [Abbeville Press, New York, London, Paris, 1989], by a woman who grew up in Turkey, Alev Lytle Croutier, many of whose own relatives had lived in traditional harîms. The books contains photographs from the Ottoman era (including her relatives) as well as historical drawings and the sort of lush and sensual paintings by Western artists that infuriate the anti-"Orientalism" crowd. The image above is a 19th century photograph. It is given by Croutier [p.74], but I also remember it from many years ago in Time magazine, at the time that the Topkapï Harîm was first opened to the public. Recent apologetics that life in the Harîm represented some sort of progressive political power for women are simply ridiculous, and they disturbingly parallel justifications for the horrors of the status of women in many contemporary Islamic states.
| The Shihâbî Amîrs of Lebanon | |
|---|---|
| Bashîr I | 1697-1707 |
| H.aydar | 1707-1732 |
| Mulh.im | 1732-1754 |
| Mans.ûr | 1754-1770 |
| Yûsuf | 1770-1788 |
| first Maronite Amîr, 1770 | |
| Bashîr II | 1788-1840 |
| overthrown by Britain & Turkey, 1840 | |
| Bashîr III | 1840-1842 |
| direct Turkish Rule, 1842-1918; French Rule, 1920-1943 | |
| Republic of Lebanon | |
| Bishara al-Khuri | President, 1943-1952 |
| Camille Chamoun | 1952-1958 |
| Fuad Chehab | 1958-1964 |
| Charles Hélou | 1964-1970 |
| Sulayman Franjieh | 1970-1976 |
| Elias Sarkis | 1976-1982 |
| Amin Gemayel | 1982-1988 |
| Selim al-Huss | 1988-1989 |
| Elias Hrawi | 1989-1998 |
| Émile Lahoud | 1998-present |
The Israelis, who invaded Lebanon in 1982 to get rid of the Palestinians, more or less accomplished that task, with the PLO leaving for Tunisia, but then discovered, as the Syrians had already, that the communal rivalries of the Lebanese themselves, especially with the Shi'tes adopting Iranian suicide and terror tactics, made the place a tar baby for any outsiders who wanted to exert control by force. With the foreign powers chasened, the Lebanese began to patch things up with some needed political compromises; and as the 1990's progressed, some peace and prosperity seemed to be returning to the country. It remains to be seen, however, if a modus vivendi can be found to produce another golden age of communal alliance against the outside.
Maronite Patriarchs of Lebanon
Egypt was abruptly pulled into modern history with the invasion of Napoleon in 1798. Although Egypt had been conquered by the Turks in 1517, the strange slave dynasty of the Mamlûks had continued and by Napoleon's time had reestablished de facto authority in the declining Empire. After the French were driven from Egypt in 1801, Muh.ammad 'Alî arrived, supposedly to reëstablish Turkish authority.
Brilliant, ruthless, farsighted, and probably the most important Albanian in world history, Muh.ammad 'Alî very quickly established his own authority instead. The final Mamlûks were massacred in 1811, and Muh.ammad 'Alî moved to create a modern state, and especially a modern army, for Egypt. In this he was as successful as any non-European power at the time. By the time the Greeks revolted against Turkey in 1821, it was Muh.ammad 'Alî who turned out to have the best resources to put down the revolution and was called on by the Sult.ân in 1824 to do so. He very nearly did, until Britain intervened and sank the Egyptian fleet at the Battle of Navarino in 1827. Frustrated in that direction, Muh.ammad 'Alî was successful in his conquest of the Sudan (1820-1822), probably advancing further up the Nile than any power since Ancient Egypt, though at a terrible cost to the Sudanese in massacre, mutilations, and slaving (of which the American boxer Cassius Clay was probably unaware when he adoped the name "Muhammad Ali" upon his conversion to Islâm). Egyptian interventions in Arabia in 1818-1822 and 1838-1843 very nearly exterminated the House of Sa'ûd and its fundamentalist Wahhâbî movement, which much later would create a united and independent Sa'ûdî Arabia.
| The House of Muh.ammad 'Alî in Egypt | |
|---|---|
| Muh.ammad 'Alî | Pasha, 1805-1848 |
| Ibrâhîm | 1848 |
| 'Abbâs H.ilmî I | 1848-1854 |
| Muh.ammad Sa'îd | 1854-1863 |
| Suez Canal Started, 1859 | |
| Ismâ'îl | 1863-1867 |
| Khedive, 1867-1879, d. 1895 | |
| Suez Canal Opened, 1869 Britain buys Khedive's share in Canal, 1875 | |
| Muh.ammad Tawfîq | 1879-1892 |
| British Occupation, 1882 | |
| 'Abbâs H.ilmî II | 1892-1914, d. 1944 |
| British Protectorate, 1914-1922 | |
| H.usayn Kâmil | Sult.ân, 1914-1917 |
| Ah.mad Fu'âd I | 1917-1922 |
| King, 1922-1936 | |
| Fârûq | 1936-1952, d. 1965 |
| Ah.mad Fu'âd II | 1952-1953 |
| Republic of Egypt, 1953- | |
| Muhammad Naguib | President, 1953-1954 |
| Gamal Abdel Nasser | 1954-1970 |
| Anwar as-Sadat | 1970-1981 |
| Mohammed Hosni Mubarak | 1981-present |
The most formative subsequent event for Egyptian history was certainly the construction of the Suez Canal. Although Britain had nothing to do with the project, and it was the French Emperor Napoleon III who attended the lavish opening ceremonies, the collapse of Egyptian financies led to the purchase by Britain of all Egypt's shares in the Canal Company. This did not solve Egypt's financial problems, which got worse. The Khedive Ismâ'îl also wasted resources on disastrous campaigns against Ethiopia in 1875-1876. With its interests now in danger, Britain occupied Egypt, without French support, in 1882. Ironically, the Occupation was undertaken under Prime Minister William Gladstone, who was opposed to British Imperialism. He was not, however, going to endanger British finances just because the Khedive didn't know how to handle his.
This made Egypt a de facto part of the British Empire, indeed one of the most important parts, with the Suez Canal an essential strategic link between Britain and India. Some of the most colorful episodes in British Imperial history occured because of this. In 1881 a revolt had started in the Sudan, led by a man claiming to be the Apocalyptic Mahdî of Islâmic tradition. Gladstone was not going to spend British money, or Egyptian, in trying to suppress the rebellion. Consequently, Charles Gordon, known as "Chinese Gordon" for his part in putting down the Taiping Rebellion in China (1860-1864), and who had already been governor-general of the Sudan from 1877-1880, was sent back in order to evacuate the Egyptian garrison. Once there, he decided to stay and resist the Mahdî. By 1885 this insubordination stirred up public opinion back home and forced Gladstone to send a relief expedition; but it missed rescuing Gordon by two days, as the Mahdî's forces overran Khartoum and killed Gordon. This made Gordon one of the great heroes of the day, humiliated Britain, and resulted in the fall of Gladstone's government. However, the Sudan was, for the time being, abandoned. When the British returned in 1898, in the heyday of imperial jingoism, Lord Kitchener, with a young Winston Churchill along, calmly massacred the mediaeval army of the Mahdî's successor at the Battle of Omdurman, avenged Gordon, and made himself one of the immortal heroes of the British Empire too. Although formally in Egyptian service, Kitchener reconquered the Sudan as an Anglo-Egyptian "condominium." The theory of British and Egyptian joint rule in the Sudan continued until Sudanese independence in 1956, though between 1924 and 1936 the British didn't even allow Egyptian forces or authorities into the Sudan.
All this took place with Egypt still legally part of the Ottoman Empire. Right down until 1914 the Turkish flag was dutifully flown and Turkish passports issued. When Turkey repaid a century of British support by throwing its lot with Germany in World War I, however, the fiction came to an end, and Egypt de jure came under British rule as a Protectorate, with the Sult.ânate, abolished by the Turks in 1517, reëstablished. This was not popular in Egypt, and after the war Egypt did become a formally independent Kingdom. However, the British did retain Treaty rights to garrison and protect the Suez Canal; so, in many ways, the British Occupation of 1882 simply continued. There was little doubt of that once World War II started. Egypt, a legally Neutral country, was first invaded by Italy and then by Germany, with British forces meeting, fighting, and ultimately expelling them. Egypt at the time seemed no less a part of the British Empire than it had ever been. Egypt did eventually declare war on Germany, but not until February 24, 1945.
The end of Muh.ammad 'Alî's dynasty resulted from the humiliation of continuing British occupation, the mortification of Egyptian failure in the war against Israeli independence in 1948, and from the failure of King Fârûq, who was rather more successful as a playboy than as a leader, to deal with any of it. The army, soon led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, swept away the monarchy, got British forces to leave Egypt, and then won a great political victory when Britain and France (74 years late) reoccupied the Canal, Israel invaded the Sinai, and both the United States and the Soviet Union told them all to leave in no uncertain terms, in the Suez Crisis of 1956 (just as Soviet tanks were rolling into Hungary!). Thus, Egypt became a player in the Cold War, and the heritage of Muh.ammad 'Alî, the Ottoman Empire, and British imperialism faded rapidly.
| The Sanûsî Amîrs & Kings of Libya | |
|---|---|
| Muh.ammad as-Sanûsî | 1837-1859, Cyrenaica, 1841 |
| Muh.ammad al-Mahdî | 1859-1902 |
| Ah.mad ash-Sharîf | 1902-1916, d.1933 |
| Italian occupation, 1911 | |
| Muh.ammad Idrîs | 1916-1949; Amir, 1949-1951; King, 1951-1969, d.1983 |
| Muammar Qaddafi dictatorship, 1969-present | |
This was a thinly populated backwater for the Turks, noteworthy mainly for Roman ruins and piracy (with U.S. Marines landing at Tripoli in 1801). It all achieved greater significance when Italy displaced the Ottomans in 1911 (ceded in 1912). Indeed, Libya became one of the most important strategic theaters of World War II. The Italians tried invading Egypt from Libya in September 1940 but by February 1941 had been thrown completely out of Cyrenaica, with 130,000 soldiers captured. Alarmed, Hitler sent Erwin Rommel with a couple of divisions to prevent the Italian position from collapsing completely. Rommel, however, went on the offensive. For more than a year, things surged back and forth, with Cyrenaica recovered, lost, and recovered again. By July 1942, Rommel was deep into Egypt, barely stopped at El Alamein, 60 miles from Alexandria. By then, however, the United States was in the War; and the strongly reinforced British began an offensive in October. They broke through and soon swept the Germans and Italians entirely out of Libya. Retreating into Tunisia, they were caught against the Americans who had landed in Morocco and Algeria in November.
After the War, Libya formally became independent in 1951, under the Sasûnî Amîr of Cyrenaica. The long lived King Idrîs was eventually overthrown in 1969. This was under the leadership of the erratic and megalomaniacal Muammar Qaddafi. Along with armed clashes with Egypt and Chad, 
Libya became a sponsor of terrorism. Blamed for a bombing in Berlin in 1986, Libya was bombed by Ronald Reagan in retaliation. Later blamed for a bomb that brought down Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, sanctions were imposed on Libya until accused operatives were surrendered. This eventually happened, Qaddafi may have thought better of his ways, and sanctions were lifted in 2003. Meanwhile, Qaddafi had dressed up his dictatorship with an idiosyncratic political theory. Libya became the "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Jamahiriya, similar to the Arabic word for "republic," jumhûrîya, was a term coined by Qaddafi for his political system, which was supposed to be a kind of direct, mass democracy, but is probably no more democratic than similar arrangements in the Soviet Union. Like Mao's little red book, Qaddafi produced a little green book. Qaddafi seems secure enough, like many other dictators (one thinks of Castro), but increasingly anachronistic (Castro, again).
"Romania" means the area in the Balkans and Middle East with successor states to the Mediaeval Roman Empire. That distinguishes it from historic Francia (the land of the "Franks" to those in Islâm), which means Western, Central, and Northern Europe originally subject to the Latin, Roman Catholic Church in Rome, and from historic Russia in Eastern Europe, subject to the Russian Orthodox Church. The map below thus roughly corresponds to the territories covered by the Roman Empire at the mid-11th century, except for modern România and Georgia. These were outside the Empire, but in culture and religion they are historically linked to Constantinople.
This will be an unfamiliar use of the name "Romania" for most, and the reason for it is explained in "Decadence, Rome and Romania, the Emperors Who Weren't, and Other Reflections on Roman History," "The Vlach Connection and Further Reflections on Roman History," and the "Guide and Index to Lists of Rulers." 
The double headed eagle of the Palaeologi symbolized the European and Asian sides of the Empire. This now represents a significant historical and cultural divide. The Asian side, and the center of the Empire at Adrianople and Constantinople, is still largely Turkish. This is a rather different Turkey from the Ottoman Empire, however, secularized and Westernized by Kemal Atatürk, with things like the Arabic alphabet actually outlawed, now hoping to join the European Union. On the European side, the successor states to Rome in the 12th and 13th centuries have reemerged. This is also the case to the east, where Georgia and Armenia, kept from the Ottomans 
by Russia, are now independent.
Thus, "Modern Romania" here means the modern successor states, first to Rome ("Romania" to itself, "Byzantium" to the historians), second to the Ottoman Empire, which in the 14th and 15th centuries established its domination over all former Roman possessions, and more, in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the Roman successors emerged in the 12th century, so do the Ottoman successors emerge in the 19th century. Familiar states from the earlier period are Serbia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and even Bosnia. The earlier states of the Vlach speaking Romanians, Wallachia and Moldavia, continue from the past, subject to special achievements in Ottoman misrule, ultimately to unite as the modern state of România, the only country in Europe to preserve the proper name of the Roman Empire. Turkey is still the largest and most powerful state in the region.
Entirely new states are Montenegro and Greece itself. Montenegro, the "Black Mountain" (Qara Dagh in Turkish and Crna Gora in Serbo-Croatian), like many remote areas of the Ottoman Empire, began to drift out of central control as Turkish power went into its long decline. "Greece" itself was something that, in a sense, didn't exist in the Middle Ages. What the Ancient Greeks had called themselves, "Hellenes," came to be used in Late Roman times to mean Greek pagans. Greek Christians were "Romans," Rhômaioi in Greek. This distinction was maintained through the Middle Ages, and was remembered well into the 19th, if not the 20th, century (a Greek can still be Rum in Turkish). A modern Greece, Hellas, that was not an heir to Rome, was an entirely new phenomenon.
The politically, religiously, and culturally dominant language of Mediaeval Romania was 
Greek, 
whose alphabet today, however, is only used for Greek. Other alphabets, nevertheless, were developed, based on the Greek, for other languages, from Gothic, to Armenian, Georgian, and Cyrillic. The Armenian alphabet was in use by Armenians both in Romania and in the often separate kingdoms of Armenia. Under the Ottomans,
| Europa | 1. Romania | 2. Constantinople |
| 2. Francia | 1. Rome | |
| 3. Russia | 3. Moscow | |
Georgians dates from the same era as the Armenian, and now continues to be used in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Both the Armenian and the Georgian alphabets, although based on Greek, have their own striking and distinctive styles. The conversion of the Slavs resulted in the introduction of a new alphabet, the 
Cyrillic, which has remained the alphabet of choice for Slavs who belong to Orthodox Churches, like the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Russians. When modern Romanian (Vlach) first began to be written, it also used the Cyrillic alphabet, but eventually both Romanian and Albanian (also for many centuries unwritten) were rendered in the Latin alphabet, which thus came to be used for spoken languages in the Balkans for the first time since Latin speaking Roman colonists, and the Imperial Court in Constantinople, would have used it many centuries earlier. Since one's alphabet usually went with one's religion in the Middle Ages, the Turks, and other local converts to Islâm, used the Arabic alphabet; and Jews, especially Jews arriving after Spain expelled them in 1492, used the 
Hebrew alphabet. We have already seen some exceptions to the religion rule, however. Orthodox Christian Churches could be found using different alphabets, Greek, Armenian, and Cyrillic (as well as, more distantly, Coptic, Syriac, and Ethiopic), which already had introduced an ethnic or national dimension to the issue. This is also evident when the Orthodox Romanians and the largely Moslem Albanians 
turn to the Latin alphabet, neither with the slightest intention of entering into religious communion with Papal Roman (i.e. Frankish) Catholicism. The Turks themselves, directed by Kemal Atatürk, followed suit. The Jews of Turkey also fell into this, and it became possible to find Ladino, the language of the 15th century Jewish refugees from Spain, being written in 20th century Istanbul synagogues using the Turkish version of the Latin alphabet. 
Thus the ancient prestige of Latin Rome, and the modern dominance of Latinate Francia, has exerted itself in modern Romania over Orthodox Christianity, Islâm, and Judaism -- even while the old Hebrew alphabet is now used for Hebrew revived as a spoken language in modern Israel.
A characteristic of imperial states is an easy mixing of peoples and languages. They all have too much to fear from the imperial power for too much trouble to develop between them. When the heavy imperial hand is withdrawn, however, serious trouble can result. Thus, the end of the British Empire resulted in the partitions, amid war and massacre, of India, Palestine, and Cyprus. The decline of Turkish power similarly uncorked more than a century of conflict, continuing even in the 21st century, in the Balkans. Border areas end up with the most ambiguous identities and so can provoke the greatest conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been swapped back and forth between Hungary and Romania and Serbia in the 12th and 13th centuries, and then were long held by the Turks, ended up with a mixed population of Croats (Latin/Catholic Christians), Serbs (Orthodox Christians), and Moslem Bosnians (Bosniacs). All, as it happened, spoke the same language, Serbo-Croatian, but written in different alphabets. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, with the lifting of the heavy imperial hand of Communism in the 1990's, led to terrible fighting, massacres, and atrocities, most famously carried out by the Serbs against the others, but not unheard of from the Croatians, Bosniacs, and Kosovar Albanians also. A famous bridge in Mostar in Herzegovina, which had linked, actually and symbolically, the Christian and Moslem parts of the city, was destroyed (evidently by Croatians) in the fighting. With a peace settlement patched up for Bosnia, the Serbs then turned their hand against the restless Albanian majority of Kosovo, which the Serbs regarded as the Serbian heartland but which had contained few Serbs for a long time. It is enough to make one yearn for the return of the Palaeologi. The first map above shows the situation in 1817, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, rebellions, and a final grant of autonomy to Serbia. The Ionian Islands had originally belonged to Venice but were seized by Britain in the Napoleonic Era and ceded to Britain by the Congress of Vienna. The continuing concern of Russia for Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and the proximity of a phil-Hellene Britain to Greece, set the stage for a long century of revolt and intervention against the tottering Ottoman Empire.
The second maps shows the situation after the Crimean War (1853-1856). In the Crimean War, Russia began with an intervention in România, preliminary to an invasion of Turkey; but Britain and France joined Turkey against Russia, with some cooperation from Austria, with much of the fighting taking place, as one might expect from the name, in the Crimea. This pretty much preserved the status quo for Turkey, though the borders were extended against Russia along the Black Sea. One change we see, however, was the unification of Wallachia and Moldavia into the state of România. My source for these lists was originally the Kingdoms of Europe, by Gene Gurney [Crown Publishers, New York, 1982], which had some errors and obscurities and, especially, the list of the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia was incomplete. Now, however, I have been able to fill things out, including the list for România, using the Regentenlisten und Stammtafeln zur Geschichte Europas by Michael F. Feldkamp [Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 2002], Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, and articles at Wikipedia, which are usually up to date on recent changes. The maps are based on The Penguin Atlas of Recent History (Europe since 1815) [Colin McEvedy, 1982], The Anchor Atlas of World History, Volume II [Hermann Kinder, Werner Hilgemann, Ernest A. Menze, and Harald and Ruth Bukor, 1978], The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia [John Channon with Rob Hudson, 1995], and various prose histories, such as The Ottoman Centuries (Lord Kinross, Morrow Quill, 1977).
The first map shows the situation after the War of Greek Independence (1821-1829). To save Greece, all the Great Powers were drawn in against Turkey. In addition to traditional concerns about the treatment of Christians under Ottoman rule was now added the fruit of an 18th century Neo-Classical love of Greece. This drew enthuasiasts like Lord Byron (1788-1824), who arrived in Greece in 1823 and drew both financial aid, political support, and the attention of a new popular press to the revolt. In perfect Romantic form, Byron then died in the midst of the struggle. Against the feeble Ottomans, the Greeks did well enough; but the Sultân then appealed for aid to the modernizing Muh.ammad 'Alî of Egypt. The Greeks were then defeated, but this lead to the intervention of the Powers. The British sank Muh.ammad 'Alî's fleet at Navarino in 1827, and that spelled victory for the Greeks. With Greek independence went increased territory for Serbia, autonomy for Wallachia and Moldavia, and border concessions to Russia.
| 1. ROMÂNIA |
|---|
Before long the Princes, however, were of value to the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) mainly as tax farmers, a lovely institution in which the government expected a certain revenue, and the farmer could keep any surplus revenue he could manage to collect. This was a recipe for a simple looting of the population. After the middle of the 17th century, appointments begin to feature Greeks, the Phanariots -- from the Phanar section of Istanbul -- as Princes (indicated with the Greek letter 
). Their job was simply to get as much money out of the land as possible, both for the Sultân and for themselves (the reason to be a tax farmer). This was not good for the Principalities, nor popular, but not much could be done about it until the influence of some friendly Christian power, like that of Russia, began to be felt in the region. After a while, Phanariots can be identified by family, like the Mavrocordats. The multiple terms of the Princes here are fiendishly complicated and sometimes extend to the neighboring Principality. Rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia are numbered separately, but this does not always seem to be done consistently.
| ROMÂNIA | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Continued from "Rome and Romania," "Romanians"; Ottoman Sovereignty, unless otherwise noted | |||
| WALLACHIA, Ottoman conquest, 1395 | MOLDAVIA, Ottoman conquest, 1455 | ||
| Nicholas I Patrascu | Voivode, Prince, Governor, 1599-1600 | Ieremiah Movila | Voivode, Prince, Governor, 1600-1606 |
| 1600-1601 (1601-1602) | Simeon Movila | 1606-1607 | |
| 1601-1602, 1611, 1611-1616, 1620-1623 | Radu Mihnea Basarab | 1616-1619, 1623-1626 | |
| Radu (VII) Serban Craiovescu-Basarab | 1602-1610, 1611 | Mihail II Movila | 1607, 1607 |
| Constantin I Movila | 1607, 1607-1611 | ||
| to Transylvania, 1610-1611 | Stefan X Tomsa Mushatin | 1611-1615, 1621-1623 | |
| Gabriel Movila | 1616,1618-1620 | Alexandru V Movila | 1615-1616 |
| Alexandru IV Ilias Basarab | 1616-1618, 1627-1629 | Gaspar Gratiani | 1619-1620 |
| Alexandru V Ilias Mushatin | 1620-1621 | ||
| Alexandru V Basarab the Child-Prince | 1623-1627 | Myron Barnovschi-Movila | 1626-1629, 1633 |
| Leon Mushatin | 1629-1632 | Alexandru VI Coconul Basarab | 1629-1630 |
| Moses Movila | 1630-1631, 1633-1634 | ||
| Radu VIII Ilias Basarab | 1632 | Alexandru Ilias Mushatin | 1631-1633 |
| Matthew Basarab Craiovescu-Brancoveanu | 1632-1654 | Basil Lupu | 1634-1653, 1653 |
| 1654-1658, d.1661 | Constantin (II of Moldavia) Serban Craiovescu-Brancoveanu | 1659, 1661 | |
| Mihnea III Craiovescu-Brancoveanu | 1658-1659 | George Stefan Ceaur | 1653, 1653-1658 |
| 1659-1660 | George I Ghica | 1658-1659 | |
| Gregory I Ghica | 1660-1664, 1672-1673 | Stephanito Lupu | 1659-1661, 1661 |
| Radu Leon Mushatin | 1664-1669 | Istrate Dabija | 1661-1665 |
| Anthony Voda din Popesti | 1669-1672 | Ilias Alexander Basarab | 1666-1668 |
| Stefan X Petriceicu | 1672-1673, 1673-1674, 1683-1684 | ||
| Phanariot Greek Tax Farming, | |||
| 1673-1678 | George II Dukas, | 1665-1666, 1668-1672, 1678-1683 | |
| Serban Cantacuzino, | 1678-1688 | Dumitrascu Cantacuzino, | 1673, 1674-1675, 1684-1685 |
| Antioh I Rosetti, | 1675-1678 | ||
| Constantin III Cantemir | 1685-1693 | ||
| Constantin I Brancoveanu | 1688-1714 | Demetrius Cantemir | 1693, 1710-1711 |
| Constantin III Dukas, | 1693-1695, 1700-1703 | ||
| Antioh II Cantemir | 1695-1700, 1705-1707 | ||
| Michael III Racovita | 1703-1705, 1707-1709, 1715-1726 d. 1744 | ||
| 1715-1716, 1719-1730 | Nicholas II (of Wallachia)/I (of Moldavia) Mavrocordat, | 1709-1710, 1711-1715 d. 1730 | |
| Stefan II Cantacuzino, | 1714-1715 | Occupied by Russia, 1739 | |
| 1716-1719 | John Mavrocordat, | 1743-1747 | |
| 1730, 1731-1733, 1735-1741, 1744-1748, 1756-1758, 1761-1763, d.1769 | Constantin II (of Wallachia)/IV (of Moldavia) Mavrocordat, | 1733-1735, 1741-1743, 1748-1749, 1769 | |
| 1730-1731, 1741-1744 | Michael I (of Wallachia)/III (of Moldavia) Racovita | 1703-1705, 1707-1709, 1715-1726 d. 1744 | |
| 1733-1735, 1748-1752, d.1752 | Gregory II Ghica | 1726-1733, 1735-1739, 1739-1741, 1747-1748, d. 1752 | |
| 1752-1753 | Matthew Ghica | 1753-1756 | |
| George III Racovita | 1753-1756 | Constantine V Racovita | 1749-1753, 1756-1757 |
| 1758-1761, 1765-1766 | Scarlat I Ghica | 1757-1758 d. 1766 | |
| Constantin III Racovita | 1763-1764 | John Theodore Callimachi, | 1758-1761 |
| Stefan III Racovita | 1764-1765 | Gregory III Callimachi, | 1761-1764, 1767-1769 |
| Alexandru VI Ghica | 1766-1768 | ||
| 1768-1769 | Gregory III (of Wallachia)/IV (of Moldavia) Ghica | 1764-1767, 1774-1777 | |
| Occupied by Russia, 1769-1774; Russian right of intervention, Treaty of Kuchuk Karinarji, 1774 | |||
| Emanuel Giani Ruset (Rosetti), | 1770-1771 | Constantine VI Moruzi (Mourousis), | 1777-1782 |
| 1774-1782, 1796-1797 | Alexandru VII (of Wallachia)/IX (of Moldavia) Ypsilanti, | 1786-1788, d.1797 | |
| Nicholas III Caragea | 1782-1783 | Alexander VII Mavrocordat, the Mad Prince | 1782-1785 |
| Mihail II Sutu (Soutzos), | 1783-1786, 1791-1793, 1801-1802 | Alexander VIII Mavrocordat, the Fugitive | 1785-1786 |
| Nicholas IV Mavrogheni | 1786-1790 | Occupied by Austria, 1787-1788 | |
| Emanuel Giani Ruset (Rosetti), | 1788-1789 | ||
| Occupied by Russia, 1789 | |||
| Occupied by Austria, 1789-1791 | |||
| 1793-1796, 1799-1801, d.1807 | Alexander VIII (of Wallachia)/X (of Moldavia) Moruzi (Mourousis), | 1792, 1802-1806, 1806-1807 | |
| Constantin IV Hangerli | 1797-1799 | Michael IV Sutu (Soutzos), | 1792-1795, 1819-1821 |
| Alexander XI Callimachi, | 1795-1799 | ||
| 1802-1806, 1806-1807 | Constantin IX (of Wallachia)/VII (of Moldavia) Ypsilanti, | 1799-1801, d.1807 | |
| 1806, 1818-1821 | Alexander IX (of Wallachia)/XII (of Moldavia) Sutu (Soutzos), | 1801-1802, d.1821 | |
| Occupied by Russia, 1806-1812 | |||
| John George Caragea | 1812-1818 | Alexander XIII Hangerli | 1807 |
| 1821 | Scarlat (II of Wallachia) Callimachi, | 1806, 1807-1810, 1812-1819, d.1821 | |
| Gregory IV Ghica | 1822-1828 | Direct Ottoman military administration, 1821-1822 | |
| Ionita (John VIII) Sandu Sturza | 1822-1828 | ||
| Occupied by Russia, 1828-1834; Governor Count Kisselev | |||
| Autonomy for Wallachia and Moldavia, 1834 | |||
| Alexander X Ghica | 1834-1842 | Michael V Sturza | 1834-1849 |
| George IV Bibescu | 1842-1848 | ||
| Revolution in Wallachia, 1848 | |||
| Russian Occupation, 1848-1851 | |||
| Barbu Stirbei | 1849-1853, 1854-1856 | Gregory Alexander Ghica | 1849-1853, 1854-1856 |
| Crimean War, 1853-1856; Russian Occupation, 1853-1854 | |||
| Occupied by Austria, 1854-1856 | Gregory Alexander Ghica (again) | 1854-1856 | |
| Ottoman Occupation, 1856-1859, Sovereignty until 1881 | |||
| ROMÂNIA | |
|---|---|
| Alexander (XIV) John Cuza of Moldavia | 1859-1866 |
| Charles Eitel Frederick of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Carol I | 1866-1881 |
| King, 1881-1914 | |
| Russo-Turkish War, 1876-1878; Russian Invasion, Romania proclaimed independent, 1877; Congress of Berlin, 1878; Romania Independence, 1881 | |
| Ferdinand | 1914-1927 |
| Michael | 1927-1930, 1940-1947 |
| Carol II | 1930-1940 |
| Ion Antonescu, pro-German dictator | 1940-1944 |
Communist takeover, 1947  | |
| Constantin Parhon | President, 1948-1952 |
| Petru Groza | 1952-1958 |
| Ion Georghe Maurer | 1958-1961 |
| Georghe Georghiu-Dej | 1961-1965 |
| Chivu Stoica | 1965-1967 |
| Nicolae Ceauçescu | 1967-1989, overthrown & executed |
| Ion Iliescu | 1989-1996, 2000-2004 |
| Emil Constantinescu | 1996-2000 |
| Nicolae Vacaroiu | interim, 2007 |
| Traian Basescu | 2004-2007, 2007-present |
The Russian wars against Turkey in the 19th Century led several times to the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia. After the Crimean War (1853-1856) and, for a change, Austrian occupation (1854-1857), and a bad experience with a local candidate for rule of the unified country, a European prince, as in Greece and Bulgaria, 
was brought in, Karl of Hohenzollern. The Congress of Berlin recognized Karl (Carol) and Romanian independence (1878).
With the Allies in World War I, winning Transylvania from Hungary and Moldova from Russia, Romania was the biggest long term winner of the War in the Balkans. However, after much internal strife, she switched to the Axis in World War II, losing Moldova to the Soviet Union (seized in 1940, actually, before Romania was a belligerent) and part of Dobruja to Bulgaria. While Moldova (traditionally called Bessarabia) is now independent, I have not noticed any discussion of reunion with Romania. The Russians tried hard to promote the idea that the language of Moldova was not Romanian, but it is.
Rejecting the Cyrllic alphabet and the Turkish influenced "Rumania" (or "Roumania") for the Latin alphabet and the pure Latin România, Romania can now claim that name as its own, with few remembering that it was the proper name of the Roman (and the "Byzantine") Empire. In the Middle Ages, "Romania" tended to refer to the contemporaneous extent of the Empire, i.e. Anatolia and the Balkans ("Asia and Europa" or "Rûm and Rumelia"). The modern state might be said to be "Lesser Romania" in contrast to that "Greater Romania"; but this might be considered insulting by Romanians (though intentionally no more so than "Lesser Armenia" in Cilicia) and so is not likely to catch on.
The mysterious history of Romance speakers in the Balkans, the Romanians and Vlachs, whose existence is not noticed until the 12th Century and whose language is not attested until the 16th, is treated separated in "The Vlach Connection and Further Reflections on Roman History." This is a story now charged with the nationalism both of Romania and neighbors like Hungary.
The marriages of the Romanian Royal Family quickly connected it to major European, especially British and Greek, royalty. Thus King Ferdinand was the grandson of a first cousin of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert (Ferdinand of Portugal, the brother of Augustus, Prince of Coburg, who was the father of Ferdinand of Bulgaria), and he married one of their own grand- daughters, Marie of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Marie was a bit of a stylish international personality in the 1920's. King Carol II then married Helen of Greece, who was a great-granddaughter of Queen Victoria, through her mother Sophia, the sister of Kaiser Wilhlem II of Germany. All these connections, of course, profited the monarchy little in the conflicts of fascism and communism that had the country under one form of dictatorship or another from 1940 to 1989.
A notable personality of modern România was Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), who fruitfully extended Rudolf Otto's ideas in history and philosophy of religion. Controversy continues over the degree to which Eliade was involved in the Fascist movement in România, but he actually avoided residence in the country during the War, by taking diplomatic posts in London (during the Blitz!) and Lisbon. After the War he was able to do what he had wanted to do before, emigrate to America.
The two maps above show the situation before and after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Note that by then Britain had ceded the Ionians Islands to Greece (1864). In 1875 rebellions started in Bosnia and then Bulgaria. The brutality with which these were suppressed aroused European opinion, and after some delay Russia declared war. With some hard fighting, the Russians ended up capturing Adrianople and arriving at the outskirts of Constantinople. The Treaty of San Stephano which ended the war mostly freed the Balkans, but the Great Powers didn't like it. The Congress of Berlin rolled things back a bit. Serbia, România, and Montenegro all became independent, with increases in territory, but Bulgaria was divided and merely allowed autonomy. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novipazar were made protectorates of Austria. The map looked much the same for many years, with Bulgaria annexing East Rumelia in 1885.
| 2. MONTENEGRO | |
|---|---|
| Danilo I Petrovic | Prince-Bishop, 1697-1737 |
| Sava | 1737-1756 d.1782 |
| Vasili | Coadjutor, 1756-1766 |
| Stephen the Little | Coadjutor, 1766-1774 |
| Sava | Coadjutor, 1774-1782 |
| Peter I | 1782-1830 |
| Peter II | 1830-1851 |
| Danilo II | 1851-1860 |
| Nicholas | 1860-1910 |
| King, 1910-1918, d.1921 | |
| Union with Yugoslavia, 1918 | |
| Presidents of Montenegro; Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992-2003; Union of Serbia & Montenegro, 2003-2006 | |
| Momir Bulatovic | 1990-1998 |
| Milo Đukanovic | 1998-2002 |
| Filip Vujanovic | acting, 2002-2003 |
| Rifat Rastoder & Dragan Kujovic | acting, 2003 |
| Filip Vujanovic | 2003-2006 |
| President, 2006-present | |
| Independent, 3 June 2006 | |
Serbia's only access to the sea, through the historic port of Kotor (Cattaro in Italian, obtained from Austria after World War I), the fear was that, should the Montenegrans decide to go their own way, the Serbs would use force, with enough local support to make resistance abortive.
Nevertheless, Montenegro voted for independence in 2006 and seems to have successfully made the transition, recognized by many governments and admitted as a member of the UN. The pretense that the two countries still constituted Yugoslavia had been abandoned in 2003, so the secession of Montenegro simply left Serbia as, well, Serbia.
1908 was a big year in the Balkans. Bulgaria became independent and Austria annexed most of its protectorate from the Congress of Berlin. Part of the territory was even returned to Turkey. This all was bitterly resented by Serbia because of the large Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A causus belli was thus introduced for Serbian attempts to stir up trouble in the provinces, which ultimately meant a Serbian assassin who killed the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and set off World War I. In Turkey, the Sultan, "Abdul the Damned," was overthrown by the Young Turks, whose impetus, unfortunately, was more merely nationalistic than liberal. As a stage in the modernization of Turkey, it was also unfortunately more militaristic than liberal, a direction that soon resulted in increasingly friendly dealings with Germany. This was not a good deal for Turkey. Meanwhile, Greece was able to add Thessaly (1881, with adjustments in 1897). A rebellion on Crete led to autonomy (1898) as a prelude to Greek control (1912).
| 3. GREECE | |
|---|---|
| Greek War of Independence, 1821-1829 | |
| Alexander Ypsilanti | leads revolt, 1821-1828 |
| Treaty of London, Britain, France, & Russia support Greek independence, Battle of Navarino, Egyptian fleet sunk, 1827 | |
| Count Kapodistrias | regent, 1827-1830 |
| Russian War on Turkey, 1828-1829; Peace of Adrianople, 1829, London Conference, 1830, recognition of Greek Independence | |
| Otto of Bavaria | King, 1832-1862 |
| George I of Denmark | 1863-1913 |
| Constantine I | 1913-1917, 1920-1922 |
| Alexander | 1917-1920 |
| George II | 1922-1924, 1935-1941, 1946-1947 |
| Republic, 1924-1935 | |
| Pavlos Konduriotis | President, 1924-1926, 1926-1929 |
| Theodoros Pangalos | 1926 |
| Alexandros Zaimis | 1929-1935 |
| German Occupation, 1941-1944 | |
| Paul | 1947-1964 |
| Constantine II | 1964-1973, exile 1967 |
| Military Dictatorship, 1967-1974 | |
| Giorgios Zoitakis | 1967-1972 |
| Giorgios Papadopoulos | 1972-1973, President, 1973 |
| Phaidon Gizikis | 1973-1974 |
| Republic, 1974 | |
| Michael Stasinopoulos | 1974-1975 |
| Konstantin Tsatsos | 1975-1980 |
| Konstantin Karamanlis | 1980-1985, 1990-1995 |
| Christos Sartzetakis | 1985-1990 |
| Konstantin Stephanopoulos | 1995-2005 |
| Karolos Papoulias | 2005-present |
The revolt of Greece against the Turks was one of the sensations of the 19th century, drawing partisans, 
like Lord Byron (1788-1824), from far and wide. Against the Ottomans alone, the Greeks could well have been successful, but the Sultan called in Muh.ammad 'Alî, who had modernized the Egyptian army enough that the rebellion was being suppressed. This was too much, however, for "civilized" opinion. Not only the Russians, the traditional protectors of Orthodox Christians in Turkey, but Britain and France, inspired by all that Classical Oxbridge learning, moved to help the Greeks. The British sank Muh.ammad 'Alî's fleet at Navarino in 1827. They say that the ships are still visible at the bottom of the bay, right by the island of Sphacteria, where the Athenians defeated the Spartans early in the Peloponnesian War, and just south of "Sandy Pylos," where a great Mycenaean city supplied wise Nestor to the Greek forces at Troy. A lot of history in that area.
The house of Denmark supplied most of the kings of modern Greece. The kingship itself contained an interesting ambiguity, since the Greek word basileus only meant "king" in Classical Greek. In mediaeval Greek, basileus was used by the Emperors of Romania to translate Latin imperator, i.e. "emperor." So which was it? Was the ruler of Greece merely the King of the Hellenes, or the Emperor of the Romans (Rhômaioi)? When the Greeks tried to seize a large part of western Asia Minor from the Turks in 1920, it looked like restoring the Empire was the objective. Unfortunately, Turkey remained, and remains, fundamentally stronger than Greece, and the Greek invasion only provoked the expulsion of all Greeks from the mainland -- under the formula of an "exchange," in which the much greater numbers of Christians in Turkey were "exchanged" for Muslims, not always Turkish, in Greece.
Politically, Greece has swung back and forth in the 20th century. Whether the monarchy was a good thing was often in doubt, as it was briefly abolished in the 20's and almost not reinstituted after World War II. Then the Army took over in 1967, creating a dictatorship that lasted until 1974. King Constantine II tried to organize a counter-coup against the dictatorship, but then fled the country when he failed. Eventually the dictators abolished the monarchy. When democracy was restored, after a stupid attempt to overthrow the government of Cyprus (provoking a Turkish invasion), the Greeks nevertheless seemed to think that Constantine had not been sufficiently vigorous in opposing the dictatorship, so the monarchy was not restored. Since then, Greece seems to have made a speciality of electing anti-American, socialist governments, long after that made any sense either geo-politically or economically. A good example of recent foolishness was a nationwide strike on May 17, 2001, with 10,000 protesters marching on the Parliament in Athens. Protesting what? Well, the Greek state pension system is nearly bankrupt, and the Government is considering reforms, like cutting benefits and increasing the retirement age (to 65). Even the socialist government, however, might have anticipated the offense to the (not just) Greek sense of entitlement that this would cause.
This kind of thing was all bad enough, but then 60 Minutes reported (6 January 2002) that the Greek government, and especially the dominant Socialist Party, appeared to be tolerating a radical leftist terrorist organization, "17 November," that had been responsible for bombings and murders for years. Not a single member of this organization had been arrested or even identified by the government, even though unmasked members raided a police station for weapons and could easily have been described. When members of the Greek press were threatened for reporting on the organization, and police closed the investigations even of murder cases against them, one began to wonder if a sort of leftist death squad had come into existence in Greece. This boded ill for the future of Greece, not only economically, but even as a functioning democracy. Now, however, this situation is looking up. Perhaps under pressure to straighten things out if Greece wanted to host the 2004 Olympics, the government now has arrested many members of "17 November," and the suspects have been spilling details about the membership and operations of the organization [Los Angeles Times, Wednesday, August 7, 2002, "Toppled From Their Pedestal"]. The actual popularity of the group has been damaged by the very willingness of its members to inform and cooperate in order to avoid harder sentences. Happily, the 2004 Olympics came off without incident.
Although the Greek monarchy is now gone, the Greek Royal family remains impressively connected to two of the most important centers of contemporary European royalty. The heirs of the British monarchy are now all descendants, through Prince Philip, of King George I of Greece; and all the Greek Royal Family itself is descended from both Queen Victoria and the Emperor Frederick III of Germany. Then Constantine II's sister Sophia married Juan Carlos of Spain, who was able to do in Spain what Constantine wasn't able to in Greece -- restore democracy. Now the heir of Spain, Philip (Filipe), is a descendant of Kings George, Constantine I, and Paul of Greece. One might gather from this diagram that the throne of Britain is due to pass the House of Denmark and Greece, or, more precisely, the House of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glucksburg; but on marrying Elizabeth, Prince Philip renounced his rights to the Greek throne and his connection to the Greek Royal family, taking the name of his mother's family, Battenberg/Mountbatten, so this connection is obscured. Now that royalty is more a matter of international celebrity than of political power, Greece, by blaming Constantine for a bunch of military dictators, is really missing out on its share of space in People magazine. This may seem like an absurdly trivial consideration, but Greece depends heavily on foreign tourism; and foreign tourism depends heavily on international perception and publicity. Space, free space, in People magazine means millions of dollars in business for Greece. Instead, Greeks still have these ridiculous demonstrations for socialism (not to mention the frightening terrorist activity) and nurse their historic grievance against Turkey.
A real basis for the latter concerns Cyprus. In 1974 the Greek generals tried to annex Cyprus to Greece. This provoked a Turkish invasion and the de facto partition of the Island (and, happily for Greece, the overthrow of the generals). The Turks even set up a separate Turkish Cypriot Republic, which is recognized by no one in the world but Turkey. What this all really meant was that the effort to maintain Cyprus as a bi-national Republic, since independence from Britain in 1960, had failed utterly. The obvious solution would seem to be a real partition of the island with the Greek and Turkish parts annexed, respectively, by Greece and Turkey. Since the Turks took rather more of the island than was warranted by the Turkish percentage of the population (with Turkish settlers now introduced to fill the space), Greece could expect a territorial adjustment in exchange for international recognition of Turkish separation. For some reason, however, the international community still seems to expect a restoration of the bi-national Republic. With no real pressure on Turkey, however, and no prospect of it, the bi-national Republic is certainly dead and buried, and the realistic solution is not even being addressed.
Conspicuous Americans of Greek origin in recent years have been the stunning actress Melina Kanakaredes, of the late NBC drama Providence (she now appears on other popular shows), and the comedienne, actress, writer, and producer Nia Vardalos, whose 2002 movie, My Big Fat Greek Wedding, 
was an unexpected and astonishing success, with over $200 million in domestic boxoffice. The movie good naturedly pokes fun at the father's old world paternalism and exaggerated nationalistic claims (e.g. that the Japanese word kimono is actually of Greek origin), a familiar phenomenon in Greek nationalism.
As noted above, it is now largely forgotten in Greece, and entirely outside of it, that in the Middle Ages the Greeks called themselves "Romans" (Rhômaioi), because, as it happens, they were. For many centuries Hellênes, which the Ancient Greeks had called themselves, and now the modern Greeks again, meant pagan Greeks. The history of Mediaeval Greece is thus found with that of Rome and Byzantium.
The map for 1912 gives us the situation right before the Balkan Wars. Turkish holdings in Europe still extend all the way to the Adriatic, including Albania which, although largely Moslem, has already been restless for independence.
| 4. SERBIA & YUGOSLAVIA | |
|---|---|
| George Petrovic, Kara ("Black") George | leads revolt, 1804-1813 |
| Milos Obrenovic | leads revolt, 1815-1817; Prince, 1817-1839, 1858-1860 |
| Milan I | 1839 |
| Michael | 1839-1842, 1860-1868 |
| Alexander Karadjordjevic (Karageorgevich) | 1842-1858 |
| Milan II Obrenovic | 1868-1882 |
| King, 1882-1889 | |
| Alexander I | 1889-1903, murdered |
| Peter I Karadjordjevic | 1903-1921 |
| King of Yugoslavia, 1919-1921 | |
| Alexander II | Regent, 1918-1921 |
| 1921-1934 | |
| Peter II | 1934-1945 |
| Paul | Regent, 1934-1941 |
| German & Italian Occupation, 1941-1943 | |
| German Occupation, 1943-1945 | |
| Communist takeover, 1945 | |
| Ivan Ribar | 1945-1953 |
| Josip Broz Tito | 1953-1980 |
| Presidency Rotates among Republics, I | |
| Lazar Koliševski | 1980, Macedonia |
| Cvijetin Mijatovic | 1980-1981, Bosnia- Hercegovina |
| Sergej Kraiger | 1981-1982, Slovenia |
| Petar Stambolic | 1982-1983, Serbia |
| Mika Špiljak | 1983-1984, Croatia |
| Veselin Ðuranovic | 1984-1985, Montenegro |
| Radovan Vlajkovic | 1985-1986, Vojvodina (Serbia) |
| Sinan Hasani | 1986-1987, Kosovo (Serbia) |
| Presidency Rotates among Republics, II | |
| Lazar Mojsov | 1987-1988, Macedonia |
| Raif Dizdarevic | 1988-1989, Bosnia- Hercegovina |
| Janez Drnovšek | 1989-1990, Slovenia |
| Borisav Jovic | 1990-1991, Serbia |
| Stjepan Mesic | 1991, Croatia |
| Branko Kostic | 1991-1992, Montenegro |
| Slovenia, Croatia, & Macedonia secede, 1991; Bosnia, 1992 | |
| Presidents of Republic of Yugoslavia | |
| Dobrica Cosic | 1992-1993 |
| Miloš Radulovic | acting, 1993 |
| Zoran Lilic | 1993-1997 |
| Srda Božovic | acting, 1997 |
| Srdjan Bozovic | 1997 |
| Slobodan Milosevic | 1997-2000 |
| Kosovo detached by NATO, 1999 | |
| Vojislav Kostunica | 2000-2003 |
| Union of Serbia and Montenegro | |
| Svetozar Marovic | 2003-2006 |
| Montenegro secedes, 2006 | |
Presidents of Serbia  | |
| Slobodan Milosevic | 1990-1997 |
| Milan Milutinovic | 1997-2002 |
| Boris Tadic | 2004-present |
In the shadow of the Napoleonic Wars and a Russian war with Turkey, Serbia began the Balkan independence movement against Turkey with a long revolt that led to an Ottoman grant of autonomy. The rivalry of the two leaders of the revolt, Milosh Obrenovic and "Black" George Petrovic, however, led to a century of sometimes bloodly conflict between their two families, culminating in a coup in 1903 when King Alexander I was murdered. The Congress of Vienna in 1878 granted Serbia full independence, and the status of a Kingdom followed shortly.
The Serbian dream was not just to unite all Serbian speakers remaining in Bosnia, Montenegro, Hungary, and Turkey, but all of the "Southern Slavs," including the Croatians, Slovenians, and perhaps even Bulgarians. In the aftermath of World War I, which began with the Serbian inspired assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, this dream was realized in the establishment of Yugoslavia, which contained all the Southern Slavs except for Bulgaria, which had its own fiercely separate traditions and ambitions. Macedonia, however, had been wrested from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War (1913). These benefits were substantially due to the Russians, to whom the Serbs looked as the protectors and patrons of the Orthodox Slavs. World War I formally began when Russia declared war on Austria to protect the Serbs. The flags of both Serbia and Yugoslavia are like the tricolor flag of Russia, with just a different arrangement of the stripes. The ethnic tensions between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Slovenes and Croatians (and others), however, manifested themselves both in World War II, when the Germans found willing allies in the Croatians, and with the Fall of Communism, when the growth of democracy unmasked the separatist hostilities again. Yugoslavia broke up, with bitter fighting, atrocities, and "ethnic cleansing" as the various communities and new states sought to secure territory. Although all the groups have been guilty of offenses, the consenus of international observers and investigators, not to mention the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, seems to be that the Serbs, seeking to maintain a dominant position and initially with a military advantage, are more guilty than others, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. The future remains uncertain, as NATO/UN peacekeeping forces are the only thing that seems to restrain the violence from breaking out again in Bosnia, and the status of Kosovo is open, as Serbs flee the retaliation of the Albanians, which has extended to vandalizing churches and monasteries, and the Albanians have no interest in being returned to Serbia.
| Former Yugoslav Republics |
|---|
| Slovenia |
| Croatia |
| Macedonia |
| Bosnia Herzegovina |
| Montenegro |
| Kosovo |
The Balkan Wars all but eliminated Turkey in Europe. In the First War (1912-1913), everyone attacked Turkey, which even lost Adrianople to Bulgaria. Serbia was going to annex Albania, but the Great Powers required that it become an independent state. The Serbs were not happy about that, and Bulgaria wasn't happy about its share either. So the Second War (1913) featured everyone against Bulgaria, which lost Macedonia to Serbia, Adrianople to Turkey, and some territory south of the Danube to România. Meanwhile, Italy had been at war with Turkey in 1912 and had obtained Libya and, on this map, the Dodecanese Islands.
| 5. BULGARIA | |
|---|---|
| Russo-Turkish War, 1876-1878 | |
| Alexander of Battenberg | Prince, 1879-1886 |
| Ferdinand of Saxe-Coberg-Gotha | Prince, 1887-1908 |
| King or Czar, 1908-1918 | |
| Boris III | 1918-1943 |
| Simeon II | 1943-1946 |
| Cyril | Regent, 1943-1944 |
| Communist takeover, 1946 | |
| Vasil Petrov Kolarov | 1946-1947 |
| Mintscho Naitschev | 1947-1950 |
| Georgi Damjanov | 1950-1958 |
| Dimitar Ganev | 1958-1964 |
| Georgi Traikov | 1964-1971 |
| Todor Schivkov/ Zhivkov | 1971-1989 |
| Petar Mladenov | 1989-1990 |
| Stanko Georgiev | acting, 1990 |
| Nikolay Todorov | acting, 1990 |
| Schelju Schelev/ Zhelyu Zhelev | 1990-1997 |
| Petar Stojanov | 1997-2002 |
| Georgi Parvanov | 2002-present |
Bulgaria was the last of the mediaeval Balkan states to regain complete independence from Turkey. Although usually regarded as a Kingdom, rather more was implied when King Ferdinand (a second cousin of Edward VII of England) also called himself "Tsar." He is actually supposed to have carried around the vestments (obtained from a theatrical costumer) of a Roman (/Byzantine) Emperor. This was no less than what most of the successor states wanted, but the Bulgarians came closest to the physical heart of mediaeval Romania in the First Balkan War (1912-1913) 
when they occupied Adrianople and drew near Constantinople. This advantage, however, was lost in the Second Balkan War (1913), when Bulgaria took on all the other belligerents from the First War, largely in a dispute with Serbia over Macedonia (where a dialect or near relative of Bulgarian was spoken), and was overwhelmingly defeated.
Adrianople went back to Turkey, Macedonia went to Serbia, and other territories went to Greece and Romania. Still stinging from this defeat, Bulgaria threw its lot with Germany in World War I, which cost it access to the Aegean Sea. The same stra